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ABSTRACT

Within the industrial relations literature there has been a growth in
publications that utilise the concept of 'managerial strategy'.
Many writers use the concept as a simple shorthand description of
managerial actions and decisions; other writers use it for solely
normative purposes. However, a significant nimiber of writers claim that
the concept can be used to effectively explain industrial relations activity
and arrangements, and also as a way of redressing problems inherent in
traditional theoretical approaches to industrial relations.
This thesis examines these claims and also seeks to contribute to several
debates concerning the concept of 'managerial strategy' that are raised in
the industrial relations literature.
The conclusions drawn in this thesis are primarily based on a study of
the progress of a managerial strategy developed in the NSW South West
Region of Telecom Australia, and of industrial relations problems that
emerged in the Narrandera office of the organisation. It is concluded that
the concept of 'managerial strategy' does facilitate the generation of
useful explanations of industrial relations activity, and that it does help
to redress the inadequacies of traditional approaches.
In addition to investigating the concept of managerial strategy, this thesis
briefly discusses a number of other issues. In particular, it examines the
ability of consultative management approaches to improve industrial
relations, the industrial relations of redundancy, and the dynamics of
industrial relations in rural commimities.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Hiis thesis is concerned with managerial strategy and industrial
relations. More particularly, it is about the way the concept of
'managerial strategy* has been, and can be, used in the study of
industrial relations. The examination will be based on an analysis
of the relevant industrial relations literature and an empirical
study of industrial relations activity and the progress and impact
of a management strategy within Telecom Australia.

As will be discussed, within the industrial relations literature
there has been a growth in the number of publications that
concentrate on managerial strategy. Many of these articles use
the concept in an imcritical way as a shorthand method of
describing managerial actions and decisions. Ihese approaches
rarely define the concept and do not consider, in any depth, its
theoretical implications. Rather, it appears to be assimied that its
definition is obvious and its implications improblematic. Other
articles use the concept normatively as a way of improving
organisational effectiveness and efficiency. It is argued that
managers should move awayfiromreactive approaches towards
industrial relations and adopt proactive approaches that focus on
the development of industrial relations strategies and the
incorporation of industrial relations into corporate decision
making.

Such approaches, it is implied, will improve the ability of

managers to deal with the dynamics of industrial relations over

the longer term.

However, not all writers adopt a purely descriptive or normative
approach. Many are investigating the concept in more depth and
are intent on using it as a way of explaining industrial relations
activity and arrangements. Further, they are trying to use
'managerial

strategy' to address

problems

associated

with

orthodox industrial relations approaches and the classic labour
process

statements

of writers such

as Braverman.

These

traditional approaches, it is claimed, are unable to explain
contemporary developments in industrial relations because of
inherent weaknesses in the theories themselves. Because they
concentrate

on

industrial

relations

institutions,

orthodox

approaches are seen to be too static in nature. The classic labour
process approaches, on the other hand, are thought to be too
determinist. They portray development as progressing down an
inevitable and somewhat predictable track which, it is claimed, is
not in accord with actual events. 'Managerial strategy', it is
argued, can rectify these problems by including a dynamic
element in the theories: the decisions and choices of managers.
Management actions, it is claimed, are not strictly determined by
external factors, nor the institutions within which they work. The
decisions and choices they make can have a profound effect on
industrial relations and, as a result, can be used to explain
diversity in industrial relations structures and processes.

This thesis seeks to examine these claims. That is, the primary
aim of the thesis is to enable a judgment to be made about the

efficacy of 'managerial strategy' as an explanatory concept in
Industrial relations. In doing this, it will help to determine
whether or not the concept can be successfully used to address
the inadequacies of orthodox industrial relations and labour
process theories.

The thesis also raises, addresses and attempts to contribute to
several debates about the concept of 'managerial strategy' which
are raised in the industrial relations literature. It will discuss the
way the concept has been defined, what activity it is seen as
embracing, and the conceptual problems raised. In this regard,
the thesis will investigate issues such as whether a course of
managerial action needs to be intentional, planned in detail,
coherent and implemented to be deemed a managerial strategy: if
in discussing managerial strategy management should be treated
as a homogeneous group or as composed of groups or coalitions
with sometimes conflicting perspectives and goals; and whether
the concept of 'managerial strategy' leads to excessively
voluntarist explanations of industrial relations activity. With
respect to this last issue, because the empirical research in this
thesis relates to activity in Telecom Australia, it will consider the
constraints on managerial strategy which may be associated with
the organisation's public ownership. That is, it will consider the
nature and impact of the political context within which
organisations such as Telecom operate.

Beyond

definitional issues,

relationship

between

this thesis will consider

managerial

strategies

and

the

industrial

relations. It will investigate the impact that managerial strategies
may have upon industrial relations. It will also briefly consider
the extent to which industrial relations is a consideration in the
development of managerial strategies and the ways industrial
relations may affect the strategy implementation process.
As a way of examining the concept of 'managerial strategy', the
thesis will use the concept to provide an explanation for
industrial relations problems which developed in the Narrandera
office of Telecom Australia. These problems, it is argued, relate to
broader changes in Telecom Australia and, in particular, to a
specific managerial strategy developed at the regional level of the
organisation.
Since coming to power in 1983, the Federal Labour Government
has initiated a series of reforms into government business
enterprises such as Telecom Australia. The reforms were designed
to improve the efficiency and accountability of the organisations,
and were an integral part of the Gk)vemment's micro-economic
reform agenda and its moves to overhaul Australian public sector
administration. The reforms were aimed to make management
more responsible for the performance of therr organisations and
to increase accountability to the public. They led to the creation
of new corporate structures within Telecom and eventually to the
opening up of the telecommimications industry to competition.
In responding to the reforms, Telecom management implemented
a range of initiatives aimed at improving the competitive position

of the company. In the South West Region of the Countiy
Division, management responded by formulating a strategy that
invoh^ed the amalgamation and, therefore, rationalisation of
Telecom districts. In the Riverina area of NSW this involved the
amalgamation of two long standing districts: the Wagga Wagga
district and the Narrandera district. The amalgamation strategy
was underpinned by regional management's belief that it would
enable a rationalisation of management and clerical positions;
therefore increasing efficiency and cutting costs.

It wiU be argued that the strategy led to an increase in industrial
relations problems within the Narrandera Telecom office.

During the mid to late 1980s, industrial relations within Telecom
generally was far more consensual than it was in the early 1980s.
The early 1980s were marked by a poor relationship between
Telecom management and unions. Changes, such as

the

introduction of new technology, frequently lead to significant and
protracted industrial disputes. Many of these disputes had wider
industrial relations consequences and attracted intervention from
the Ftaser Liberal Government. Since the election of the Labor
Party, the level of disputation has declined and the relationship
between Telecom management and unions has improved at both
national and local levels. This was despite a quickening in the
pace of change associated with the Government's GBE reform
agenda, broader micro-economic and labour market reforms and
the introduction of major technological innovations.

Events at the Narrandera office provide an exception to this
improving relationship between management and unions. Before
the amalgamation of the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga offices,
relations between management and employees at Narrandera
were excellent. High levels of trust existed and employees only
undertook industrial action in response to national calls from the
unions - and then only on rare occasions. However, in the period
leading up to and following the amalgamation of the Narrandera
and Wagga Wagga offices relations at Narrandera soured. Several
industrial disputes arose from within the office and employees
and managers increasingly came to view each other with
suspicion.

It

is

these

industrial

relations

problems

and

regional

management's amalgamation strategy that are the main focus of
this thesis. The objective is to establish whether the development
and implementation of the amalgamation strategy can be used to
adequately explain the Narrandera experience.

In investigating industrial relations at Narrandera, the thesis also
provides a tentative and cursory examination of the nature or
dynamics of industrial relations in rural communities. ^

^ Because it is not tbe coitral concern of the study an extensive examination of relevant literature on rural industrial
relations in rural communities has not been undertaken. In any case, literature searches revealed that the issue had not
been examined in dqjth in the industrial relations literatme. Some work has been done on industrial relations in
company towns and mining communities but no analysis of rural commtmities has taken place. As a result, all analysis
of the issue is based {Hirely on m^irical data. The issue is raised and investigated simply because it was seen to be a
potentially important factor
managerial strategy.

which may have a bearing on events at Narrandera

and. therefore, of theroleplayed by

There is a strong belief amongst Telecom managers and
employees that industrial relations within rural commimities is
less conOictual than is the case in urban areas. Rural based
employees, it is claimed, are less willing than their urban
colleagues to engage in industrial action: they rarely start
industrial disputes and frequently refuse to become involved in
national union campaigns. In this thesis the reasons put forward
for the supposed rural industrial relations harmony are
described. Factors discussed include the weak nature of the rural
labour market; the quality of rural life; and the notion that social
interaction in rural towns is more close knit.
In the concluding chapter of the thesis, a brief analysis of this
claim is made based on the Narrandera experience. The
conclusions

are tentative:

fcir more research

is

needed.

Nevertheless, it does appear that the Narrandera experience does
not support a view that industrial relations is less problematic in
the bush than it is in the city. In fact, as will be described, to
some extent the industrial action was exacerbated because it did
take place within a small rural commimity. Many rural townships
throughout Australia are in decline. Emplo5nnent prospects are
continually contracting as the size of town economies shrink and
as the population steadily dribbles away to larger rural and urban
centres. As a result, people remaining within the commimities
believe that the very existence of their towns is under threat. Any
initiatives that are likely to reduce opportunities further are,
therefore, fought against vigorously.

The Narrandera community is a prime example of this problem.
The town reached its population peak in the first half of this
century, but has been in decline ever since. By the 1980s the sole
remaining large employers were government organisations such
as Telecom. With the emergence of reform processes in the public
sector, employment in government organisations in Narrandera
has now begim to decline rapidly as well. This has led to
suspicion and negative reactions firom commimity members
towards any new initiatives aimed at reducing the operating costs
of public sector organisations. As will be described, the
amalgamation strategy was seen in this light. It was perceived to
be a real threat to the town and drew a strong negative response.
The community came out in support of the local Telecom
employees and to a fair degree pressured them to react as
strongly as possible.
Turning to the structure of the thesis, in Chapter 2 the industrial
relations literature that addresses the concept of 'managerial
strategy' is reviewed. The chapter begins with a brief examination
of why the concept has been increasingly used in discussions of
industrial relations activity. Definitional issues are examined, a
stance taken on a number of the issues and a definition of the
concept for the thesis is adopted. The discussion then
investigates the link between corporate level strategy and
industrial relations and the influence of public ownership on
managerial strategy and industrial relations. Finally, a nimiber of
the issues discussed are identified as being subjects for empirical
research in the thesis.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the history of Telecom
Australia from its vesting in 1975 until the early 1980s. Major
events during that period and the character of industrial relations
are described. The chapter also describes in detail the reform
process initiated by the Labor Government. In this respect.
Chapter 3 concentrates upon the Government's 1977 'Guidelines
for Statutory Authorities and Government Business Enterprises'
and the 1988 Statement on the Conmiunications Industry. The
information for this chapter was gathered from a range of
government publications and from the significant body of
research on public sector reform. The chapter is designed to act
as a background to developments at Narrandera. It helps to
provide an understanding of events by providing a description of
the history of Telecom and the recent extensive reform process.

The aim of Chapter 4 is to present a picture of industrial relations
generally within Telecom against which industrial relations
activity at Narrandera can be compared. The intention is not to
provide a detailed description of industrial relations throughout
the organisation, but simply to provide an impression of the
Industrial relations climate at Telecom. The period involved is
from the mid 1980s imtil late 1990. Data for this chapter was
derived from an examination of Industrial Relations Commission
decisions and from in-depth interviews of 22 Telecom managers,
supervisors and imion representatives. The interviews were
undertaken in 1990 and took place at Telecom's regional head
office at Burwood, the district ofiftce at WoUongong and the
district ofiice at Wagga Wagga. The analysis of transcripts was

aimed to provide a picture of industrial relations at the formalised
national level. The interviews were designed to develop a picture
of local or workplace level industrial relations.
The focus of the study is narrowed in Chapter 5 to an
examination of events in the Riverina region of Telecom where the
Narrandera office is located. The chapter describes the progress of
regional management's strategy to amalgamate the Narrandera
and Wagga Wagga districts and also examines the effect this
strategy had upon industrial relations within the Narrandera
office. In this regard, the chapter enables a further examination of
local level industrial relations. More importantly, it facilitates an
analysis of the concept of 'managerial strategy' in Chapter 6.
Data for Chapter 5 was partly drawn from the local Narrandera
newspaper, and Telecom annual reports. Most of the data was
drawn from a series of in-depth interviews conducted in late 1990
and early 1991. The interviews were of 25 managers, supervisors,
clerical staff and union delegates at Telecom's Burwood, Wagga
Wagga and Narrandera offices. The interviews were designed to
provide a clear picture of events within the Riverina region, and
the Narrandera office in particular.
In Chapter 6 the empirical data discussed in Chapter 5 is
examined from the perspective offered by the concept of
'managerial strategy' as it is defined in Chapter 2. The objective of
this chapter is threefold. First, it provides an explanation of the
events

and

developments

at Narrandera which were

a

consequence of the amalgamation strategy. Second, it provides
insights into the concept of 'managerial strategy'. In this respect,
it addresses some of the debates discussed in Chapter 2 and also
raises several other issues which shed further light on the
concept of 'managerial strategy' and its use as an explanation of
industrial relations activity. Leading on from one and two, the
chapter enables an overall judgment to be made about the power
of 'managerial strategy' as a concept which can be used to explain
industrial relations. While it is not seen as totally adequate, it is
argued that an examination of events using 'managerial strategy'
as an explanatory concept does facilitate understanding and the
generation of useful explanations.
In the final chapter a judgment is made about the ability of the
concept of 'managerial strategy' to address the inadequacies of
orthodox industrial relations and labour process theories. It is
argued that the efficacy of both theories is improved substantially
by including the concept because it provides for 'choice' as a
dynamic element in the theories. However, it is argued that both
labour process and orthodox Industrial relations theory could be
improved further- by investigating not only the strategies of
managers, but also the strategies of other groups involved in the
industrial relationship. The chapter and thesis is concluded with
a brief discussion of a number of other issues which it is felt
require further investigation. In particular, the ability of
consultative management strategies to improve industrial
relations and aid the implementation of change in organisations;
the industrial relations of redundancy; and the dynamics of

industrial relations in rural communities.

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW: MANAGERIAL STRATEGY AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

As Stated In the introduction, in this chapter the managerial
strategy and industrial relations literature will be examined. The
review will investigate theoretical issues claimed by writers to be
important to any study of the interrelationship between
managerial strategy and industrial relations. A specific objective
of the chapter is to highlight issues that will be examined
empirically as part of the study of managerial strategy and
industrial relations in Telecom Australia-Riverina.

MANAGERIAL STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

In the last decade a body of literature has developed that
considers the role of managerial strategies in industrial relations.
Broadly this literature can be argued to have developed from two
fields: orthodox industrial relations approaches^ and labour
process theory (Bray and Taylor 1986).

In the orthodox literature the development appears to be related
to dramatic economic changes faced in modem market based
economies over the last two decades. Writers point out (eg.
Kochan, Mckersie, and CappeUi 1984, Kinnie, 1985, Cappelli,
McKersie, 1987, Bramble 1989) that in recent decades significant
economic downturns coupled with an intensification of market
9

. •
This literature is gmerally undeipinned

concerned with the institutions of industrial relations.

pluralist assumptions and has been primarily

competition have taken place in many advanced economies. The
changed

economic

conditions,

it is inferred, have

led

to

reductions in trade union membership, and increased proactivity
and initiative on the part of management in industrial relations.
These changes, especially the increased role of management,
appear to have prompted researchers to take a much greater
interest in the activities of management in industrial relations. As
a result, in recent years an increasing body of research has
focused on the role of management in industrial relations (eg..
Bray and Taylor 1986, Gospel and Uttler 1983, Knights and
Willmott 1986). The growing concentration on managerial strategy
reflects this increase in interest (Whitaker 1986).

Further, in the light of the economic and industrial relations
changes,

it has

been increasingly argued

that traditional

approaches to industrial relations no longer provide adequate
explanations of industrial relations activity (eg. Kochan, McKersie,
and Cappelli 1984, Gospel 1983, and Seglow 1983). It is argued
that the concern with institutions in the traditional systems and
pluralist based literature promotes a static approach that cannot
adequately

explain

significant

changes

and

developments.

'Managerial strategy' is now claimed as a concept that can redress
this inadequacy because it embraces processes that are dynamic
and variable. It is, as a result, being used by some writers (eg.
Kochan et al.) as a way of adjusting the traditional approaches so
that they ofiFer more powerful explanations of current industrial
relations developments.

Finally, at a more normative level, increasing emphasis is being
placed on managerial strategy by writers who, it appears, wish to
persuade practising managers to take a more strategic approach
to industrial relations as a way of coping with recent economic
and industrial relations changes. These writers stress the,
generally, reactive nature of industrial relations management and
the extent to which industrial relations is divorced from broader
corporate considerations (Miller, 1987; Purcell, 1983).
In the labour process literature the increased interest appears to
be related to an inability on the part of classic statements of
labour process theory (eg. those of Braverman, 1974; Edwards,
1979; and Friedman, 1977) to describe or explain adequately the
diverse ways in which the labour process in modem capitalist
enterprises has varied over time. Contemporary writers (eg.,
Uttier and Salaman 1982, Storey 1985, Knights and Willmott
1990) argue that the classic statements tend to identify inevitable
trends, stages or limited alternative control strategies as almost
immutable characteristics of capitalist development. However,
they claim that the highly diverse developments in modem
capitalist organisations undermine determinist conclusions. It
now tends to be argued that the reality of modem work
organisation implies that no general conclusion can be made
concerning the direction of change or stmcture of the labour
process.
Thus, it is claimed that Braverman's apparent emphasis upon an
inevitable trend towards the degradation of work is far too one

directional. Writers have provided empirical evidence to show that
management has at various times upgraded work as means of
gaining control. In a similar way, Edwards' identification of
discrete stages in the development of the capitalist labour process
has been shown to over-simplify the complexity of labour process
development.

Further,

Friedman's

classification

of

control

strategies into either "Direct Control" or "Responsible Autonomy"
typologies is claimed to be, on the basis of empirical evidence, far
too restrictive (Littler and Salaman 1982, Storey 1985, Knights
and Willmott 1990).

As a response to these problems, many contemporary writers
have started to investigate the role of management in structuring
the labour process. In doing so, some now identify managerial
strategies as possible explanations for this diversity and are using
the concept in their argimients. They claim that the way the
labour process is structured in a particular organisation can be
explained, at least partially, by the strategies adopted by
managers (Morgan and Hooper, 1987). As Littler (1990 p50)
states:

If there is no iron law that determines the nature of the labour
process, then perhaps it is possible to understand events and
processes in terms of a range of managerial strategies.

In addition to the above, in both the orthodox and labour process
literature an underlying reason for the development of the
concept of 'managerial strategy' is that it embraces the idea of
'choice*. That is, in adopting the notion of 'managerial strategy',
labour process and orthodox writers imply that management has
an ability to choose a particular course of action. In other words,
the idea that environmental factors directly determine industrial
relations action and outcomes is rejected. Managers are given a
vital role in choosing strategies to deal with environmental
change. It is the idea that managers have a role to play in
choosing possible strategies of action that is being used to explain
diversity and change in modem capitalist organisations. In the
labour process literature it is this ability to choose that is
portrayed as the reason why the capitalist labour processes can
vary (eg.. Littler 1990, Friedman 1990). In the orthodox literature
writers portray 'choice' as the needed dynamic element missing in
systems and institutional approaches (eg., Kochan et al. 1984).

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

A significant number of writers using the concept of 'managerial
strategy' have done so in a highly unproblematic way. Many do
not clearly define what they mean by 'managerial strategy', nor do
they explicitly discuss the theoretical implications associated with
the concept. It appears to be assumed that the meanings and
implications are clear in the terms and can be treated in a largely
commonsensical way.

Other writers appear to be waiy of commonsense assumptions
and endeavour to provide a clear impression of the meaning and
implications of the concept.
In this regard, the orthodox writers tend to portray 'managerial
strategy' as concerned with medium to long term plans and
policies developed and initiated by corporate management. The
impression given is that managerial strategies are directed toward
the attainment of specified corporate, business or industrial
relations objectives that are related to corporate viability or profit
(Thurley and Wood 1983).
The labour process literature generally appears to portray
•managerial strategy' as embracing those techniques, methods,
and approaches, used by management to control the activities of
employees involved in the production of goods and services
(Armstrong 1986). In Marxist terms, labour process theorists
identify the objective of managerial strategies as being
ftmdamentally concerned with the conversion of labour power
(the capacity to work) into labour (effort actually expended) in
ways that ensure capital accumulation or surplus (Lazonick
1990).
A significant number of writers have attempted to go beyond
general definitions, and have attempted to clarify more explicitly

what the concept of 'managerial strategy' embraces and implies

(eg., Thurley and Wood 1983, Uttler 1990, Child 1985). In doing
so, they have raised a number of problematic issues.

PLANNING, INTENTION, AND COHERENCE

In both labour process and orthodox approaches the question of
whether or not the concept of 'managerial strategy' must imply
conscious planning, intention, and coherence on the part of
management is frequently raised.

Writers who seek to persuade practitioners to adopt a more
strategic stance, or who are intent on exposing the reactive
nature of industrial relations management, claim, unsurprisingly,
that managerial strategy must involve planning, intentionality,
and coherence. This is the case because it is a perceived lack of
planning, intention and coherence in management which they are
trying to address (eg.. Marsh and Gillies 1983, Purcell 1983,
MiUer 1987).

Some writers who are more concerned with the theoretical utility
of the concept have also claimed that the term implies planning,
intention and coherence. Rose and Jones (1985, p87), for
example, claim that the use by labour process theorists of the
notion of 'managerial strategy' to explain managerial activity
ignores the extent to which:

managerial approaches to the change of ux)rk processes and
industrial relations lack the characteristic of a detailed plan of

campaign implied by the term 'strategy'.
As a result. Rose and Jones appear to oppose the use of
'managerial strategy* as an explanatory variable (Thompson
1990).
Many writers do not take such a hard line. For example. Child
(1985) rejects Rose and Jones's claim by arguing that it is far too
restrictive. For Child (1985, pi 10) the notion of 'managerial
strategy need not imply strict coherence, it need only:
reflect a consciousness of certain general objectives which are the
normal conditions for organisational surutuaL
Craig Littler (1990, p51) makes a similar point when he claims
that:
Choices have to be made within a set of constraints and tf these
choices foR within a certain pattern, we are entitled to talk about
'managerial strategy'.
Child and Littler were writing from a labour process perspective,
but a nimiber of orthodox writers also reject a rigid approach. For
example, Kochan et al. (1984, p22) argue that 'strategy':
may appear only indirectly, and may not even be the result of a
consciously articulated and preconceived plan.

Further, Thurley and Wood (1983, pl97) avoid an excessively
rigid definition by talking about strategy in terms of:

a consistent approach over time which is intended to yield results
in the medium and long termfor a specific problem.

IMPLEMENTATION

A number of writers are critical of the assumption in some
treatments that strategy intentions and outcomes can be
collapsed (eg., Thurley and Wood 1983). In particular, writers are
critical of the inference that successful implementation can be
assumed when discussing the intentions of managerial strategy
or that outcomes automatically reflect managerial intentions. In
other words, the claim is that an improblematic link between
implementation and management intentions cannot be taken for
granted. Writers stress factors such as worker resistance,
informal practices, and managerial rivalry, as being potential
barriers between the intentions of managerial strategy and
successful implementation (eg., Batstone, Femer and Terry 1984).

For some, the problems of strategy intention and implementation
raise questions about the usefulness of the concept of 'managerial
strategy*. For example, Thurley and Wood (1983) ask whether the
fact that many strategies are not implemented without negotiated
modifications means that only deals, not strategies, exist. In a
similar vein. Rose and Jones (1985) appear to use this problem as

another reason to reject 'managerial strategy' as an explanatory
concept.
Other writers while acknowledging the problem reject it as a
reason to claim that managerial strategies don't exist. For
example, Storey (1985, p203) argues that it is unlikely that:

a coherent nujlti-faceted strategy wiR be implemented
unproblemoticaRy, But dtffictilties of tnnplementation seem a
peculiar reasonfor denying the existence of strategy.
DIVISIONS IN MANAGEBIENT

Another issue raised by the definitional ambiguity of the term
'managerial strategy' concerns the extent to which it is possible to
talk about management as a coherent group. A significant
number of writers point out that management does not
necessarily act in a unified manner (eg., Armstrong 1986,
Teulings 1986, Child 1985). Management, it is claimed, may be
firactured in a number of ways and different management groups
may have different objectives that may, in varying degrees,
conflict. In this regard, writers identify cleavages between senior
and Junior management, line and staff management (Brewster &
Richbell 1983), between different professional groups in
management (Armstrong 1986), corporate and branch level
management (Edwards 1987), and between different managerial
functions in organisations (Hopper et al. 1986).

Managerial conflicts are one important explanation for problems
in the planning, coherence, and implementation of managerial
strategy. Further,

such

conflict questions the

efiBcacy of

discussing "a" managerial strategy towards industrial relations.
For a few writers, such as Rose and Jones, managerial factions
imdoubtedly add support to their argument that the concept is
far too problematic. However, it appears that most writers think
that despite divisions in management the concept is still useful
(e.g. Child, 1985).

The above issues emphasise the danger involved in using the
notion of 'managerial strategy' in a simplistic way. The dangers
are all the more important given that managerial actions will
often face resistance from unions and the workforce. That is, the
coherence, etc., of a strategy and its potential to be implemented
wiU be significantiy affected by the way unions and workers react
(eg.. Child 1985, Batstone et al. 1984, Femer 1985).

The responses by writers to these issues vary. For example. Rose
and Jones seek to jettison the notion of management strategy.
Buchanan (1986) appears to concur by suggesting that, perhaps,
managerial choice does not exist.

O n the other hand, Littier (1990) implies that regardless of
coherence, etc. 'managerial strategy' is a valid notion because it
provides a useful approach to modelling processes within
organisations.

Other writers (eg., Batstone et al. 1984, Child 1985, Friedman
1990) seek to get round the issue by claiming that despite the
problems of incoherence and division, etc. management does, to a
significant degree, formulate and successfully implement
strategies. For example, Batstone, et al. (1984) argue that
managerial strategy will, at some stage or level, be planned,
intentional, coherent, and implemented. They acknowledge that
there are many factors related to the "complexities of situations"
which may imdermine strategies. Nevertheless, they argue that:

The dijgiculties in pinning down strategies are not sufficient
grounds, .. for adopting the opposite course: of seeing aR
management action as blind 'muddling'through' without any
coherence. Evidence abounds to suggest that management is to a
high degree 'proactive', rather than reactive, constantly making
planned conscious choices and carrying them through. (p5)
For writers such as Batstone, et al. the problem is not so much
whether or not intentionalily and division, etc. exist but how
strategies can be identified. They claim that the solution to this
problem is not to reject the concept of 'managerial strategy' but to
engage in detailed research (Batstone et al. 1984).
Further, it is inferred by a significant number of writers that the
concept of management strategy has validity because
management decisions take place within a context that tends to
shape the choices managers can make (eg. Littler 1990,

Thompson 1990, Child 1985, Kochan et al. 1984). That is, it is
argued that the problems of incoherence, division, and resistance
are constrained within boimds by contextual factors that
influence the direction of choice and aid the implementation of
managerial strategy. In this regard, writers identify a variety of
different factors. For example. Labour Process writers tend to
highlight the imperatives of capitalism, for instance the need for
accumulation, that are seen to influence strategy through factors
such as properly rights (Morgan and Hooper 1987), financial
controls (Hopper et al. 1986), the techniques of dominant
professional groups (Armstrong 1986), and broader influences
such as the state of product and labour markets (Child 1985).
Orthodox approaches, while rarely talking in terms of the
"imperatives of capitalism", also claim that choice is constrained
by factors such as the nature of product and labour markets as
well as political, social, technological, and organisational
conditions (eg., Thurley and Wood 1985, Batstone et al. 1984).
In making this claim, writers acknowledge that whfle
environmental factors don't directly determine industrial relations
activity, they are far from irrelevant. To identify managers as
always being able to choose, plan, and implement coherently any
strategy they thought relevant would be to adopt a degree of
volimtarism that all writers on managerial strategy and industrial
relations appear to eschew. As Hiurley and Wood (1983 p2) state:

The study of strategy wiR be of little concern to those who see
economic laws as sovereign, deterniinirig the cowse of

organisationcd life in such a way that management has no choice,
so that both its ol^ectvues and the best way of pwsuing them are
given: managers

cannot, and, hence, do not, have the kind of

autonomy which the term strategy conveys. The idea of strategy,
however, does seem to imply an external force or forces which one
must anticipate and try to come to terms with; strategic thinking
arises from the need to cope with such pressures, not because they
can be ignored. Lack of autonomy and strategic thinking are not
then mjutuaJlly exclusive. To argue otherwise is to make a very
common mistake of associating choice with freedom, and treating
its opposite as determinism.

As a starting point for this thesis, and taking into account the
above issues, 'managerial strategy' is defined here as

any

intentional course of action undertaken by any managerial
group that is aimed at achieving certain preconceived goal/s.
In adopting this definition, the following positions on the issues
discussed above are tentatively adopted.
First, the most important criteria defining a managerial strategy
is intentionality. That is, a particular course of action can only be
portrayed a s a managerial strategy if there was an intention on
the part of a manager or managers to achieve some preconceived
goal. If a given action is not preceded by such an intention, it
cannot be characterised a s part of a managerial strategy.

The notion of intentionality is important because, as mentioned
earlier, the concept of 'managerial strategy' introduces 'choice'
into explanations of industrial relations.
Following on from this, to give the notion of 'choice' validity,
intentionality on the part of management must be accepted. If
managers do not, at least at some stage, intend certain things to
happen, then it is not really appropriate to argue that they can
make choices. In such a situation, it may be more valid to argue
that their actions are directly determined by environmental
factors.
Second, highlighting the importance of intentionality does in no
way imply that managerial strategies need be planned in detail
and coherent. Managerial strategies may be hurriedly or loosely
conceived, and they may not be particularly coherent. To argue
that the concept of 'managerial strategy' can only embrace
carefully planned and coherent management actions would seem
to be a far too rigorous requirement. Careful planning may be an
often striven for ideal but it is at least intuitively obvious that very
little himian activity makes that grade. To insist that 'managerial
strategy' must embrace such an ideal would surely reduce the
concept to a mere empirical curiosity. Further, what constitutes
coherence is highly dependent on an observer's or actor's point of
view. What is coherent to one person is likely to be an irrational
mish mash to someone else. In other words, coherence tends to
be a highly subjective phenomenon.

Third, the definition should in no way be seen as implying that
managerial actions need to be fully implemented in order to
qualify for the titie of 'managerial strategy'. As Storey infers, to
deny a given course of managerial action the title of 'strategy'
because it was not successfully implemented is a rather limiting
criterion. As stated above, the important criterion is not
implementation but intention. A course of managerial actions is a
strategy tf at its outset it was intended to achieve a preconceived
goal. Whether or not it will be fully implemented in the manner
intended, and whether or not all actions go as planned, will be
highly dependent upon a variety of factors best summarised by
Batstone et al.'s., 'complexities of the situation'. In taking this
stance, it is accepted that managerial strategies and outcomes
cannot be automatically linked, but this does not mean that the
concept has no utility.
Fourth, 'managerial groups' are included in the above definition
because it is accepted that treating management as a
homogeneous group ignores the ways in which management is
firactured. 'Managerial strategy' refers to the strategies of a
particular individual or group of managers. Different management
groups may have different strategies which may be intended to
achieve different outcomes and, thus, possibly result in conflict
within management. While this factionalism is important, it
should not be seen as a reason to reject the concept of
'managerial strategy'. It may be problematic to discuss an all
embraciag organisation wide managerial strategy, but it is argued
here that the concept can be applied to particular management

groups.

Fifth, the problem with adopting highly flexible criteria is that the
concept of 'managerial strategy' may end up embracing too much.
In other words, given the above criteria it is, perhaps, fair to ask
whether or not there is any sort of management activity which
cannot be labelled a 'management strategy'. The definition
adopted in this thesis is intended to address this problem by
limiting the concept of 'managerial strategy' to a course of
managerial actions aimed at achieving certain preconceived goals.
That is, a one off management decision does not constitute a
managerial strategy. A management strategy involves a series of
decisions or choices all aimed at the same preconceived goal.

Finally, though not clearly spelled out in the definition, it is
accepted here that the degree of incoherence and irrationality, the
problems facing implementation, and the extent of managerial
factionalism are constrained

by

external factors. That

is,

managerial strategies are seen to be constrained by a potentially
large variety of external factors such as the imperatives of
capitalism, the profit motive, etc. While it is accepted that the
concept of 'managerial strategy' provides for choice and, hence,
avoids extreme determinism, it is also accepted that constraints
exist. Managers are not completely firee agents. Determinism is to
be avoided but so is extreme volimtarism.

On this point, the success of attempts in the literature to achieve
a balance between determinism and voluntarism is questionable.

The acceptance in the literature of the constraining role of the
environment probably reflects a need in most industrial relations
writers to avoid reducing explanations of strategy to purely
psychological or subjective factors. However, in seeking to avoid
excessively voluntarist explanations of managerial strategy,
writers have ignored the extent to which managers can affect the
environment. In other words, in most of the literature the strong
impression is given that the direction of influence between the
environment and organisations is only one way. Yet, as has been
argued by a significant nimiber of organisational theory writers,
managers and their strategies can and do influence the
environment (Clegg and Dimkerley 1987). This can be understood
in two ways. First, it has been argued that management can, to
an extent, select the environment within which they must operate
by, for example, making choices about entry into new product
markets. Second, where they have the power, managers may be
able to manipulate their envirormient by, for example, lobbying
governments or threatening to withdraw capital (Child 1972).
It would be incorrect to argue that all the literature on managerial
strategy

and

industrial

relations

ignores

the

impact

of

management strategy on environmental factors. For example, the
discussion of circuits of capital (Morgan and Hooper 1987), and
dialectical analysis and totality (Storey 1985, Bray 1986) in some
labour process writing implies a two way interaction. Further,
Batstone et al. (1984) fleetingly acknowledge it in their treatment
of the telecommunications industry in Britain. However, most of
the literature does not appear to consider the issue. This is

unfortunate for it is, at least, intuitively obvious that coq)orate
management's ability to influence environmental factors can have
implications for industrial relations.
CORPORIATE STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Moving away from definitional problems, a frequently addressed
area in the literature concerns the relationship between corporate
level strategies and industrial relations. In both orthodox and
labour process approaches the extent of interaction between
corporate strategy and industrial relations activity has been
identified as an important research topic (Thurley and Wood
1983, Uttler 1990).
In this regard, there appears to be agreement amongst orthodox
writers that corporate strategies can significantly influence
industrial relations in organisations. For example, Purcell and
Ahlstrand (1989) argue that corporate strategies can influence
industrial relations through the determination of management
style, personnel resources, collective bargaining levels, and
financial control systems.
There appears to be less agreement about the extent to which
industrial relations issues effect corporate strategies. Purcell and
Ahlstand (1989) cite nimierous studies of organisations in
Western Europe, the United States, and England where it is was
foimd that the influence of personnel and employee relations
issues upon corporate strategy formulation was low. They argue

that their own research supports this conclusion, though there is
strong evidence to suggest that industrial relations issues are
taken into account at the implementation stage of corporate
strategy considerations.
Other writers appear to argue that, while other issues may be
equally or more important, industrial relations issues are
considered in the formulation of management strategy. In this
regard. Kochan, et al. (1984) and Seglow, (1983) and Thurley and
Wood (1983) argue that industrial relations and corporate
strategies are interdependent or interactive.
Another perspective is given by Batstone, et al. (1984, p284) who
argue that even if corporate policies and strategies don't explicitly
address industrial relations issues they:
are likely to cany built in asswnptions about labour relations, and
decisions on such strategic issues as pricing,

marketing,

investment, product range, technology and so on may imply, or
amount to, labour strategies.
Labour process writers address the relationship between
corporate policy and industrial relations from a somewhat
different angle. Early treatments of the labour process tended to
identify the control of labour at the point of production as the
central method of generating surplus value or profits (Littier and
Salaman 1982). By implication this meant that industrial
relations must be a vital corporate management concern.

However, this emphasis upon the labour process has been heavily
criticised in recent years (in addition to Littler and Salaman see,
for example, Morgan and Hooper, 1987).
It is claimed that profits can be generated awayfiromthe arena of
production in areas such as commodity and currency speculation
as well as asset stripping and credit manipulation (Littler and
Salaman 1982). Further, it has been argued that realization of
surplus value is equally, if not more, important than its
production. As Littler and Salaman (1982, p257) state:
Su/pius vahte has to be produced bub also realized in the market
What this implies is that the realization of surplus value (ie.,
finding markets, selling in those markets, and making a profit) may
be more crucial than the production of surplus value for certain
firms, certain industries or during certain periods.
Contemporary labour process writers appear to have accepted
this criticism but have reacted to it in various ways. For example,
Friedman (1990) acknowledges that strategies towards product
markets, etc. are important and can have a significant impact
upon the labour process. However, he argues that labour process
theory emphasises strategies of control over labour because the
main objective of the approach is to explain industrial relations
and work organisation. Further, he makes the point that labour
control strategies will undoubtedly constrain and influence the
outcomes of managerial strategies directed at marketing, finance,

etc.

Thompson (1990) also claims that managerial strategies may be
formulated with little explicit consideration of labour in mind. Yet,
in terms similar to Batstone et al. (1984) above, he argues that
there are often taken for granted cissumptions about labour and
the role of managers built into these strategies.
Other labour process writers, such as Morgan and Hooper (1987),
argue that managerial strategies directed at the labour process
must be portrayed as part of a wider context. They claim, that
capitalism can be broken into three "circuits" of capital:
industrial,

commercial,

and

banking.

It is

argued

that

management's strategies toward labour are directed at the
industrial circuits, but other strategies may relate to either the
banking or commercial circuits. All circuits are seen to
interrelate, and none is portrayed as fundamentally more
important than another. Finally, though not exhaustively. Littler
(1990) argues that the centrality of the labour process is variable.
He implies that under certain circimistances labour strategies will
be primary, but imder others they will not. Littler discuses a
range of factors that will influence the primacy of the labour
process such as technology, the state of the labour market,
competition, industrial conflict, and comparative efftciency.

The argument put forward by writers such as Batstone et al.
(1984) and Thompson (1990) is intuitively appealing. It does seem
at least logical to expect, especially in Australia, that explicit or
not all corporate strategies will include assimiptions about the

nature of labour and industrial relations. In nations where labour
problems have a high profile and where there is a well-organised
labour movement, it is perhaps possible to expect that managerial
strategies will include labour as a consideration. In countries
where the labour movement is not strong, for example. South
East Asian nations, it is perhaps possible to expect that labour
will not be explicitly considered. However, the very absence of a
well-organised

labour

movement

undoubtedly

affects the

assimiptions that underpin strategies in those nations. In fact, it
could be argued that some South East Asian coimtries are
targeted as production sites by organisations because the labour
movement is undeveloped or weak.
Despite the above highly tentative assertions it is clear that the
strength of the interrelationship between management strategy
and industrial relations cannot be determined without empirical
investigation. In this regard, it is dangerous to make any solid
theoretical generalisations. Therefore it is, perhaps, safest to
argue that Uttler's (1990) 'it all depends' approach is the most
valid.

PUBLIC

OWNERSHIP

MANAGERIAL

STRATEGY

AND

INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS.

Telecom Australia is. at present, a publicly owned corporation.
Given this, it would seem important to investigate the treatment
given in the literature to the impact that public ownership has

upon the relationship between managerial strategy and industrial
relations.

While this issue has not been widely researched, it has been
investigated in detail by a small nimiber of writers (Batstone et al.
1984, Femer 1985,

Macdonald 1986, Cousins 1986). In this

regard, perhaps the most detailed treatment was imdertaken by
Batstone et al. (1984) who investigated managerial strategy and
industrial

relations

in the

postal

and

telecommimications

industry in the United Kingdom. An important strand of Batstone
et al.'s study was concerned with the impact that public
ownership has upon the relationship between managerial strategy
and industrial relations.

Batstone et al. (1984) point out that both the orthodox and labour
process approaches have tended to underplay the significance of
public ownership. However, public ownership, Batstone et al.
argue, does have an important impact upon managerial strategy
and industrial relations. In brief, they claim that in publicly
owned

organisations

political

pressures

imposed

by

the

government, rather than the pursuit of profit, drives managerial
strategy. These politically influenced strategies, they claim, wiU
shape

the

character

of industrial

relations within

public

organisations. This means the pursuit of profit or the imperatives
of capitalism will not necessarily be a dominant influence upon
strategy and industrial relations in public owned organisations.
Rather, broader political and social goals, as defined by the
government of the day, may be dominant. Batstone et al. point

out that these 'political contingencies' may at various times
impose on public sector management pressures very similar to,
and just as strong as, those in the private arena. For example,
they point out that imder the pressure of government,
management strategy in public sector organisations may be
strongly directed towards the reduction of labour costs,
improvements in efficiency and the containment of unions.
However, at other times the 'political contingency' may direct
strategy away from a concern with cost reduction and efficiency
and more towards other goals such as employment creation or
industrial democracy. Thus, in summary Batstone et al. argue
that public ownership is an important factor because it provides a
situation where political intervention into the link between
managerial strategy and industrial relations is an ever present
element.
Femer (1985) investigated the impact of public ownership on
managerial strategy and industrial relations in British Rail. His
findings are in accord with Batstone et al. in that he claims:
„that nationalised industries face political contingencies that alter
the calculus according to which management strategy is
formulate±„.However, tt is not enough to see political constraints
as a 'static', constant element in the strategy formulation process.
The fact ofpolitical intervention may be a constantfor public sector
management, but its form and content are subject to change and
development. (p67)

While Batstone et al. and Femer acknowledge labour process
theory, their work can best be classified as contributions to the
orthodox approach. Macdonald (1986) and Cousins (1986), on the
other hand, address the issue of public ownership and its effect
upon managerial strategy and industrial relations from a clearly
labour process perspective.

Macdonald (1986) argues that while labour process theory is
"explicitly concerned" with management in the private sector it is
also applicable to the public sector because:

..the JundameritoZ monofiferial problem of the conversion of labour
power into labour in the face of endemic and resilient workforce
resistance stiR remains for most employing organisations. Even in
those public sector organisations for which the profit motive is
totaRy irrelevant, the problem persists for management to ensure
that sufficient labour effort is forthcoming to enable the
organisation to satisfy its political superiors (p49).

As the above quote suggests, Macdonald does not claim that there
is no difference between the public and private sector. As with
Batstone, et al. and Femer, he suggests that objectives in the
public sector are set by the political system rather than the profit
motive. However, Macdonald does not draw the distinction as
sharply as Batstone et al. and Femer. He argues that there are
"more similarities between government and non-govemment
employment than is often recognised." (Macdonald 1986, p49)

Cousins (1986) argues that while the labour process in the
private and public sectors are similar, a different 'criterion of
rationality' exists in each. Drawing on the work of writers such as
O'Conner (1973), Habermas (1976), and Offe (1976), Cousins
argues that management action in the private sector is governed
by a capitalist rationality (ie. profit maximisation). However, in
the public sector, despite the post war emphasis upon cost
efficiency and productivity, non-market criteria such as political,
interest group, and budgetary demands govern managerial
activity.
A common theme in the above articles relates to the direction that
the political imperative or demands have taken in recent decades.
In all the public sector organisations studied it was found that
management have been put under pressure from government to
adopt a more "commercial" approach to operations. That is, the
organisations were forced to adopt more market based strategies
than had previously existed. Cost reduction and efficiency, rather
than public service and equity, became the dominant objective.

This

new

approach

the

writers

argue

had

significant

consequences upon managerial strategies towards industrial
relations. In general terms, it appears to be argued that
commercialism has been associated with far more aggressive, uncompromising approaches to industrial relations. For example,
according

to

Batstone

et

al.

(1984)

the

British

telecommunications industry had been dominated by a "sharing
of

control"

through

agreements,

joint

negotiation,

and

consultation with the unions. However, with the push towards
commercialism the old consensus was rejected. Notions of
fairness, and mutual trust were replaced by competition, ability
to pay, individual merit and direct communication between
management and employees (Batstone, et al. 1984, pl61).
There are a number of explanations put forward for the link
between increasing commercialism and aggressive managerial
strategies towards industrial relations. Some writers appear to
infer an almost technical link between commercialism and
aggressive strategies (Pendleton 1988). That is, it is inferred that
in order to reduce costs and increase efficiency management has
no option but to adopt a more aggressive stance towards
industrial relations and unions. Other writers, such as Femer
(1985), seem to argue that the aggressive stance is forced upon
management by government as part of the overall commercial
philosophy. That is, governments pushing for a more commercial
approach tend also to be hostile towards unions.
The contention that managerial strategy and industrial relations
has a different character in the public sector because of the
political decisions of governments makes intuitive sense. Further,
the empirical data collected by the above writers appears to add
considerable support to the argimient. All the writers portray the
political decisions of governments as a contextual factor or
contingency which can influence the direction and character of
managerial strategy and industrial relations in the public sector.
However, in making this claim there is an obvious risk that

writers may go too far and portray the political contingency in an
excessively determinist light. It is important to remember that the
notion of 'managerial strategy' implies that managers can choose
the ways in which they react to government directions.
In this regard, Batstone et al. (1984) and Femer (1985) appear to
avoid overplaying the role of the political contingency. Choice is
highlighted in the argimients of Batstone et al. and Femer. In
addition, Femer explicitly raises as a danger the issue of giving
the political contingency too much influence when he states in
the conclusion to his article:

A further point is that it is necessary to avoid deterministic
explanations of management strategy„..The constraining effect of
external factors does not rule out managerial choice of strategy.
(p67)

Macdonald (1986) and Cousins (1986) are not so forthright about
the role of choice. They seem to be more determinist in their
articles. They appear to imply that the movement towards
commercialism is almost an inevitable development within
capitalism.

CONCLUSION

This review has considered a number of issues that have been
identified in the literature as important to any consideration of
the role of managerial strategy in industrial relations. The
positions taken by the various writers in the field have been
discussed, tentatively assessed and a stance on most of the
issues has been put forward.

Theoretical argument can only go so far, conclusions about many
of the issues can only be made by undertaking detailed empirical
investigation. In the following chapters of this thesis many of the
above

issues

will

be

empirically

examined

through

an

investigation of managerial strategy and industrial relations in
Telecom Australia- Riverina Region. In particular, as stated in the
previous chapter, the thesis will concentrate upon the impacts of
a managerial decision to restructure operations within the
Telecom- Riverina Region and more specifically the consequences
of the strategy in the Narrandera Telecom office. In examining the
restructuring strategy, the thesis will be primarily concerned with
examining the efficacy of the concept of 'managerial strategy' as a
way of explaining industrial relations activity. Nevertheless, in
doing this it will also seek to shed light on the foUowing issues:
managerial factionalism; the contextual factors that affect the
course of managerial strategy; the ways in which management
strategies

affect industrial

relations;

the extent to which

industrial relations is considered in strategy

formulation^;

the

^ In this respect, this thesis will not explicitly address the extent to which corporate level strategy formulation takes into
account industrial relations issues. Rather, it examines the importance of industrial relations issues in the foraiulation of
a Telecom regional level management strategv that took place in response to pressures to increase efficiencv and

impact of industrial relations on the progress of strategy
implementation; the role of the political contingency; and the
impact of pressures to commercialise public sector organisations.

productivity imposed by corporate and divisional management

CHAPTER 3 - HISTORY OF TELECOM AND DESCRIPTION OF RECENT
REFORMS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a selective summaiy of the histoiy of
Telecom Australia since the organisation was established in 1975.
The aim of the chapter is to provide a background to the events
that have occurred in the Riverina region of Telecom over the past
3 years. Significant events in the organisation's histoiy during the
period 1975 to the early 80s are described as is the general
character of industrial relations in Telecom during that period.
The second half of the chapter seeks to describe a series of
reforms introduced into Telecom by the Labor Government since
it came to power in March 1983. The reforms are part of a
broader package of changes introduced into the public sector,
which are in turn an important facet of the Labor Government's
micro-economic reform agenda for the Australian economy. The
reforms at Telecom have resulted in a series of structural and
operational changes that are important to an understanding of
events in the Riverina.

HISTORY OF TELECOM AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE LATE

1970s AND EARLY 1980S

During the period following the federation of Australia and up
until the establishment of Telecom in 1975, telecommunication
services in Australia were provided by the Post Master General's
Department (PMG). The PMG was a department of the Federal

Government and provided both telecommunication and postal
services for the Commonwealth.

Telecom was established by the Whitlam Labor Government on 1
July 1975. The vesting of Telecom followed a commission of
inquiry presided over by an ex-general manager of GSR, Sir
James Vernon. The Vernon inquiry had reconmiended to the
Whitlam Government that the PMG not be run as a department of
the state but be broken up and established as two corporations
outside the public service bureaucracy. It was recorrmiended that
the two corporations be required to meet financial objectives and
have complete responsibility for the determination of wages and
conditions of employment (Report of the Conmiission of Inquiry
into the Australian Post Office, 1974).

According to Reinecke and Schultz (1983), the creation of Telecom
was resisted by senior management from the postal side of the
PMG and was bitterly opposed by professional engineers'^
throughout the orgeinisation who saw their power under threat. In
fact, the professional engineers carried their opposition right-up
through the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to the High
Court. However, they were defeated: a great many people
supported

the

formation

of

the

organisation

expectations were held for its future.

^ Professional engineers being dominant in managerial positions throughout the organisation.

and

great

In December 1975 the Fraser Government was elected to power.
As a consequence, the removal of the government controls
recommended by Vernon did not occur. Instead, the FYaser
Government adopted a highly interventionist role as evidenced by
the following quote from Reinecke and Schultz (1983):
The government certainly exercised a strangltr^ hand in the years
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, interfering in everything from
the purchase of property, industrial relations, staff numbers, policy
decisions about changes to the network, to restructuring loans
without consultation and declining contracts. The cabinet, under
the leadership of Molcobn Fraser, has tended to act as a superior
board, passing Judgement and reserving the right of veto on
decisions made by senior management and the board of the
commission itself. (p45-46)
The extent to which the Fraser Government intervened in the
management of Telecom was such that some managers felt they
had more freedom when they were part of a government
department. This was particularly the case, evidently, once the
Fraser Government had establishment the Department of
Commimications (Reinecke & Schultz, 1983).
The Fraser Government's control over Telecom management's
discretion was particularly acute in the area of industrial
relations. E)ven though the responsibility for industrial relations
had been taken from the Public Service Board and handed over to
management, they apparently had little real discretion. For

example, in the late 70s an attempt by Telecom management to
provide a commercial incentive to its staff by offering them
cheaper phone call rates was overruled by the then Minister for
Communications, Tony Staley. In addition, on a number of
occasions the Liberal Government demanded that management
reduce the organisation's personnel. This form of intervention
reached its peak when Sir Philip Lynch's "razor gang" was formed
to cut nimibers in the public sector. The Fraser Government's
interventionist stance is further exemplified by its adoption of an
aggressive stance towards worker militancy. The Government
established

and

used

the

Commonwealth

Employee's

Employment Provisions Act against ATEA members (Reinecke and
Schultz, 1983).

However, the most telling example of the Fraser Government's
interventionist

approach

to

industrial

relations

was

the

establishment of a coordination committee chaired by the
Department of Industrial Relations. The coordination committee's
role was to control industrial relations within the various
departments, statutory authorities and government business
enterprises in order to avoid adverse flow-ons throughout the
public sector. The committee's powers were significant and gave
them a virtual right of veto over any agreements reached between
Telecom management and employees (Interview with DIR officer
Nov 1991; Reinecke and Schultz, 1983).

In addition to restricting management discretion, the Fraser
Government placed severe restrictions on Telecom's accessibility
to financial resources. Under the new charter senior management
was required to generate at least half the organisation's capital
needs internally. The Fraser Government progressively increased
this requirement to a high of 79 per cent in 1978-79. At the same
time, severe restrictions were placed on senior management's
ability to borrow funds for capital expansions. In 1981, without
consulting

Telecom

management,

the

Fraser

Government

increased the interest rates on the companies long term loans
from the negotiated 7% to 10%. This increased the interest bill by
$58 miUion in 1981/82 and by $133 miUion in 1982/83. The
consequence of these increasing financial restriction was an
increase in the price of telephone calls in 1981, despite a
corporate objective to reduce the real cost of telecommimication
services (Reineke and Schultz, 1983).

In accordance with the Fraser Government's orientation, senior
management

within

Telecom

adopted

an

aggressive

and

centralised approach towards decision making and industrial
relations (MuUer, 1980; Williams, 1986). Muller argues that
before the creation of Telecom Australia, industrial relations in
the telecommimications arm of the PMG was predominantiy
peaceful:

Prior to 1975, and under the aegis of the Public Service Board, the
organisation and the unions were insulated from industrial
relations in the private sector. The role of the Board in the

forrnidation of industrial relations policy promoted collaboration
between management and union officials in satisjying their mutual
interests. Both acknowledged that the enterprise, as a public
service, had certain responsibilities towards the general community
and to its employees. (Muller 1980, pi 10)

Muller argues that in the PMG days management adopted a
paternalistic style that fitted within a 'Human Relations School'
framework. That is, team work was portrayed by management as
essential and industrial conflict was argued to be an aberration or
deviation from the norm.

With the vesting of Telecom, senior management centralised
decision making and adopted a more aggressive strategy that
stressed consumer satisfaction and cost minimisation (Muller,B.
1980, Williams,C. 1986). Policy functions were centralised to the
Melbourne head ofi&ce and divided into seven departments:
accounting, engineering, industrial relations, personnel, research,
information systems, and customer services. The rest of the
organisation was divided into districts within which all the day to
day operational functions were controlled by a district manager.
Management increased their control over the lower levels of the
organisation by standardising and formalising management
practices and introducing efficiency and cost targets. Nonmanagerial employees imder the new approach were required to
"accept increased workloads, less discretion, lower employment
levels, and technological change" (Muller 1980, pi 12).

According to Reinecke and Schultz, Muller, and Williams, the
consequences of all these developments were a significant drop in
staif morale, a radicalisation of the trade unions and a
significantly changed pattern of industrial relations.
As stated above, the restriction placed on Telecom management's
ability to acquire financial resources led to an increase in phone
charges to the consumer. This led to a media assault on the
organisation that reduced the status of Telecom workers in the
commimity generally and within small towns in particular. This
evidently contributed to the reduction in staff morale. Morale was
reduced even ftirtiier when senior management opted to defend
the company against attack by qmetiy lobbying the Government
rather than publicly addressing criticisms (Reinecke and Schultz,
1983).
Prior to the changes unions in Telecom were conservative and had
only a small role to play in the organisation. Management
expected unions to have a limited welfare role and they were
recognised by management only because it was a requirement
under the arbitration system. Unions tended to comply with this
expectation by adopting narrow "legitimate" goals, moderate
political outiooks, and reljring upon tribunals when pursuing
demands. (MuUer, 1980).
In the face of the Ftaser Government's interventionist approach
and with the adoption of the new aggressive management strategy

the unions in Telecom started to develop a more militant stance.

The

Australian

Telecommunications

Employee's

Association

(ATEA) in particular, rejected management's right to define staff
interests and began to demand an equal say in the decision
making process (Muller,B. 1980). In the 1960s the Postal and
Telecommimications Technicians Association, as the ATEA was
then called, was a very conservative body. By the late 70s and
early 80s it had been transformed into one of the most influential
unions in the coimtiy (Williams 1986). The ATEA came to have a
significant effect upon industrial relations in Australia: it helped
to bring down the wage indexation system in 1981; it aided the
introduction of a shorter working week; and successfiiUy pushed
for a national inquiry into technological change. Other unions
within the organisation were also transformed. For example, the
Australian Telephonists and Professional Officers Association was
traditionally a part time association dominated by supervisors.
However, during the 70s it set out to organise rank and file
telephonists and experienced a massive increase in membership
(Reinecke and Schultz, 1983).

MuUer (1980) and WiUiams (1986) argue that the major eff'ect of
the new managerial strategy and union orientation was a
transformation in industrial relations. Prior to 1975 the PMG was
a department of the state, and the determination of pay and
conditions was

controlled by the employing body for all

government departments, the Public Service Board. The control
and policies exercised by the Board insulated the organisation
firom private

sector

industrial

relations

and

promoted

a

collaborative relationship between management and unions with

only a few exceptions, such as the Redfem Mail Exchange dispute
in the late 1960s (MuUer, 1980). In the period 1975 to 1978
industrial conflict increased considerably. It was manifested in an
increase in stoppages and a dramatic increase in the number of
people involved in disputes

(Muller,B. 1980). Further, the

frequency of bans increased dramatically. Quoting MuUer:

Between 1975 and 1978 there has been an average of twenty
disputes a year involving some form of industrial action, typically
black bans. On the basis of data covering the period the period
May 1975 to the end of 1978, bans averaged slightly over ten
weeks duration. Indeed, there was no time during that period
when at least one ban was not in force. (MuUer 1980, p 109)

In addition to the increase in disputation, MuUer (1980) and
Williams (1986) claim that the changes had significant effects
upon the attitudes of the workforce toward Telecom management.
MuUer,

argues

that

workers

came

to

distrust

Telecom

management and this was reflected in a reduced willingness on
the part of workers to accept management's right to make
decisions. Further, aU workers in Telecom began to see a
divergence of interests between themselves and management:
management being seen to develop a narrow concern for
efficiency at the expense of the needs of workers and broader
society. WiUiams (1986) argues that the changes were associated
with

an

iacrease

in

union

soUdarity.

This,

she

impUes,

underpinned the increased willingness of Telecom workers,
specificaUy ATEA members, to strike.

A useful example of the new pattern of industrial relations and
the unions new influence is the 1981 pay dispute involving the
ATEA. In that year the ATEA, after twelve months of negotiating
with Telecom management and twelve days of industrial action
that severely disrupted the telephone network, won a significant
pay increase. Telecom management agreed to the increase on the
basis of work value but hoped for a productivity trade off.
However, the agreement was outside the indexation guidelines
and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission refused to ratify
the agreement. In doing so, the then President of the
Commission, Sir John Moore, indicated that the company should
honour the agreement. Following Moore's suggestion, the Fraser
cabinet was forced to approve the agreement in order to avert
continued industrial action by the ATEA The consequence of this
was the collapse of wage indexation and the resignation of the
managing director of Telecom, Jack Curtis (Williams, 1986).

The new militant approach adopted by Telecom unions and the
more conflictual pattern of industrial relations should not be
understood as being solely a consequence of the Fraser
Government's

policies

and

management's

new

aggressive

industrial relations strategy. Other factors such as a decline in
the Australian economy undoubtedly played an important part. In
addition, a factor of particular importance in Telecom Australia
was the introduction by management of new telecommunications
technology.

Throughout the 1970s and 80s Telecom management introduced
a significant amoimt of new technology that had a considerable
effect upon the number and nature of Jobs in the organisation.
The impact of new technology was particularly felt by telephonists
and must be seen as an important imperative behind their rising
militancy. The introduction of computerised exchanges and
docketless operations led, according to Reinecke and Schultz
(1983), to a significant reduction in the number of telephonists
employed and to the deskilling of those who remained. In country
towns and centres the progressive replacement of manual
exchanges with automatic ones took away from the telephonists
involved a significant role they enjoyed in the life of small towns.
The ATPOA reacted against this threat by conducting a series of
advertising campaigns on country radio stations that pushed
forward the message that telephonists were vital to country
towns: they acted as the conmiunity receptionists and as an
emergency service. The ATPOA's campaigns met with some
success in that they managed to force Telecom to temporarily
retain many manual exchanges.

A further example of the attitudes and reactions of telephonists to
new technology is clearly described by Reinecke and Schultz
(1983) who discuss the impact of a new computerised exchange
called the IOC in Sydney:

The telephonists hated it. Going from the dilapidated but homely
GPO, with its plugs and cords, to IOC, with its artificial lights and
computer terminals, was a shock, quite apart from the change in

the nature of the work.
During a technicians" wage dispute in 1978, the IOC exchange
broke dowru As is accepted practice when such computer failures
occur, the 300 telephonists trooped across Pitt Street to the GPO to
put the colls through with the old plug and cord gear which is still
used as a backstop.
When the operators got out of the building, they decided that they
would not return until certain concessions were obtained, and
facilities improved. It was a spontaneous response to intolerable
working conditions. After several weeks out of the new exchange,
Telecom relented: improvements were made in lighting, the chairs
were recovered with fabric, and telephonists no longer had to ask a
monitor before taking a toilet break.
For telephonists to apply blackballs and hold out for improvements
was utterly unheard of (pi47)
The work of ATEA members was also affected by technology. The
move towards electronic exchanges threatened to make the skills
and Jobs of many technicians redimdant. The ATEA reacted to
this threat in a number of ways. In 1978 the Union embarked on
a dispute which brought the national network to a halt. While the
dispute was predominantly concerned with staff structures, its
actual settlement included an agreement from Telecom
management to discuss with the union all plans for new
technology prior to implementation. Following the 1978 dispute.

the Union began to push for the establishment of a national
inquiry into the potential impact of technological change in the
broader community. The Fraser Government eventually agreed to
this proposal and set up the Committee to Investigate the Impact
of Technological Change. The president of the ATEA, Bill
Mansfield, was appointed to the committee as the union
movement's representative. While the final report did not
particularly satisfy anyone, the ATEA had at least put the issue of
new technology on the Australian communities' policy agenda
(Reinecke and Schultz, 1983).
The increased militancy of the imions in Telecom and the
worsening of industrial relations can be argued to have had in
their turn an effect on the policies of the Fraser Government. The
Fraser Government set up a committee to inquire into private
sector participation in telecommunications, called the Davidson
Inquiry. The terms of reference were specific and to the point.
They were required to investigate:

(a)the extent to which the private sector could be widely involved in
the provision of existing or proposed telecommunications services in
Australia either alone, in competition with or in conjwiction with the
Australian Telecommunications Commission;
(b) what consequential changes may be necessary in the statutory
Junctions, duties, financial objectives and monopoly provisions of
the Commission: and

(c) the effectiveness of the Conumssion's operational policies and

organisational arrangements (Report of the Committee of Inquiry
into Telecommimications Services in Australia, Vol 1, 1982, pi).
The Committee was given one year to report. It took submissions
from a significant number of parties including Telecom
management and the ATEA. Given the terms of reference the
ATEA saw the Davidson committee as a real threat. They
predicted that many Jobs would be lost if the private sector was
allowed to enter the industry. They also argued that the standard
of Australia's telephone services would be negatively affected
(Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Telecommunications
Services in Australia, Vol 2, 1982).
In October 1982 the Davidson report was presented to the
Minister for Conmiunications. Amongst the many changes
recoromended by Davidson, Telecom was to retain its monopoly
over the local telephone network, but most of its profitable
operations were to be opened up to competition. In addition, the
organisation was to be fragmented by the establishment of a
private terminal equipment supplier. Of importance to the ATEA
was the recommendation that installation be undertaken in
fiiture not by Telecom technicians (all members of the ATEA) but
by anyone who simply had prior experience in the installation of
telecommimications equipment^ (Report of the Corrmiittee of
Inquiry into Telecommunications Services, Australia, 1982).
^The Davidson inquiiy whilst ignoring most of the ATEA's submissions did adopt at least one of them: in line with its
private sector orientation it recommended that the govermnent control over Telecom via the coordination committee be
abolished

The Davidson report was soon over-taken by events. In March
1983 the Ffaser Liberal Government was defeated and the Hawke
Labor Government came to power. However, it could be argued
that the committee set an agenda for change. As described below,
the Hawke government implemented a wide range of reforms that
have and are having a profound effect on Telecom.

G B E REFORM AND TELECOM AUSTRALIA

Since coming to power, the Labor Government has introduced a
range of reform initiatives into Australian government business
enterprises (GBEs), including Telecom Australia. The changes
taking place are an integral part of broader public sector reform
strategies (Evans,G. 1988), which are intended to create efficient
output oriented activities rather than the input and control
orientation of traditional processes (Keating,M. 1989; Radbone, I.
1988; Sinclair,A. 1989).

As stated in the introduction, the reforms form an important facet
of the Labor Government's micro-economic reform agenda for the
Australian economy. An understanding of their development is
important to any description of industrial relations in government
business enterprises.
During the early to mid 1980s, the Australian economy went into
a serious decline. There was a deterioration in the terms of trade
and the balance of payments. The value of the Australian dollar
depreciated and the size of the external debt increased

Significantly. In response to this crisis, the Government, unions
and peak employer bodies agreed that the Australian economy
needed to be restructured in a way that would lead to increases in
exports and reductions in imports. The way to achieve this, it was
decided, was to make Australian industry more productive and,
therefore, more internationally competitive (NLCC, 1988).

It was agreed that a greater emphasis needed to be placed on
micro-economic initiatives aimed at increasing the internal
efficiency of Australian firms. Microeconomic reform, it was
argued, had the potential to increase the mobility of resources,
lower costs, encourage investment, increase efficiency and
flexibility

and,

therefore,

improve

the

international

competitiveness of Australian industry. Public sector reform
aimed at improving efficiency, flexibility and productivity was
identified as vital to this process CW^illis, R. 1988).

The public sector reform process introduced by the Hawke
Government, and similar developments overseas (Nethercote,J.R.
1989; CarroU,J.L. 1986; ILXD, 1991; Wiltshire,K 1990), have been
discussed by writers under three broad headings:

"new-

managerialism" in public or civil services; "commercialism" in
GBEs; and "privatisation" in some public service areas and many
GBEs.

"New-managerialism" is used by writers to refer to the adoption in
the public or civil service of managerial practices

and

orientations that are claimed to induce economic efficiency and

effectiveness. As stated earlier, public service organisations are
moving away from the traditional model, which stressed
ministerial control, formal bureaucracy, and policy
administration, towards a more performance or results oriented
approach modelled on private sector practices (Sinclair,A. 1989;
Emy,H. Hughes,O. 1988; Keating,M. 1989, Yeatman,A 1990a).
The actual practices that are adopted include initiatives such as
the devolution of managerial responsibilities, personnel
reductions, specification of clear objectives, development of
performance indicators, and program budgeting (Blackwell,R.
Lloyd, P. 1989; Keating,M. 1989; Sinclair, A. 1989; Considme,M.
1988).
"Commercialism" is a term adopted in the British literature (eg
Batstone, et al. 1984, Femer,A. 1985, 1989). It is used to refer to
reforms that are intended to make GBEs, and the industries
within which they are located, operate more efficiently and more
in accord with the way they would operate if they were exposed to
the pressures of the market (Batstone, E. et al. 1984). As with
new-managerialism, the actual mechanics of commercialism vary
but include initiatives such as management devolution; an
emphasis upon budgetary planning and cost cutting; personnel
reductions; attempts to create a more competitive ethos or
culture; and the opening up of the GBE's industry to greater
market competition (Batstone, et al. 1984; Femer, A. 1989, 1988).
"Privatisation" generally refers to the process of selling all or a
substantial part of a government business enterprise or public

service area. Overseas, particularly in the United Kingdom, there
has been a very significant move towards privatisation. In
Australia a strong trend towards privatisation has also begun to
develop (Wiltshire. K. 1990). As with new-managerialism and
commercialism, privatisation is generally portrayed as a way of
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisations
concerned.
A common thread in the British literature on public sector reform
is that the push for increased efficiency was accompanied by
aggressive

and

conflictual

management

strategies.

These

strategies it is argued were a result of pressure from the Thatcher
Government. With respect to GBEs it is claimed that the Thatcher
Government used them as a symbol of its resolve to curb the
power of the unions and reduce the size of the public sector.
Thus, GEE management was put under continual pressure to
introduce commercialism aggressively and to do so even in the
face of intense union and workforce resistance (Batstone et al.
1984, Femer, A. 1985, Pendleton. A. 1988).
The push for efficiency in Australia has not been accompanied by
pressure from the Labor Government for the adoption of
aggressive

industrial

relations

strategies.

Rather,

the

Government, using the Accord as a foundation, has attempted to
ensure that change in the public sector, and, indeed, microeconomic reform throughout the whole economy, is introduced
through

processes

of

consultation

between

unions

and

management rather than confrontation. According to the Labor

Government, with respect to reform:

A cooperative approach is the only sensible way to go. The
altematiue may appear a sunpler and perhaps quicker approach,
but, in fact, the reverse wiR be the case.

An advesarial approach wiR not bring about the Jimdamental
changes in workforce and management attitudes required for long
term improvement in productivity and competitiveness, or for
continuing acceptance of new technology and other change. In fact,
it wUl result in more entrenched and antagonistic attitudes and
greater resistance to change. (Willis, R 1988 p4)

It is in this light that the efficiency reforms, described below,
must be understood. While the Thatcher Government may have
used public sector reform as a symbol of its resolve to break
unionism, the Hawke Labor Government, it can be claimed, was
more inclined to use the public sector as a symbol of its resolve to
engender consensus in industrial relations. This is clearly a very
different approach to that adopted by the Fraser Government
described earlier.

The reform process in the Australian Public sector was put on the
agenda by a series of Royal Commissions, Committees of Inquiry
and Reviews in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the Commonwealth
arena the major reviews were imdertaken by the Royal
Commission on Australian Government Administration known
as the Coombs Royal Commission in 1974-76 and the Review of

Commonwealth Administration: the Reid Review in 1982-83.

Actual changes were introduced into the Public sector by the
Labor Government in 1984. EMdently, the Labor Government
took into account the recommendations of the Coombs and Reid
reports. But the actual changes it introduced were based on a
document produced by members of the Parliamentary Labor
Party, when it was in opposition, called- Labor and the Quality
of Government and a December 1983 paper called Reforming
the

Australian

Public

Service:

A

Statement

of

the

Government's Intentions.

The reforms in the Australian public sector are intended to shift
the emphasis away from the traditional bureaucratic control
orientation and in this regard have three broad objectives.

First, according to many writers, the most important aim of the
reforms is to create an administration which is more efficient and
capable of effectively and creatively meeting its goals without
wasting or misusing human and financial resources (Wilenski,
1986). These reforms are informed by theories and management
practices developed in the private sector (Keating, M. 1989;
Yeatman,A. 1987, 1990a, 1990b; Considine,M. 1988; Painter,M.
1987) and can be seen as an attempt to restructure the public
sector along more "commercial" or market-driven lines.

Second, a more democratic administration in which the major
policy decisions and the allocations of resources are made by

ministers as the elected representatives of the people; and (since
ministers cannot take or supervise all decisions) a more
representative and diverse bureaucracy whose decisions are more
open to public influence, public scrutiny and to appeal (Keating,
1989).

Third, a more equitable administration that is Just and fair in
dealing with its own employees and applicants for employment,
and with individual citizens and groups relying on the services it
provides. With respect to government employees, the Labor
Government argued that:

public administration will be wore efficient if it is based on more
open and democratic systems of organisation and management
than those which have tradttionaUy prevailed in public services. A
more participatvue approach to management will improve decision
making by ensuring full opportunities for the staff who will be
Greeted to make their views known and to have them properly
considered. An administration more responsive to the needs of staff
wUl ergoy improved morale and performance, while at the same
time enriching the working lives of men and women who are part of
the Governments workforce. (Hawke, R.J.L. 1984, p34)

In the Labor and Quality of Government paper and in the Labor
Government's December 1983 statement, reforms to GBEs were
foreshadowed.

Towards the end of 1984 a report prepared by Professor Hugh
Stretton for the Minister of Finance called Directing the
Australian Public Sector - A Consultant Paper on the Design
and Direction of Commonwealth Business Enterprises was
released. Stretton proposed that GBE reform take place with the
general intention of making public business management more
enterprising and inventive, efficient and accountable.

Stretton's proposals were followed by a policy discussion paper in
1986 and by the release in 1987 of the Policy Guidelines for
Commonwealth

Statutory

Authorities

and

Government

Business Enterprises. The Policy Guidelines were followed by the
1988 Economic statement which included reforms directed at all
statutory authorities and GBEs as well as measures specifically
targeted at the telecommunications industry.

The stated aims of the guidelines were, to quote them, to:

provide

incentive, enhance efficiency and

improve public

accountability. It is intended that these objectives be achieved
through a package which combines removal of unnecessary central
controls which detract from enterprise performance with greater
emphasis on bottom line performance. Government attention will be
focussed on strategic issues which are properly a matter for
MinisterUjdresporisibiltty, (Waish^P. 1987,pl)

As the above statement indicates, the Government was seeking to
improve GBE efficiency by devolving a significant amount of the

responsibility for decision making away from direct government
control towards managers within the GBEs. In doing this,
however, the Government still wished to keep the GBEs
accountable to the public.
In simimary, the method set out in the guidelines to achieve the
reforms had four components.

First, the amount of direct government control over the day to day
operations of GBEs was reduced by the Guidelines. The
Guidelines stated that "priority will be given to the removal of
those controls that most clearly detract from an enterprise's
commercial performance" (Walsh,P. 1987, p21). Further, they
allowed GBE management to identify the controls which if
abolished would best aid cost reduction and profitability.

Second, contained within the guidelines was a requirement that
GBEs prepare strategic corporate plans. The plans must be
prepared every three years and cover such things as broad
financial objectives and operational targets. A provision in the
guidelines is that the responsible Minister may suggest to GBE
management that they reconsider the corporate plans if he or she
feels that they could better reflect government policies.

Third, GBEs are required to reach agreement with the responsible
Minister on financial performance objectives or targets. In most
cases, financial targets must be developed annually and will
generally take the form of "a specified rate of return on the

enterprise's assets, funds employed or capital" (Walsh,P. 1987,
p21).

Fourth, the Guidelines required GBEs to report annually on their
financial performance as measured against the targets. As stated
in the guidelines:

Annual reports of enterprises wUl give account of peiformance
against previously

established

goals, including financial

operational targets, together with assessments

and

of the cost of

meeting 'community service obligations' and observing residual
non-commercial central controls which adversely

affect their

profitability, (Walsh,P. 1987, p22)

The May 1988 Economic Statement built on the Guidelines. It
included reforms that created new corporate structures, clarified
and added to the Government's strategic oversight role and
further relaxed day to day government controls including those
relating to industrial relations.

As part of the May statement, Gareth Evans, the Minister for
Transport and Communications, released a statement that was
specifically related to the telecommimications industry.

The statement provided for a major restructuring of the regulatory
environment of the telecorrmiunications industry. It provided for a
continuation of Telecom's monopoly over the basic telephone

network, but opened the industry up to competition in value
added services and, to an extent, network terminal equipment.
The statement, also provided for the establishment of an
independent regulator (AUSTEL) that would provide technical
regulation, protect Telecom's monopoly, protect the competitors
from unfair practice, protect consumers and promote efficiency.
Further, the statement, in line with the Policy Guidelines for
Commonwealth

Statutory

Authorities

and

Government

Business Enterprises, provided for a reduction in direct
government involvement in the operation of Telecom. This was to
be achieved in a number of ways.

The statement provided for the revision of Telecom's corporate
and financial structures. This included the conversion of 25% of
Commonwealth loans to equity and replacement of the rest with
private sector borrowings, the revaluation of assets, and the
exposure of Telecom to all taxes.

Major strategic controls were modified: Loan Council processes
were changed to allow for more flexibility, longer term capital
expenditure and market borrowings; a Telecom superannuation
scheme was set up; the authority for setting

executive

remuneration was devolved to the Telecom Board (in consultation
with the Remuneration Tribimal); and industrial relations
controls were relaxed. The changes in industrial relations controls
were set out as follows:

Industrial relations co-ordination arrangements have applied since

1948. The enterprises are required to consult with the Department
of Industrial Relations on a wide spectrum of industrial relations
issues from mcgor wages and conditions matters to initiatives on
occupational health and safety and industrial democracy. The
Department can oppose initiatives and proposals which it believes
do not accord with government policy. The consideration of these
matters inevitably involves greater delays than if the enterprises
could settle them without the requirement to consult, and has also
been criticised for diminishing the negotiating status

of GBE

managers. The Government has decided that:

1.

The present industrial relations coordination

arrangements will be substantially altered by devolving to the
enterprises greatly increased responsibility and autonomy to
develop wages and employment conditions proposals.

2.

Standard guidelines on government wages

and industrial relations policy wUl be established by the Minister
for Industrial Relations in consultation with the enterprises and the
Minister for Transport and Communications. Enterprises wtil be
free to manage their industrial relations within the scope of these
broad guidelines without being required to refer matters to the
Department of Industrial Relations. (Evans, G. 1988, p 218-219)

The industrial relations guidelines were progressively developed
following the May statement. They allowed for a significant
reduction in the need for Telecom to gain clearance from the

Department of Industrial Relations before making decisions on
industrial

relations matters. Telecom management is now,

theoretically, free to manage industrial relations as it wishes
within the scope of the guidelines. Management is only required
to consult with the Department of Industrial Relations in
situations where they or the Department thinks there may be a
breach of the guidelines (Interview DIR Officer, 1991).

The 1988 Statement also provided for the removal of many day to
day controls, including the necessity for Telecom management to
obtain ministerial approval to enter into contracts,

obtain

individual borrowings, and make investments, and establish
subsidiaries and joint ventures.

Finally,

the

statement

provided

for

new

planning

and

accountability mechanisms. Telecom must now provide the
Minister for Transport and Communications with a strategic
corporate plan every three years and agree with the Minister on
financial targets. Further, they must include in annual reports an
account of performance against the financial targets and against
comparable telecommunications companies (Evans, G. 1988, p
218-219).

The reforms were put in place by three pieces of legislation: the
Telecomimimications
Telecommunications

Amendment Act
Corporation

1988,

Act

the

1989,

Australian
and

the

Telecommunications Act 1989 (DTOC Annual Report 1988-89).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has described developments in Telecom Australia
since it was vested in 1975. It is clear that since its inception the
organisation has been under increasing pressure to change and
reform along more commercial lines. Under the Fraser Liberal
Government this culminated in 1982 with the Davidson report,
which recommended that Telecom be exposed to competition.
With the election of the Labor Government in 1983 the pressure
has been kept up with the introduction of a broad ranging set of
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and accountability of
the organisation.

Since the introduction of the reforms outlined in this chapter, the
change process has continued in Telecom. In December 1989 the
Department of Transport and Communications commenced a
review of ownership and structural relationships among the
telecommunications carriers. This review culminated in November
1990 with an announcement by the Minister for Transport and
Communications, Kim Beazley, and the Prime Minister of further
significant reforms. The announcement foreshadowed, amongst
other things, the establishment of a private sector competitor,
which took place around the end of 1991; the merger of OTC and
Telecom; the sale of AUSSAT; the end of Telecom's first phone
monopoly on 30 June 1991; and the enhancement of AUSTEL's
role as an independent regulator (Financial Review, 9 Nov 1990).

In the first half of this chapter industrial relations during the
1970s and early 1980s was described. It was argued that as a
result of the intervenionist action on the part of the Fraser
Government

and

the

aggressive

strategies

adopted

by

management, industrial relations became highly conflictual. The
reform process under the Labor Government, however, has been
associated with pressure for a more consensus based or
consultative approach to industrial relations.
In the next chapter an impression of the climate of industrial
relations within Telecom since the early 1980s and during the
period of reform is provided. This, to a limited extent, provides an
insight into the success of the Labor Government's desire for
more consensus based industrial relations. More importantly for
this thesis, the next chapter provides further context for the
discussions in chapters 5, 6 and 7.

CHAPTER 4 - OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TELECOM
SINCE THE EARLY 1980S

INTRODUCTION

MuUer (1980), Reinecke and Schultz (1983), and WiUiams (1986)
paint a picture of increasing militancy amongst Telecom unions
and, hence, a fairly conflictual industrial relations climate in
Telecom during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Unfortunately,
since the early 1980s there has not been any further detailed
investigations of industrial relations in Telecom. Given the
significant changes that have occurred in the organisation the
findings of any such wide-ranging study would be exceedingly
interesting. However, it is not the objective of this thesis to
undertake a broad analysis of industrial relations across the
organisation. Rather, an impression of the general climate of
industrial relations within the organisation is provided below and
serves as a necessary background to the discussion in later
chapters, which concentrates on activity in the Riverina region.
This chapter provides a broad view of industrial relations in the
organisation against which the events at Narrandera can be
compared. The discussion describes industrial relations in
Telecom by examining Industrial Relations Commission decisions
on issues brought before it by Telecom management and imions,
and transcript of interviews of managers, supervisors and union
representatives collected by the author in February, March and
April 1990. In general terms, the decisions and interviews reveal
that industrial relations within the organisation has been less
conflict ridden in recent years. In addition, it appears that

management has moved away from aggressive industrial relations
strategies towards strategies imderpinned by communication and
consultation.

TELECOM DECISIONS

An examination of 90 decisions handed down by the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission during the period 1984 to 1990
does not reveal any disputes as divisive as those that occurred in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the decisions reveal
that the major agenda in the company has been one of reform.
Cases brought before the Commission were diverse with claims
for allowances of various types and, since 1987, proceedings
imder Restructuring and Efficiency and

Structural Efficiency

principles being dominant.

New technology was, unsurprisingly, a frequent imderpinning to
many issues brought before the Commission. However, unlike the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the introduction of new
technology led to a nimiber

of disputes between Telecom

management and Telecom unions, there does not appear to have
been any conflicts resulting in major time losses or network shut
downs. In the 1980s it appears that most attempts by Telecom to
introduce new technology were not rejected by Telecom unions;
rather, they have been met with claims for increased wages and
allowances.

For example, the 1980s saw the introduction of optical fibre
technology which has been described as one of the most
revolutionary developments since the transistor (Telephone
Engineer and Management, 15 February 1985). An examination
of IRC decisions (AIRC, 6/8/85) reveals that the introduction of
optical fibre meant a signijacant change in the work of lines staff,
covered by the APTU, and technicians, covered by the ATEA.
However, despite a ban on optical fibre imposed by the APTU, the
imions appeared to accept "that technological change is part and
parcel of Telecom's operations" (AIRC, 6/8/85, p2). It appears
that the main objective of the unions was not to stop the
introduction of optical fibre, but to obtain increases in
remimeration for those workers who were required to install and
service it. Thus, the APTU sought and obtained an Optical Fibre
Cable Allowance in 1985 and the ATEA sought (but later agreed
to not pursue) a similar allowance.
Similar developments occurred with the introduction by Telecom
in the mid 1980s of new computerised systems, such as
LEOPARD testing equipment, the Subscriber Line Test Access
Network (SULTAN), and the AXE Electronic Computer Exchanges.
LEOPARD, SULTAN and AXE represent major technological
changes but they were not rejected by the unions. Rather the
ATEA sought and gained an allowance for using the
LEOPARD/SULTAN testing equipment while the ATPOA sought
the creation of a new classification for its members using
LEOPARD and SULTAN (AIRC, 25/11/85).

Another significant technological change introduced by Telecom
involved replacement of old telegram equipment with new
computerised systems (AIRC, 9/5/85). This innovation meant
significant changes for the workers concerned. Quoting the
Telecom advocate who appeared in the case, Mr Douglas:

„.there is no designation which wiR not require more and different
skills in the new system. For example, if a cwrent telegraphist is
successjvl in obtaining a Job in the new system, he or she will stiR
be required to prepare and receive telegrams and public telex
traffic as is currently the case; but that person will perform the
functions on a visual display terminai requiring knowledge of the
varied formats involved.,rather than is currently the case on
teleprinters which require certain manipulative and tape reading
skills only. Similarly, while a telegraphist currently performs a
good deal of the junctions of the proposed message bureau
operator, she only performs the range in the after-hours period
when the standard of service is not as high as that which is
required during the day. This means in essence the telegraphist
has more time to get the Job right, removed from the pressures and
variables and Junctions which normal business hours traffic can
present. Another example of the net addition of skUl is the
phonogram operator VDU who receives telegrams from subscribers
and inputs them directly into the TRESS system by means of a
VDU, They use only a relatively smaR number offormats; that is,
they handle a very limited range of traffic, whereas a message
bureau operator wUl be a multifunctuonal designation in the very
true sense of the word, (MRC, 9/5/85, p2j

As with fibre optics, LEOPARD, SULTAN and AXE computerised
systems, the unions involved; TTSOA, ATPOA, PSA, and UPCT,
appeared to accept that the introduction of new message bureau
technology was necessary.

In the decision the Commission made orders relating to the
creation of a new award, classifications, remuneration, hours to
be worked by employees, and coverage. The orders were accepted
by most of the imions (AIRC, 14/2/86)^.

Thus, the cases reveal that technological change in Telecom
during the 1980s was largely an agreed process between
management and imions. The push by Telecom management and
the Labor Government towards a more commercial approach is
also reflected in the IRC Telecom decisions. The restructuring and
structural efficiency cases dominate in this regard and are
described below. However, not all cases heard by the Commission
that were concerned with moves towards commercialism were
associated with national wage case proceedings.

For example, in 1985 the Commission heard a case involving
Telecom and the ACOA that related to a decision by Telecom to
shift its sales force away from a traditionally "passive order taking
role to one of active selling" (AIRC, 24/1/85, pi). By 'active
selling' Telecom management meant that officers at various levels
would initiate sales by calling prospective customers either over
the phone or by outside calls. In seeking to develop a more active
^The hours and coverage issues were appealed by the UPCT, which had been excluded as a party to the award in the
original proceedings. The UPCTs appeal was reieaed bv the Full Bench.

sales force, Telecom also sought to change the method of payment
away from the tradition clerical salary scales to one related to
performance. Telecom claimed that a move to performance related
pay was essential to the success of the move from passive to
active selling.

These changes the ACOA claimed and Telecom acknowledged,
meant a significant change in the nature of the work for those
employees concerned. Quoting Peter Robson, the ACOA advocate
at that time:

So here you have a situotioTX where previously selling and
marketing work in Telecom was being done by clerks, who never
had a car, never used to get out, they used to do it as a part time
Job in the main although some of them did it in a more Jidl-time
way, but certainly they had oR the normal sort of trappings of the
public service security of position and tenure. Now Telecom have
proposed, and subject to there being proper systems ACOA have
agreed, that we have targets being used for such sacrosanct things
as increments and tenure. Soit is in our view, a very new way of
operation. iAlRC, 24/1/85, p2)

The case put forward to the Commission by the parties was for
the establishment of new sales, accounts and

consultant

classifications, which would be associated with different base
level

salary

scales

comprising

a

bench-mark

rate

and

accompanied by several incremental advances. Performance pay

was based on a 'product points system' and was described to the
Commission in the following terms:
..that achievement by a sales representative of 80 of target, (ie,
points earned by selling products compared with "points value" or
target allocated at the beginning of each twelve-month period) wûl
ensure tenure in the business sales force; 90 achievement will
create entitlement to annual incremental advancement within the
scale proposed; and achievement at levels of 110 and above of
target, calculated on a quarterly basis, wUl be rewarded with an
incentive payment equivalent to accelerated incremental
advancement, payable for duration (sic) of the next succeeding
quarter. (AIRC, 24/1/85. p2J

The Commission was also advised that the new arrangements
would lead to changes in conditions of employment such as
overtime, ordinary hours of work, allowances, and the calculation
of recreation leave, long service leave and superannuation. The
parties indicated that the changes, and in particular the incentive
system, would be implemented over a two year period. Further, it
was submitted that employees who did not achieve the 80 target
would not be retrenched, rather they would be redeployed
elsewhere in the Telecom workforce^.
This case provides a useful insight into the shift towards a more
"commercially" oriented perspective. However, the shift is best
•J
The differences between the partiesrelatedto the actual salary to be paid to the classifications concerned, allowances
and travelling time. These issues were settled by arbitration.

reflected in Telecom cases heard as part of national wage case
increases and, in particular, those governed by the Restructuring
and Efficiency Principle (REP) and the Structural Efficiency
Principle (SEP)8.

In Telecom the principles set by the IRC, both under the
Restructuring and Efficiency Principle and the Structural
Efficiency Principle, were strongly embraced and formed part of
the general push towards commercialism and greater efficiency
within the organisation.

g
° The emphasis in wage fixation in Australia since the early 1980s has been upon attempts to make Australian woric
organisation and award structures more efficient and therefore to help industry to become more internationally
competitive. This orientation has been pushed by the Labour government and its Accord partner the ACTU, as well as by
major employer associations(NLCC, 1988). The Commission enshrined the new orientation in its national wage case
decision of 10 March 1987. It established a two-tier approach to fixmg wages and introduced a principle that parties had
to meet in order to gain increases in the second tier. The Restracturing and Efficienqr Principle allowed for a set 4 %
increase in rates of pay and improvements in employment conditions, if employers and unions could convince the
Commission that they had implemented measures which would lead to increases m efficiency and productivity. The
emphasis in the principle was upon achieving these goals by increasing flexibility at the enterprise or woikplace level
(NLCC, 1988).
Whilst the experience with the Restmcturing and Efficiency Principle was seen as constractive, the Government and all
major parties recognised that they needed to build on the changes akeady achieved. In August 1988 the Australian
Conciliation and Aibitration Commission handed down its 1988 National Wage Case Decision. The decision reinforced
the importance of stracmral change and labour market reform by building on the steps taken under the two tier system
and hastening the speed of labour market refomi. (Commonwealth Sutsnission to the Review of the Stractuial Efficiency
Principle, Februaiy-May 1989) The central feature of the August 1988 Decision was the establishment of the Structural
Efficiency Principle which focused on award restracturing. The Commission determined that anployees would be
granted two wage increases (3% no later than 1 September 1988, and $10 per week no eariier than six months after the
first increase) if their union gave a formal undertaking to positively cooperate in a fundamental overhaul of the awards
which covered the employees work. The new Principle highlighted a number of areas which could be considered by the
parties to awards (Deeiy & Plowman, 1991).
In August 1989 the Commission amended the Struaural Efficiency Principle by providing for stractoral efficiency
adjustments if the parties could satisfy the Commission that they had co-operated positively in a fundameaital review of
awards and were implementing measures to improve the efficiency as well as providing workers with more satisfying
jobs (Commonwealth Submission to the National Wage Case, Dec 1990-Feb 1991).
Following reports by the Government and other parties, during the December 1990-February 1991 National Wage Case
the Industrial Relations Commission established the April 1991 Stractural Efficiency Principle. In order to gain a 2.5%
increase, parties were required to satisfy the Commission that they had, amongst other things, begun to examine whether
work classifications, patterns and arrangements were aH)ropriate; that consultative mechanism were to be set up; and
that the 1989 Stractural Efficiency Principle had been substantially implemented,(Commonwealth Submission to the
Review of Wage Fixing Principles, Sept 1991)

Claims for a 4% second

tier increase under

the

1987

Restructuring and Efficiency Principle led, for employees covered
by the ATEA, to the introduction of new technology such as a new
generation main distributing frame; improvements in staff
functional and geographic mobility; increased training; the
dropping of demarcation barriers between technical and lines
groups

for

the

installation

and

maintenance

work

on

underground repeater/regenerators; and numerous changes to
maintenance arrangements and procedures (AIRC, 4/9/87a).

For employees covered by the APTU the Restructuring and
Efficiency Principle led, amongst other things, to changes in
technology, work and managerial practices, and demarcation
barriers. For example, field based training was agreed to, as was
the introduction of keyboard and screen based equipment, and
the dropping of the technical-lines demarcation in underground
repeater/regenerators. Further, it was agreed that, in addition to
improved functional and geographic mobility, staff would if
required by management work at "any level below their nominal
or acting designations" (AIRC, 4/9/87b).

Perhaps the most significant changes arising from the March
1987 national wage case concerned the clerical areas of Telecom
and involved the integration of over fifty classifications into one
single structure containing six levels (AIRC, 17/12/87).

Associated with this rationalisation were a large number of
initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency and flexibility of the

clerical workforce. Amongst other things, clerical integration
established Telecom management's right to recruit above the base
level; removed qualification barriers; created

classification

standards; and revised incremental review processes.
The integration exercise also involved an agreement to undertake
a redesign of Jobs and work organisation. The redesign process
was to be premised on a set of objectives involving the efficient
and effective meeting of customer's needs through, where
possible, the decentralisation and devolution of decision making,
the broadening and enhancement of Jobs, and the development of
Jobs which would enable control by employees over complete
pieces of work using a variety of skills. It was agreed that changes
in the design of Jobs and the organisation of work would be
worked out and implemented through a Joint process involving
management, staff and unions at branch or section level.

Multi-skilling was also identified as a vital part of the integration
process and was to be achieved via "a combination of flexibility in
task allocation across positions. Job rotation and training
programs and the design of multi-functional Jobs" (AIRC,
17/12/87, Appendix Paperl, p5). As with Job redesign and work
organisation changes, the objective of multi-skilling was identified
as:

„greater Jlexibility in the allocation of resources and better
servicing of customers through a more broadly skilled workforce.
From a

staff

perspective,

benefits

include better career

opportunities for staff currently restricted by Job specialisation
(AIRC, YllVll^l, Appendix Paper 1, p5).

Similarly, multi-functional Job designs and Job rotation were to be
the responsibility of local management. The importance of multiskilling was highlighted in the agreements by making the
development of a flexible, multiskilled workforce a performance
criterion for managers. Backing up all these proposed changes
was an agreement to ensure the appropriate deployment of
resources for training.
Beyond the integration package the clerical restructuring and
efficiency case established agreements on issues such as staff
geographical mobility, assessment processes, demarcation issues,
the use of contract staff, managing personnel reductions, and
organisational culture initiatives. With regard to personnel
reduction, it was identified in the decision that staff reductions
would have to take place in order to meet the effects of changes in
demand for telecommunications services and the Government's
May 1987 Economic Statement. However, senior management
stated, in a docimient issued to state managers and heads of
departments within Telecom and included as an exhibit in the
decision, that:

It is not intended that redundancy will be used as a means of
achieving the reductions. The policy is to limit, and where
necessary cease, recruitment and to take advantage of wastage
and wastage opportunities, redeployment of staff, reduction in

overtime and where necessary cessation of fixed-term staff.
Redeployment may mean change of physical location and/or
change of duties. It could also include the performance of work
normoRy performed by another designation group. This may
necessitate salary maintenance. Relocation wiR be arranged with
existing conditions of service. Retraining may be necessary in some
situations and this should be arranged as soon as redeployees are
identified (AIRC, YJIVll^l

Appendix Paper 2 p2).

Further, reductions were to take place with staff being fully
informed of developments and volunteers for re-deployment being
sought first:

The staff concerned and their staff assocvatvons wiR need to be well
informed of the specific redeployments identfied and the individual
reasons for those redeployments as early as practicable. They wUl
also need to be aware of the necessity for and benefits of
redeployment, eg.

ongoing viability of the organisation and the ability to
continue to provideJobs to existing staff;

improved career prospects and skiU development.

Staff must be made aware of their conditions of service and
basicaUy that there wUl be no financial disadvantage. Volunteers
for redeployment should be sought in the first instance. The work
priority areas, where redeployees wiR be placed, must also be

clearly identified together with the numbers and skills required.
(Staff must not be moved any more than necessary, and decisions
relating to areas for reduction and priority areas must be definite
and not changed). States must take a common sense approach in
achieving staff redeployment and the staff reductions. Movement
involving change of domicile should be avoided as far as possible.
(AIRC, Y71VIIAppendix

Paper 2 p2)

The organisational ciilture initiatives involved staff in the Telecom
Information

Systems

area

and

included

a

performance

development and review scheme, productivity, motivation and
reward initiatives, and bottom line management techniques. O n
bottom line management the following was agreed:

Telecom's resources planning and

monitoring processes have

traditionally been detailed in nature with emphasis spread over a
wide range of physical targets, commercial targets, productivity
and manpower targets and expenditure items. This process is
changing, however, to a more macro based bottom line approach
whereby only a few key parameters and a short list of corporate
imperatives which must be met during the year within prescribed
macro resource levels, are provided. Managers, wUl therefore, have
greater autonomy and flexibility in the allocation of the macro
resources along with an increased degree of accountability.

The introduction of a Bottom Line Management approach is seen as
a key element in efforts to improve and consolidate performance,
productivity and profitability in the current business environment It

is considered that the introduction of this Jundarnentcd

business

practice within Telecom wUl lead to improved efficiency

and

productivity by replacing comparatively rigid finaxxciol junctional
and hierarchical structures and practices, with a simpler approach
which provides for both accountability and much more flexibility
than previously in meeting business opportunities. Because

the

nature of the concept makes it most difficult to quantify in advance
the likely efficiency and productivity benefits which would result
from its appUcatioru it is not possible to provide any meaningfijl
estimate of likely gains or savings at this early stage.

Nevertheless,

it can be said with confidence, that Bottom Line Management is an
important and fundamental

business practice whose

within Telecom wUl lead to improved efficiency and
(AIRC, Y11VIIAppendix

application
productivity.

Paper 8 p2)

Clearly the Restructuring and Efficiency Principle aided the
introduction of significant changes within Telecom. The structural
efficiency principles led to further significant changes within the
organisation.

For employees covered by the APTU a major restructuring of
classffications was implemented through the SEP process. The
nineteen classifications that originally existed were reduced to six
broadbanded classifications which meant a significant move
towards

multi-skilling

and

the

addition

of

supervisory

responsibilities for some classifications. It was predicted that the
broadbanding would lead to a reduction in demarcations between

classifications and encourage employees to become more involved
in their own skill development (AIRC, 31/5/89).

In the clerical areas discussion under the SEP built on changes
introduced through the clerical integration exercise. The job
reclassification and redesign processes continued, and initiatives
such

as

performance

review

mechanisms,

profit

sharing

arrangements, and provision for the modernisation of awards
were introduced (AIRC, 23/4/1990).

Under the SEP, changes were also introduced to the management
classifications within the organisation. In August

1990 the

Commission certified an agreement under section 115 of the IR
Act between the APEA, the POA, and Telecom. The agreement
provided for wage increases in return for a restructuring of the
executive

classifications

within

the

organisation.

The

restructuring led to:

..significant changes in the executive structure, tncluding a
reduction in the number of executive designations and in due
course in the number of executives..The restructuring also provides
for the elimination of award coverage of some senior executive
positions. (AIRC 30/8/90)

In summary, both the REP and SEP processes led to considerable
changes within Telecom, all of which were designed to increase
the efficiency of the organisation. Quoting Mr Commissioner
Lewin in a decision of June 1990:

The Australian Telecommunications Corporation employs around
80000 employees. The restructuring of the work classifications
across the depth and breadth of such a large and functionally
diverse organisation is a significant task. On the material before
me a great deal has been achieved. Following this decision and
other decisions affecting other awards

and work areas the

classification of the work of the 80000 employees wûl have been
drastically changed. The number of designations of work wUl have
reduced from 470 to J 50, and the number of salary points from
1900 to 600.

The classification of work within these new structures leads to a
much flatter overcdl wage and salary structure. In particular the
new structures establish skiR related career paths which provide
incentive for workers to participate in skUl formation, eliminate
impediments to multiskilUng, broaden the range of tasks which a
worker may be required to perform and ensure that workir^
patterns and arrangements enhance flexibility and the efficiency of
the industry.

In relation to the restructuring of work within Telecom progress has
been made in a number of important areas which wUl also
contribute to the efficient conduct of the enterprise. These include
the development of skills audits and training programmes to fit the
new

career paths, flexible

working arrangements including

broadening the span of working hours for professional grades, the
elimination of certain appeal rights and variations to higher duty
working arrangements. Significant progress has been made toward

a work performance oriented human resources strategy. (AIRC,
7/6/90)

Clearly, a push for efBciency and increased productivity was a
major theme in the cases discussed. In addition, the above cases
reveal that industrial relations with Telecom Australia at the
broad formalised level was not dominated by any major industrial
disputes similar to those that took place in the late 70s and 80s.
Rather, cases heard by Commission involving potentially divisive
issues such as new technology and changed work organisation
seem to have been accompanied not by high levels of industrial
action but by a substantial amoimt of agreement between
management and unions. The unions do not appear to have stood
in the way of change so long as their members were adequately
remimerated. The significant changes under the Structural
Efficiency and Restructuring and Efficiency principles to the
organisation

of work,

and

the

structure

of awards

and

classifications is fiirther evidence of this less conflictual pattern of
industrial relations. Significant changes oriented toward efficiency
goals have been agreed to without major problems.

In this respect, the cases suggest that the pursuit of efficiency
measures at Telecom have been done through consultation
between management and Telecom unions. That is, Telecom
management has not attempted to introduce change by making
unilateral decisions or by adopting aggressive and antagonistic
strategies. Rather, in accord with the Government's consensus
orientation, they have adopted a strategy that is based on the

pursuit of reforms through consultation. In other words, they
have used the REP and SEP processes to introduce, with the
agreement of the imions, measures to improve efficiency; rather
than forcing them through, regardless of whether or not they are
accepted by imions and employees. This orientation was evident
in all the Telecom REP and SEP cases. For example, in the
clerical integration case management representatives put the
view:
that Telecom had achieved by negotiation an agreement which
would allow it to face the corporate and commercial challenges for
at least the next decade. (AIRC, YIIVll^l p2)

It thus appears that, at least at the formalised national level,
Telecom management has moved away from the aggressive
approaches adopted in the 1970s and early 1980s and are,
instead, adopting industrial relations strategies that pursue
reform through consultation.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

The above cases do provide a useful impression of industrial
relations within the organisation and an insight into changes in
Telecom management's industrial relations strategies. However,
an assessment of industrial relations based solely on cases
brought before the Industrial Relation Commission clearly cannot
present a complete picture of the industrial relations climate

Within the organisation. The cases discussed above tended to
involve issues that were dealt with at a national or centralised
level between senior members of the imion and management
hierarchy. While all the cases, particularly those under the
Principles, had major implications for lower levels of the
organisation, the cases themselves do not and cannot be expected
to provide an understanding of the complexion of industrial
relations at lower levels. In particular, proceedings within the
Industrial Relations Commission cannot be expected to provide
direct insights into the nature of workplace industrial relations;
nor the day to day industrial relations approaches or styles of
management.
In order to establish a more complete picture, in January and
February of 1990 the author undertook a series of in-depth
interviews of managers and unionists primarily working in the
WoUongong and Wagga Wagga districts of Telecom. In all, 22
people were interviewed: specifically: 2 managers at the regional
level (located at Burwood); 9 at district management level (5 from
WoUongong and 4 from Wagga Wagga); 3 supervisors (1 from
WoUongong and 2 from Wagga Wagga); and 8 union
representatives (4 from WoUongong and 4 from Wagga Wagga).
The interviewees were drawn from the major occupational
groupings in the organisation: administration, technical and
lines. Interviews ran for periods of between 1 to Shrs^ and
covered a range of topics related to the interviewees experience of
and attitude towards industrial relations. More particularly,
^ Many interviews were conducted over two sessions of around 1.5 hours each.

interviewees were asked open ended question that were aimed to
establish the following:
views on the present industrial relations climate within
the organisation: for example, how conflictual industrial
relations was when compared to earlier periods, and what
issues were having the greatest impact upon industrial
relations at their levels;
opinions on the quality and role of management at
various levels in the organisation and the quality and role
of trade unions and trade imion representatives: in
particular, interviewees were asked about the strategies
adopted by management to industrial relations and the
character of the role adopted by unions;
the impact that the push towards commercialisation and
privitisation is having upon industrial relations and
peoples attitudes within the organisation at their level;
and
differences between the character of industrial relations
in rural centres, such as Wagga Wagga, and in more
urban/industrial centres, such as WoUongong.
The findings of the interviews are discussed below starting with
the views and beliefs of management.

MANAGERS

A consistent theme among managers was that industrial relations
at the regional or local level had improved over the last 10 years.
In the past, it was argued, industrial relations had been a real
problem at the local level. In recent years, however, the situation
had improved considerably. All managers claimed that they had
very few problems in the industrial relations area: industrial
relations was generally consensual and collaborative.

Managers argued that the major reason for this improvement was
a fundamental change in the industrial relations approach
adopted by managers. In the past, they argued, Telecom
management had been autocratic, unapproachable and unwilling
to inform or communicate with the unions and employees.
Quoting one of the managers in Wollongong:

We had a management team in those days that was very
autocratic. My boss in particular, who is no longer with us, I got
along alright with him; nobody else did. He was reaRy pig headed
and his immediate boss, who worked on the sixthfloor,never
stopped off at one of the otherfloorsin the ten years that he was
up there, and never left his office either. And he was an autocratic
engineer. That was the working environment that we were working
in. I could get through to my boss but it was very difficult. The way
Ifl)und to do it wcLS to visit the same bowling club as he did, and I
could get through to him over a beer. But I couldn't at work,
whatever they said went. They weren't willing to listen.

This particular manager claimed that imder the previous
managerial approach the only way that employees could get
things done was to go to the imion. The impact of this, he
implied, was that people began to automatically go to the union
first, regardless of the nature or importance of the problem they
wished to raise.

It was claimed by managers that the old autocratic approach had
given way to a far more open approach, which stressed effective
communication and consultation and, as a result, was having
beneficial effects upon industrial relations. The new management
approach, it was argued, was underpinned by the notion that
most industrial relations problems could be avoided by open and
honest consultation between the parties and by ensuring that
employees have a say in decision making. The following quotes
from managers illustrate these ideas very effectively:

I have always found it best to approach people in an open and
honest manner, and make them aware of as many of the facts that
you have available to you as is possible. So that when you are
discussing either a conflict or a problem they have, you are both
looking at the same set of facts „.You can establish some rapport
with people, and ask them what their real concerns are..you
usuaRy find that the real concern is unrelated to the issue that is
on the table at the time, and it is a matter of reaRy getting to that
before you can start talking.

If there is no result yet, you go and tell them there is no results

yet „that is good because then the association rep will come up
and say "have you heard anything yet' or "what is going on" and
they feel more free to talk to you..so it is Just a matter of
establishing an open relationship with people.
And
You have got to get to the staff and talk to them and you wHlfind
they wiR respond to Just your being there and speaking to them.
You mightn't have to speak to them on anything concerning work. I
have found that my style of management is Just to make myself
available and to discuss anything they want to raise. I wUl start
talking and give them an opportunity to make some leading
questions or comments Just to get them talking. I feel thats paid off
enormously.
It was clear from interviews with most of the managers that the
new open communicative approach was part of a general change
in Telecom management's strategies toward industrial relations
and the management of employees. The aggressive confrontation
strategies associated with the Fraser period were being replaced
by an emphasis upon consultation with unions and open
commimication with employees.
It was apparent that the strategy of consultation associated with
the formalised REP and SEP process was also being adopted in
order to facilitate the implementation of other reforms. For
example, the regional human resources manager pointed out that

the introduction of changes to the structure of districts within his
region (discussed in the next chapter) had only commenced once
in-principle agreements were reached between unions and
management. More broadly, the major restructure of Telecom's
corporate structure (also discussed in the next chapter) was
underpinned, he indicated, by a management strategy which
included a considerable period of negotiation between senior
management and all Telecom unions.
The regional human resource manager also indicated that the
formulation of industrial relations strategies had become a vital
aspect of all management initiated reforms within the
organisation. He stated that in line with the general push for
decentralisation, management at lower levels in the organisation
were being made responsible for the formulation of industrial
relations strategies. In the past he argued:
the decision was made and then the industrial relations strategy
was built to deliver that decision. Therefore the final outcome was
not always what was wanted because you had to compromise. If
you come up with an idea now, you have got to come up with the IR
strategy to go along with it. Which means they (managers) have to
think: instead of thinking this is a brilliant idea, we wUl shut this
place here and then somebody else can go through all the pain. Yes
it won't get considered now untd we see the IR strategy and what
we wiR do is, we wiR comment on the IR strategy. Our experts wtil
actually say, no you have got a hole here and a hole there. In the
past we have built the strategy for them and that is where we

failed because we never made the managers think in terms of
industrial relations and they should have beerL
It was inferred by the human resource manager that the
emphasis upon the incorporation of industrial relations strategies
into management decisions at all levels within the organisation
was a major explanation for improved industrial relations. His
argimient was verified by other managers who indicated that this
new approach in association with a more consultative orientation
was having a very beneficial effect.

According to a number of managers, the emphasis upon more
consensual based industrial relations strategies was, at least in
part, related to new corporate level strategies that emphasised the
pursuit of increased efficiency and competitiveness through a
concentration on the needs of customers. These strategies it was
argued portrayed the success of a customer focus as dependent
on

providing

employees

with

meaningful

work

and

the

opportunity to be involved in decision making.

In this respect, some managers mentioned the organisation's
Vision 2000 initiative which had been developed at the corporate
level in 1986. Vision 2000 was designed to improve performance
by focusing on what was called three core values: putting
customers first; using employees to make it possible through
cooperation and teamwork; and seeing business success as a key
to the future. In line with this orientation, imder the Vision 2000
program people throughout the organisation were encouraged to

participate in local projects aimed

at improving Telecom's

operations (ATC 1988; ATC 1989).

The most common initiative mentioned was the move toward
Total

Quality Management

(TQM). TQM was

described

by

managers as a strategy that involved the pursuit of continuous
improvement through a combination of scientific management
methods and participation by employees. Quoting one manager at
length:

TQM, what does that means? What we are saying is that every
single thing that happens in the company should be of quality.
Quality is not Just high quality but quality as defined by the
customers. Also, we never say we have achieved the required
quality: it is a process of continuous improvement. It is a
management philosophy which is based on a top down approach.
This means that managers create the systems that people work in,
and managers are responsible for changing the system.

What we are saying is you get your work process and you get it
down to the most simple non-complex way of doing it so that it is
absolutely foolproof. And what that basically comes down to is
using two sources of information: statistical process control which
involves scvsntiflc management techniques, and participative
management - the people that work in the process are the experts.
So the idea is for managers to get these two bodies of special
knowledge together in order to work on changing things.

Asked what assumption TQM makes about peoples' attitudes the
same manager said:

That people are basically good and want to do a goodJob and what
managers have done over the last whatever years has put
impediments in their way. So what managers now need to do is
take away those impediments and allow people to take pride in
their work agairL

Not all managers agreed that the improvement in industrial
relations was simply due to more consensual industrial relations
strategies bolstered by participative approaches such as Vision
2000 and TQM. Some managers indicated that the reality was a
bit more complex. For example, one manager argued that the
depressed

economic

times

and

the

consequent

risk

of

unemployment meant workers were less willing to engage in
strike action. This manager also argued that the threat of
privitisation meant workers shied away from highly visible
industrial disputation. Another manager claimed that, in addition
to the shift in management strategies, the improvement in
industrial relations was related to a more constructive attitude on
the part of unions. He argued that unions appeared to be more
willing to talk and accept change. This he claimed was because
unionists were better trained and more skillful than in the past.

While all the managers interviewed argued that industrial
relations had improved, none claimed that the situation was

perfect. Industrial relations problems still arose.

A source of local problems according to many managers was
industrial relations developments and activities at the national
level. Political activity between the senior union officials and
senior Telecom management, it was commonly argued, created
delays and problems at the local level that could very easily boil
over and create real industrial problems:

I dislike the way things seem to be polttically linked all the time in
that we are always playing one game against another game at a
higher level than the real topic thafs on the table. That annoys the
heU out of me, that these guys at the depot level sometimes are
used as pawns in a game when the win or lose has to be
determined

somewhere

outside

of

the

district

While

the

Associations argue that they are doing the best for their members,
in actual fact they, through many wheels and cogs, are linking it to
something else in order to get a win against Telecom. I guess that
is the nature of industrial relations but it doesn't go along with my
open policy.

In this regard, one manager argued that it was important to tiy
and keep industrial relations down at the local level. To let it go
any higher, he claimed, was to lose control:

My view on industrial relations is try and keep it local, try and
keep it down to the lowest number of people. Once it gets to state
level well they are playing politics - I'm talking management side -

you lose control of it. So if a manager wants to maintain control of
his own district or industrial relations, he has to keep it local; once
it has gone outside the local area I think you have failed.

The issue of politics was raised by other managers, but most
commonly in terms of union politics. In particular, the political
aspirations of individual unionists were highlighted by a number
of managers as a factor that could create difficulties:

GeneraRy, I find the people in the union movement are fairly
cooperative with the exception of a couple of hard ones whose role
in life seems to be to score points to keep themselves in office
rather than look at the business that we are in and trying to work
with the district management to, in a cooperative sense, try and do
the bestfor Telecom.

The existing structure of unions and attempts to rationalise them
were, for many managers, a source of potential conflict. The
existence of strong demarcations between the ATEA/APTOA and
the AFTU was, according to some managers, a severe limitation
on the viability of the organisation. Without the creation of "one
workforce", it was argued, Telecom would not be able to compete
effectively in a deregulated market. Because of this, managers
saw the amalgamation of the ATEA/ATPOA and APTU as the most
important industrial relations issue needing to be addressed:

The biggest issue that is going to hit this place, I think, is the one
workforce. They are going to have to address that one - the

amalgamation of the two mcyor unions - in the immediate JUture, in
the next two years, if we are going to be a viable organisation.
While union structure and politics were a source of frustration,
surprisingly, all managers argued that unions were vital and far
from irrelevant in the organisation. In fact, a common theme was
that unions were an important management tool, who helped to
improve the flow of information between management and
employees:

Well I use trade unionism, the union reps at the depot I get them
together, I speak to them to sort out their area, I say 'what are your
problems, be open with me', I let them talk to me and I talk to them,
Thafs the way I get the feeling of the bloke that is more in the
background„By using the union reps I can get to the seat of the
problem.

and

They can tell you things that are worrying somebody that you don't
know about and that you wouldn't probably find out about and it
probably would have festered. Also if you can convince the union
rep that you are telling him the truth, then the person gets it from
another source who they trust and are more likely to believe it. So
thafs handy, I don't know whether it always works that way. It
certainly works here.

Over and above these issues, according to all managers, were
problems related to the enormous amount of change faced by the
organisation and the considerable imcertainties this created for
employees. All managers indicated that the future was
exceedingly uncertain and many indicated that this was having a
detrimental influence upon the morale of their employees. This,
they argued, would eventually have a detrimental impact upon
industrial relations. The perception was backed up by a large
culture survey undertaken by a consultancy firm in both
districts, which had Just been completed and the time of the
interviews. According to the managers who had seen the results,
the survey indicated, amongst many other things, that Telecom
employees suffered from very poor morale. This, many managers
argued, was particularly related to strong rumours about the
future of the organisation and the very real threats of job losses
associated with the moves towards a commercial orientation.
Many of the managers empathised with their employees concerns
but could do nothing about it. Their employees wanted more
information but they, the managers, were Just as much in the
dark and under threat.
SUPERVISORS

Turning to the views of the supervisors on industrial relations
within Telecom, they appeared to agree fairly strongly with
managers that industrial relations within the organisation at the
local level had improved considerably. A major reason for this
improvement according to one of the supervisors was the change

in the economy and the introduction of new technology. In the
past trade unions, he argued, had had a strangle hold on the
community, but the downturn in the economy and the
introduction of new forms of technology had left unions with little
clout. This supervisor also insisted that change was related to
improvements in the skills and strategies of management. He
claimed that, while they could still improve, management's style
was changing from the autocratic to the open and this, he
suggested, had led to real Improvements:
The guys actuoRy know who the district manager is, they know
him on a first name basis, he speaks to them, he knows their
problems..tt has meant such a change for this area you wouldn't
know it. There is not some siRy bastard up there who knows
nothing about us, he is a part of us..
It was also argued that industrial relations within the
organisation had improved because imion officials and
representatives had become more skillful. As one supervisor put
it:
„the unions have had to smarten up their game and I think that all
trade union people at the top levels are much more skillful than
they were years ago. Before, the union official, he was a good
crowd pleaser and he could tell aJoke, and he could drink., he was
one of the boys. But now, you only have to look at the top people in
union management, the Simon Créons, the BiR Keltys, they are
very intelligent, and it wouldn't matter what side of the fence they

were on, they would stUl succeed.

In line with this, all the supervisors agreed that unions had a
vital role to play, but not in the way argued by managers: as a
useful tool. Rather, unions, they argued, were an important form
of protection for individuals:

You have got to have someone to represent yow Managers, they
are only individuals, anyway, a lot of the tune they are carrying out
duties which they have been instructed to do. Unions, you know,
they have different sources.Xhey have got more access to higher
bodies or parliamentarians. You definitely have got to have them. If
you worked for a smaR company, you can speak to your boss
directly and you can work out a deal with him as an individujoL In
a big company like Telecom you can't do that so you have got to
have someone to represent you.

Also in accord with managers, the supervisors did not think that
industrial relations in Telecom was perfect. They expressed fears
about what might happen in the future. All argued that the
uncertainties faced by all Telecom employees could cause
industrial problems. Quoting one of the supervisors:

Once again they (the staff) are getting the same vibes as an
elephant or ant gets, instinctive things that have to do with
preservation. Now if you don't know or you are not too sure, and
the future doesn't look good and there is a possibRity that Mr
Hawke has let you down, and even senior managers are not

prepared to tell you things because they don't really know whether
they have it right, it is not very morale boosting.

UNION RBPRESENTATIVES

Most union representatives argued that industrial relations had
improved considerably and that this was primarily related to
management's more open strategies. They agreed with the views
expressed by management and supervisors regarding the
autocratic style of management in the past. Quoting one of them:

When I came here ten years ago, the administration managers here
in those days were very senior men and very old men, they were
all old school tie blokes. The wiions to them were a disease to be
dealt with. If you wanted something, for instance, if you couldn't
totally Justify it you wouldn't get it. It was ridiculous the things that
were going on.

This closed approach led, the xmion representatives argued, to
considerable industrial relations problems:

It got to the stage here that we would get no answer whatsoever.
So we said righto it is no good going to you, we have given you a
chance so we wHljust ring Sydney. It is pretty bloody crook if you
go and bypass your local people..by gees there were some
disputes.

However,

a

new management

emerged,

which

was

based

approach,
on

they argued,

improved

had

communications.

Industrial relations they claimed had improved as a result:

.„before when they used to introduce things, they didn't talk to the
unions, or the people, they Just said: "bang this is it, as from
Monday you wUl do things this way". Now when they introduce
thirds the first thing they do is caR in the executive of the subbranch and explain what they want to do and ask what do you
think about it.

and

We know that if we have got a problem we go straight through the
manager now. I wouM say it has improved 400 percent and thats
a bloody lot, even in my opinvort

Two representatives argued that, while the industrial relations
climate was better than in the past and management's approach
definitely improving, some managers still adopted behaviour
which created unnecessary industrial problems. It was claimed
these

managers

representatives

were

creating

felt unable

an

to trust

"air

of suspicion".

management

The

generally

because they never really knew what some managers wanted or
were trying to do:

It would be nice to be able to Just go to a meeting, and put your
cards straight on the table and know that management is doing

exactly the same. You know it would Just save so much time and
so many problems.

One union representative argued that industrial relations had
deteriorated. A large part of the reason for this, he argued, was
the existence of exceedingly bad lines of formal communications
throughout the organisation. Quoting him:

Like one of the things that I have noticed within Telecom is that
communication is hopeless and yet on the grape vine you find out
within a day and then you might get a piece of paper coming
through the system that is two or three months old.

More specifically, he claimed that local industrial relations was,
when compared to that at the national level, very poor. This
delegate consistently argued that his relationship with more
senior levels of management outside the district was far more
consensual than his relationship with local managers. The major
cause of this he argued was that the local managers lacked
industrial relations skills.

As with managers and supervisors, union representatives strongly
identified imcertainty and the continuous process of change going
on in the organisation as a major source of potential problems. All
claimed that morale was low because of insecurities about the
future. As the following quote reveals, many people saw no future
in the organisation and were looking for ways to get out:

Fred said to meJ'l'm thinking of getting out very shortly, I cant see
any Juture for us". He says "ten years Telecom wtil be lucky to be
here". Everyone is ux)rried, and the common thing is that Telecom
won't be here in ten years time.
The other threat to industrial relations according to a number of
union representatives was changes at the top of the organisation.
At the time of the interviews, a senior level manager in the
organisation had been recently replaced by a new manager
recruited overseas. The imion representatives were very
suspicious about this development claiming that the "Canadian"
(he was rarely referred to by name) was brought in to take the
unions on and break theml^:
Yes he is taking us on, thofs why they got him over here.
Canadians, they are no different from the bloody Yanks. They have
cdl got the same bloody view. You've come when its nice and quite.
I reckon if you come back in twelve months, if this bloke isn't
shifted out of the way, you will find things starting to turn bad
again.
On the issue of union coverage, representatives claimed that the
amalgamation of the APTU and ATEA/ATPOA was inevitable. In
addition, they argued that it was an important and very valuable
development. However, most indicated that the amalgamation
process would not be easy. Some argued that the extreme rivalry
between the two unions and the chauvinistic attitudes of some
The "Canadian" was one among many overseas managers brought in at the senior level of the organisation.
Employees tended to view these people suspiciously, believing they were henchman intent on destroying the
organisation.

sections of the membership would cause difficulties. Others
claimed that the two tmions had different ways of operating which
made them incompatible. Quoting an ATEA representative:

There is a lot of differences within the two wiions. Ows is a totally
democratic wiiorL If it comes down to a decision, which is going to
be a charge of policy or a new wage system or a new
superannuation scheme, the decision has to go to a mass meeting.
With the APTU the executive makes the decision and then they
might put it to the members or they might not: it doesn't really
matter. You are talking to a centralised body making decisions for
30,000 members or something.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN RURAL COMBIUNITIES

As the above discussion indicates, the overall orientation of the
interviews was towards establishing a broad imderstanding and
impression of the issues affecting the character of industrial
relations within the organisation at regional or local levels.
However,

part

of

each

interview

was

also

focused

on

distinguishing the differences between industrial relations in
rural and urban environments. The reason for this relates to
location of this study. The events being studied took place within
a rural context. It is important, therefore, to establish not only the
character of industrial relations in the organisation generally, but
also whether industrial relations within Telecom in rural areas
has its own unique character.

Ill

In terms of the issues discussed above, managers, supervisors
and union representatives in Wagga Wagga responded in pretty
much the same way as their counterparts in WoUongong. The
dominant argument that industrial relations was good and
improving; that unions had a vital role to play despite political
machinations; that amalgamation of the ATEA/ATPOA and the
AFTU was vital but difficult; and that the largest potential
problem related to imcertainty and consequent low morale was
shared by interviewees across the two regions. Despite this, a
number of the managers, supervisors, and union representatives
interviewed had had recent experience in both districts or in rural
and urban areas and they indicated strongly that there were real
differences. These people were asked to discuss the differences
and put forward possible explanations.

The dominant argument was that industrial relations in rural
areas was far less conflictual, that imionism was weaker, and
that employees were generally less militant. All people interviewed
made this claim with one partial exception: one manager argued
that, although rural people were less militant and industrial
relations less problematic in rural areas, rural workers when
involved in a dispute could fight Just as hard and long as their
urban colleagues.

The reasons put forward for the difference were varied, but in
broad terms could be divided into two general themes. One set of
arguments related to the comparatively weaker economic and
political power of people working in rural communities, while

Other arguments had to do with the perceived character and
nature of daily life in country towns.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, arguments of the first type were
predominantly put by union representatives. It was argued that
people in rural commimities tended to be trapped in a fairly weak
labour market. Rural communities offered few good employment
opportunities and, therefore, once in a Job workers tended to be
reluctant to Jeopardise their positions by engaging in industrial
conflict. On the other hand people in urban areas, it was argued,
tended to have more options for emplojnnent and, thus, were
more willing to be industrially active. Further to this, it was
argued that the relatively small numbers of workers in rural
workplaces meant that they were more easily controlled and
influenced by management than their urban coimterparts who,
particularly in places such as WoUongong, were surrounded by a
strong imion movement and industrial culture. Finally, it was
argued, that workers in rural communities lacked the industrial
muscle of urban workers because of their poor strategic position.
This argimient was put most clearly by a manager who said:

In the metro they have got more power, you know, you have got a
huge telephone exchange like Pitt Street- largest telephone
exchange in Australia, You have got huge industrial power. Why
does it reoRy matter in the big world if a place like Tumut exchange
goes off the air because of industrial problems- not that it wouldbut it doesn't reaRy matter in the big picture. It matters to the
Tumut people. But does it matter nationolly? I don't think it does.

Arguments that related to the character and nature of daily life in
rural

communities

seemed

to be

more

popular

amongst

supervisors and managers^ 1. It was argued that the quality of life
in rural commimities was far better than that which existed in
the city and this meant workers were more satisfied and less
concerned about industrial conditions and less willing to engage
in industrial action. As the following quote indicates, to most
interviewees a 'better quality of life' meant a slower or less intense
pace of work and business activity:

Sydney, I wouldn't like to live there, I could think of nothing worse.
The few times I go up there on courses you turn around and have
to get up at bloodyfiveo'clock in the morning. Like I am up at five
anyway, but I'll turn around, I'll meander through the house and
you know, have a cup of tea and feed the cat, and read a bit or
something like that. But if I was in the city, I would have to race for
the train. Then, you know, you are in there aR bloody day in the
same environment and you come out and you are Just glad to get
away, but you leave in the dark and you get home in the dark.

The quality of life argument was a common one, but perhaps the
most common argument was based on the notion that rural
communities are smaller and far more close knit than urban
commimities. Virtually every person interviewed argued that in
rural communities, because of their size, you were far more
visible as an employee, and, indeed, representative, of Telecom
Australia than were people who work for the organisation in

^ ^It must be said that some of these argumorits portraved rural life m highly romanticised and idealistic terms.

urban areas. That is, you are more likely to meet and socialise
with customers outside of work and, thus, more likely to have to
take you Job home with you and face comments and criticisms
about the organisation. This meant, it was argued, that rural
Telecom workers had a greater incentive, or were put under more
pressure to perform. As one supervisor put it:

We live with our customers. Now I have got to go homefromhere. I
go and have a beer at the pub, they (the other drinkers) are all my
customers and they all know where I work, I might seR them a
phone, they might ask me to do something about their phone or
something else. So, you are dealing with your customers all the
time. It makes you realise that you have got to do your Job well or
make sure its done wellfor you.
These strong community linkages and pressures, it was argued,
had an influence on industrial relations: people were far less
willing to engage in industrial action both because they didn't
want to inconvenience their friends and acquaintances and
because they wished to avoid derision and anger from other
members of their community.
Summarising the above, the overall impression from the
interviews was that industrial relations in rural communities is
less problematic for a range of social and economic reasons.
However, given that the impressions held by unionists, managers,
and supervisors of industrial relations in their region did not vary

to any substantial degree between interviewees in Wollongong and
Wagga Wagga it is tempting to play down the claim. That is, to a
certain extent the claim that industrial relations in the country
was more consensual than in urban areas was in contradiction
with the fact that interviewees regardless of where they came from
tended to make similar statements about the general nature of
industrial relations in their own district. But, the similarities may
be coincidental. Perhaps, at other times or in other contexts the
differences may manifest in different levels of industrial conflict.
In addition, the perceptions were so strong that to deny the
claims would be to ignore a possibly powerful influence in its own
right: people may come to act in accord with their own visions
and beliefs. The issue needs further investigation and, as a result,
will be addressed again briefly in the concluding chapter of this
thesis.

CONCLUSION

The

previous

sections

illustrate

that in

general

industrial

relations within Telecom has been more consensual in the last
eight years than it was in the early 70s and 80s. This is despite
the fact that the organisation has undergone extensive changes
and faces a very imcertain future. It can, perhaps, be tentatively
concluded that the main reason for this was the change in
managerial style and the orientation towards a decentralisation of
decision making in the organisation. In the last chapter MuUer
(1980) was identified as claiming that with the vesting of the

Telecom, management became aggressive and decision making
more centralised. This, it was argued, led to a more conflictual
industrial relations pattern. As the IRC cases indicate and the
interviews demonstrate, the trend in more recent times has been
towards a more decentralised approach to decision making with
management playing a far less autocratic role and adopting far
more communicative and conciliatory strategies towards
industrial relations and the management of their employees.
The general industrial relations climate discussed above and the
reforms described earlier form the context within which the
industrial relations activities in the Riverina region took place.
More specifically, the overall reform process, with its efficiency
orientation, is the driving force behind the changes that have
occurred in the Telecom-Riverina district. That is, they are what
lies behind the attempts to improve the efficiency of the district.
In the following chapters the details of the specific reforms, their
implementation and consequences in the Riverina district are
described.

CHAPTER 5 - THE AIMLALGAMATION STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN NARRANDERA

INTRODUCTION

In the last two chapters a historical overview of Telecom Australia
and a description of industrial relations within the organisation
since 1975 was provided. Specifically, in Chapter 3 a selective
summary of major events and important structural

and

operational changes was presented. In Chapter 4 the broad
character or climate of industrial relations within the organisation
was described. As stated at the beginning of Chapter 3, the aim of
the chapters was to provide a background to the events that have
occurred in the Riverina region of Telecom over the past 4 years.
The major conclusion that can be drawn from these two chapters
is that industrial relations in the last few years has been
consensual when compared with the experience of the early
1980's. This is despite the existence of extensive change,
imcertainties in the future and very low staff morale in the
organisation. The reason for this change, it was hypothesised, is
related to a change in managerial style. There has been a move
away from an antagonistic approach toward a more open and
communicative style and more decentralised decision making
processes.

In

this

chapter

the

focus is

narrowed

considerably

to

developments since 1987 in the Riverina - Murray District of
Telecom. Specifically, the emphasis will be upon a description of
the

progress

of

a

particular

managerial

strategy:

the

amalgamation of the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga districts, and
the effect of this strategy upon the character of industrial
relations within the Narrandera office. This chapter has two aims.
First, it will enable a further examination, at a local level, of the
claim that industrial relations has become more consensual and
management less antagonistic. Second, and more importantly for
this thesis, the chapter will aid and lead into an analysis of the
concept of 'managerial strategy' discussed in Chapter 2.
Data for this and the next chapter was collected during late 1990
and early 1991 in interviews with Telecom managers, supervisors,
clerical staff and union delegates located in the Narrandera and
Wagga Wagga offices and the regional head office at Burwood.
Twenty-five people were interviewed: 12 managers, 4 Junior
managers/supervisors, 4 union delegates and 5 clerical
employees. Interviews ran for between 1.5 and 3 hours in
duration and were aimed at establishing a clear picture of
activity in the Riverina - District. A particular emphasis in the
interviews was put on establishing the influences on and the
impacts of the amalgamation strategy as well as how it was
developed and progressed.
In addition to the interviews, data was collected from the local
Narrandera newspaper. The Narrandera Argus, and from Telecom
annual reports.

^^ Many inteiviews were conducted over two sessions of around 1.5 hours eacL

NARRANDBRA.

Narrandera township is located on the Mumimbidgee River about
100 kilometres west of Wagga Wagga; equidistant from Sydney,
Melbourne and Adelaide. The town is on the outskirts of the
Mumimbidgee Irrigation Area and serves the farmers in the
region who are mainly involved in the production of wheat and
wool (Narrandera Chamber of Commerce, 1965).

The township was officially gazetted on the 28th of April 1863.
The dominant activity in the new town was to serve the needs of
stock owners who used a punt to move their stock across the
Murrumbidgee River. In 1881 the railway reached the town and,
as a result, the population increased and commercial activity
began to grow and diversify. At the turn of the century the
population of the town was 2255 people. In September 1902 a
telephone exchange opened and by 1910 seventy-four subscribers
were connected. In 1908 the town was given an additional boost
with the building of channels for the Murrumbidgee Irrigation
Area. By 1924 Narrandera had a population of more than 10,000
inhabitants. (GamLmage,B. 1986)

However, from the mid 1920s onwards the town went into
decline. By 1933 the population had fallen by 4329 people and
economic decline has continued ever since; particularly over the
last thirty years:

The 1961 - 81 town population was static - officially it rose 6.3%, or

by 295 people, but 244 of these were Aborigines not counted in
1961 - and the 1961 - 85 Shire population outside Narranderafell
by about 27%, from 3720 to an estimated 2400, By 1981 94% of
townspeople were Australian bom, compared with 78% nationally,
and 18.8% were over 60 compared with 13.9 % nationally.
Narrondera

was

becoming a

retirement towru After 1935

residential areas grew, but by 1984 the number of businesses had
fallen by about 25%, and there were fewer larger businesses than
in 1935. The town's largest employers, the railways, the council,
the Ex-Servicemen's Club, were all service related, there were
empty shops in East street, and the town's average income was
well below the national average in 1981. Although unemployment
was about the national average in 1981, 35.9% of employed
townspeople worked for government, compared with a national
average of 24.3%. Narrandera was being propped up by service
industries, many funded from the outside. (Gammage, B. 1986,
pl84)

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in 1981 the
population of the town was 7548. This had decreased to 7386 by
1986 (The Narrandera Argus, 7/10/87). Population figures since
1986 are not available but it can, perhaps, be assumed that the
decline has continued. In fact, it could be reasonably assumed
that the pace of decline has quickened. This is because, starting
jfrom around the beginning of 1988, the 'propping up' mentioned
in the above quote has been progressively withdrawn.

In the last four years nearly all the federal and state government
departments and services in the town have been rationalised.
During the period 1987 to 1991, 165 government positions were
lost from the town. The positions had been in organisations with
a long history in Narrandera such as the State Rail Authority, the
Grain Handling Authority, the Department of Business and
Consumer Affairs, the Education Department, and Medicare.

Some rationalisations involved reductions in staff members, but a
continued service in the town. However, a significant number of
staff cuts were as a result of a complete closure of operations. For
example, the State Rail Authority closed the Narrandera station
and branch lines, and Medicare shut down its local office. The
Grain Handling Authority and the Department of Business and
Consumer Affairs also closed their offices in Narrandera and
added salt to the wounds by moving operations to Wagga Wagga
(Narrandera Argus, 6/10/88)

It is against this backdrop that the activity at the Narrandera
office of Telecom, described below, must be

understood.

Narrandera's long term decline means that any new threat to the
reducing pool of Jobs creates great hostility within

the

community. The effects of this hostility on Telecom management's
strategy to amalgamate the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga
districts will be discussed in the next chapter. In the rest of this
chapter the progress and industrial relations impact of the
amalgamation strategy will be discussed.
^^ There is intense rivalry between Narrandera and Wagga Wagga. People living and working in Narrandera are intensly
suspicious about, and appear to resent, the growth of Wagga Wagga which is now the largest non coastal tovm (city) in
NSW.

DIVISIONALISATION

Before July 1988, Telecom Australia was structured on a state by
state basis with the corporate head office of the organisation
located in Victoria. Each state office was responsible for all
operations within its own geographical boundaries. The NSW
state office in Sydney oversaw 15 districts; one of which was
Narrandera. The Narrandera district extended west from the
township out to Ivanhoe and Balranald in western NSW (ATC,
1988).

In July 1988, following nearly six months of negotiations between
senior management and the major unions, the structure of
Telecom was radically changed. The state based structure of the
organisation was replaced by five separate 'customer divisions':
Corporate Customer Division; Metropolitan Division; Country
Division; Special Business Products Division; and Broadcasting
Division. In addition, a Corporate Centre, and four 'shared
resource units': Network Engineering; Information Systems;
Research; and Services group were created (ATC, 1989).

The rationale behind the change, it was argued, was to make the
organisation a more market oriented, customer based enterprise.
This would enable it to meet the challenge of deregulation by
focusing on the "dual imperatives of financial success and service
quality" (ATC, 1988 pl2).

The new structure crossed state boundaries and was claimed to
be designed to meet the needs of the organisation's different types
of customers. Thus for example, the Corporate Customer Division
was designed to meet the specific need of Australian business,
while the Metropolitan Division was oriented towards the needs of
residential customers in suburban Australia. The role of the
Corporate Centre was to provide advice to the managing director
and to monitor business performance; the "shared resource units"
would provide support to the five operating divisions and the
Corporate Centre. The Country Division, as the name suggests,
was "established to meet the needs of country customers whose
business or place of residence is beyond the metropolitan areas"
(ATC, 1988 p55).
The head office of the Country Division was set up in Brisbane: in
order, it was claimed, to be closer to the customers it was
designed to serve Below the head ofiice level the Division was
divided into seven regions: NSW North; NSW South; Victoria;
Tasmania; Queensland; South Australia and Northern Territory;
and Western Australia. The Narrandera and Wagga Wagga
districts were incorporated into the NSW South Region along with
Bathurst, Goulboum, WoUongong, Campbelltown, and Canberra.

^^ The location of the head office, perhaps, had more to do with the fact the new general manager of the Division had
been the Queensland State Manager.

AMALGAIMLATION

In the 1988 Annual Report pressures for change that would have
a significant impact upon the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga
districts were flagged:

While revenue per service is comparable (in the country) with that
of the metropolttan services, expenses are considerably greater.
High on the list of priorities then wiU be measures to contain the
costs of both providing and maintaining services, particularly in the
rural and remote areas. Maximum use will be made of available
technology to help achieve this aim and attention wûl be given to
management structures and stcff deployment (ATC, 1988 p55)

In line with this statement, senior management in Country
Division put pressure on management in regional head offices to
develop strategies that would improve productivity and efficiency.
This pressure basically took the form of directives to regional
management to find ways of rationalising functions. Divisional
management did not stipulate how this should be done. Rather,
in line with the moves to decentralise decision making, discussed
in the last two chapters, they devolved responsibility for the
formulation and implementation of an appropriate strategy to
regional management. Managers in the new head office of the
South West Region, decided to meet these pressures by
amalgamating districts. This strategy, it was thought, would
increase efficiency and productivity because it would allow a
rationalisation

of

district

management

positions

and

administration functions such as human resource management
andfinance.As one regional manager put it:

..with divisionalisation we looked at what we had inherited as a
region: we had eight districts plus another branch of construction
workers, thats nine branches. We had to ask owselves if we could
sustain that level of management or whether we could reduce some
of that overhead component and some of the layers of
administration. (With amalgamation)..! suppose our aim was to
minimise that amount of overhead component and, with that, aR
the hidden positions that seem to float around.

Once regional management had decided to amalgamate districts a
strategy was developed to enable the determination and
implementation of a new South West Region structure. The
strategy involved two separate but interrelated processes. First,
the regional board, which was composed of aU district managers,
was asked to review the district boundaries. They were asked to
determine whether existing boimdaries were suitable under the
new divisional structure and whether it was possible to alter
boundaries. In order to help this process, district managers in
geographically close districts were asked to investigate their
boimdaries as part of a team exercise. In this regard, the district
managersfiromWagga and Narrandera were put together in one
team.

Second, regional management established working parties who
were sent to each district to analyse operations. Hieir brief was to

determine where community of interests existed and to work out
how many of the eight districts could be effectively amalgamated.
On completion of their studies the working parties put forward
their recommendations to regional management. With regard to
the Narrandera and Wagga districts, they recommended
amalgamation and the creation of one centre of administration.
They also recommended that one manager should be put in
charge of the district.
The recommendations of the working parties on amalgamation
were backed up by the district manager teams. Their discussion
had led to many district managers deciding that the
amalgamation of some districts was important. For example, the
Wagga district manager became aware of proposals, originating
from the Victoria Country Region, for a transfer of control of a
switching area located in the south of the Narrandera district to
the North Eastern District of the Victoria Region. This transfer
would result in the Narrandera district loosing around 7,500 or
about one quarter of its subscribers and would, thus, mean a
thirty per cent reduction in the workload at the Narrandera
District office.
This led the Wagga Wagga district manager to put a proposal to
regional management, and the board of district managers,
suggesting a merger between the Wagga Wagga and Narrandera
districts. His proposal, developed in consultation with the Wagga
Wagga management group, went in to the management structure

of

an

amalgamated

district

and

to

the

timing

of

the

amalgamation. The Narrandera manager, he argued, was due for
retirement in the near future and that would be an ideal time for
an amalgamation of the two districts with the headquarters
located in Wagga Wagga.

In January 1989 regional management decided to amalgamate
the Canberra and Goulbum districts, the Bathurst and Dubbo
districts, the WoUongong and Nowra districts, and the Narrandera
and Wagga Wagga districts. In making these decisions, regional
management decided not to determine where the new district
head quarters would be. Quoting a regional manager who was
involved in the decision to set up a new combined Wagga Narrandera (Riverina Murray) district:

We recommended that there be a centre for administration, that
there he one manager in charge and there be a rationalisation in
the number of managers. We didn't say where that manager
should be located. He could be located at Narrandera or he could
be located at Wagga or even down in Albury because he was
controlling a group of supervisors or managers within the overall
geographic area

So we deliberately didn't say

where the

manager's office was going to be.

This manager stated that the decision about where the new head
office would be was to be left to the discretion of the the District
Manager for the new combined district. In this respect, regional
management decided to advertise all the district manager jobs

and leave the decision about location for the successful applicant.
As part of their amalgamation strategy, during the process of
deciding which districts would be merged, regional management
had discussions with Telecom staff associations and with
representatives of local coimcils. The discussions covered a broad
range of issues including new regional organisation structures,
the likely impact on technical workers and clerical functions, how
affected staff were to be treated, and what would happen to the
managers whose positions were abolished. These discussions led
to in-principle agreement from the staff associations on the
amalgamation of districts. In addition, the staff associations
agreed to the setting up of working parties which would address
the rationalisation of administration and customer services
functions in the new amalgamated districts. Regional
management agreed that no affected employees were to be forced
to transfer or be retrenched.
In discussions with local councils, regional management gave
undertakings that Telecom would ensure a continued presence in
the affected communities. What the concept of "presence" actually
meant, however, was left somewhat ambiguous. As one regional
manager suggested:

And, of course, a lot of discussion took place on what those words
(presence in the community) meant. They wanted an undertaking
that we would never close Bathurst, Goulbum or Narrandera: that
they wUl stay there as a distinct entity. So we had to deal with

their concerns. We couldn't move away from where we were
heading but you had to accommodate the people by coming up with
the right form of words. So the appropriate words got used, which
gave them a life raft, but whether it was tied up to a moving ship or
a dock, they didn't know.
The agreements were presented to the new district managers as
frameworks for progressing the amalgamation of their districts.
In-principle agreement had been reached for the amalgamations
and the consequent rationalisation of managers and clerical staff.
The district managers were given the discretion to determine
where they would locate their headquarters, and which
management positions they would keep. They were also given the
responsibility for deciding who would fill the remaining
management positions, and what rationalisations they would
pursue in the clerical administration and customer services
areas. In addition, as part of their brief the new regional
managers were required to start smoothing over or healing the
wounds and bringing the staff in the two old districts together.
The time firame, set by Regional management, within which this
process was to be completed was three months.
In the Riverina - Murray district this dead-line was not met. As
the following describes, the amalgamation of the districts became
a very drawn out process that was never reaUy completed
satisfactorily. In April 1991 a new structure was introduced that
superseded the district structure and left the amalgamation
strategy incomplete.

The old Wagga Wagga district manager was appointed as the new
Riverina - Murray district manager at the beginning of May 1989.
He had been a reluctant applicant for the position. In fact, he had
to be persuaded by regional management to apply and was
selected from a large field of applicants including the old
Narrandera manager. The old Narrandera district manager
subsequently retired at the beginning of July 1989.

Following his appointment, the District Manager advised that his
first priority was to look at the structure of functional managers
(the management level immediately below the district manager
level) in the new district and to make appointments to positions
that would cover the whole district. In stating this, he was quoted
in the local Narrandera newspaper. The Narrandera Argus, as
indicating that he did not envisage any radical changes:

No sweeping changes were anticipated as a result of the
restructuring of district management and basically the manager's
roles would be the same as previously with a few added
responsibilities such as dealing with budgets and making some
decisions without the need to take them to the District
Management. (The Narrandera Argus, 30/589)

At this stage the new district manager evidently did not envisage
a wholesale rationalisation of management positions. The major
change he foresaw, was the removal of the old Narrandera district
manager position:

..it was Just a matter of removing [the old Narrandera manager],
who was prepared to retire, and then putting the district under one
management, giving it a new name, and leave the management
structure underneath, everyone was to retain theirJobs,

Prior to the amalgamation, the Narrandera district had fifty five
staff working in the district head office. Five of these were
managers: the district manager: one internal plant and one
external plant manager: a customer services manager and an
administration manager. In the Wagga Wagga district these
positions were duplicated. Below the functional manager position
there were several first line management positions in each
district. The initial stages of the amalgamation saw the new
district manager identify eight managerial positions as being
surplus to requirement: the district manager Narrandera, three
functional manager positions, two district financial coordinators,
one senior personnel officer and one operations analysis position.
The impact of these changes on Narrandera management, the
new district manager claimed, would be the loss of two fimctional
manager positions and their replacement with a more senior
management position:

In effect Narrandera wiü be losing two managerial positions due to
the combination of the Customer Services and Administration
Managers' positions, and in their place would gain the Commercial
Manager, who would control both these areas as well as financial
procedures and stores. (The Narrandera Argus, June 22, 1989)

In addition, he stated that two new district positions: Finance
Manager and Staff Relations Manager, would be established. One
or both of these new positions, he stated, could be located in
Narrandera.

At the beginning of July 1989, the Riverina-Murray District
Manager announced that appointments had been made to the
Staff Relations and

Finance Manager positions.

He

also

announced that the successful applicants had come from Wagga
and that the new positions would be located in Wagga. In
addition,

during July

1989

the

old

Narrandera

district

Administration Manager was appointed as the Commercial
Manager of the Narrandera office. The old district Customer
Services Manager subsequentiy retired in September 1989.

Thus, as a result of the amalgamation by July 1989 the new
district had one District Manager and six functional management
positions;

a

Commercial Manager

at Wagga Wagga

and

Narrandera; and four external and internal plant management
positions renamed as Operations Manager (Service) Narrandera,
Operations Manager (Service) Wagga Wagga, and Operations
Manager

(Network)

Narrandera

and

Operations

Manager

(Network) Wagga Wagga. The Finance Manager and Staff
Relations Manager positions were located at one level below
functional management.

However, this structure did not exist for very long. According to
the District Manager, it became clear over the following months
that more functional management positions could be rationalised.
He argued that the district didn't need the same number of
managers under a combined structure as existed when the two
separate districts existed. The drive to extend the rationalisation,
he argued, was logical and necessary. Thus, a second phase of
rationalisation commenced which involved the cutting out of two
more functional management positions.
In February 1990 the Riverina-Murray District Manager was
forced to resign from the organisation for unspecified reasons. His
position was temporarily filled by a manager from the Canberra
district.
In early April 1990 the temporary district manager announced
that the Operations Manager (Services) Narrandera and
Operations Manager (Services) Wagga Wagga positions were to be
combined into one district wide position entitled District
Operations Manager (Services). The position, which was
subsequently filled by an applicant from another rural district,
was to be located in Wagga Wagga. The old Wagga Wagga
Operations Manager (Services) had previously transferred to
another district while the old Narrandera manager was moved
sideways to a daily operational position.
During May 1990, the two Commercial Manager positions were
amalgamated. The Wagga Wagga Commercial Manager was

appointed to the new district wide position; the Narrandera
Commercial Manager was appointed as Office Manager
(Administration) Narrandera and a new position; Office Manager
(Customer Services) Narrandera, was created. The office manager
positions were non-fimctional management positions reporting to
the new District Commercial Manager. Thus, the Narrandera
Commercial Manager was effectively demoted. Possibly because of
this, following his appointment to the office manager position he
took a redundancy package and left the organisation.
In June 1990 a regional level manager was appointed as the new
permanent Riverina District Manager. He inherited a district
where all but one of the functional level managers were located in
Wagga Wagga. The Management structure at the Narrandera
office had been reduced to one functional manager: Operations
Manager (Network) Narrandera, the Office Manager (Customer
Services) plus a number of supervisory positions. The Office
Manager (Administration) position was left vacant after the
departure of the Narrandera commercial manager.
In the next phase of the amalgamation process the new District
Manager shifted his attention from the management structure to
the clerical levels of the district.
Around the end of August 1989, five vacant permanent customer
services positions at the Narrandera office were filled by
temporary staff employed on month-to-month contracts. In July
1990 the new District Manager and Commercial Manager decided

to push the rationalisation process further by not renewing the
contracts for the five temporary staff beyond the middle of August
1990. According to the Commercial Manager, the five had
originally been appointed to allow an easy transition to new local
clerical structures associated with the implementation of the
clerical integration package (agreed to under the 1988 Award
Restructuring process discussed in Chapter 4). He argued that
the positions could not be Justified over the long term. Narrandera
had a smaller staff to customer ratio than Wagga and Albury and
retention of the positions was, therefore, not economically
rational. Quoting him:

I mean the sort of numbers for Albury were something like 28 staff
and 40,000 customers and similar sorts of figures at Wagga. At
Narrandera they had 25 people rwining only 30,000 customers
and a whole lot less turnover as well It is a dead sort of area over
there and it would be obvious to Blind Freddy that they needed to
get rid ofpeople.
Further, the Commercial Manager stated that the timing of the
terminations was driven by award provisions which provided for
the automatic conversion of temporary employment to
permanency after 12 months continuous service.
The reaction of Narrandera clerical staff to the decision was
hostile and involved industrial action (discussed further in the
second half of this chapter). As a result, the implementation of

the proposal involved a series of negotiations between district
management and local union delegates. FuriJier discussions took
place between management at the regional level in Burwood and
full time officials of the Public Service Union. The outcome of
these discussions was that two of the five temporary employees
were provided with 18 hours part time work each per week. It was
also agreed that the possibility of the two people being given full
time permanent work would be investigated after six weeks when
it was imderstood that a number of full time employees were
scheduled to retire.

Following the six week period and a review of the staffing
situation, both part-timers were reinstated: one in a position
vacated by a retiring employee. The overall result, therefore, was a
reduction in four positions.

The next stage in the amalgamation process involved the
rationalisation of clerical administration fimctions within the new
district. Before the amalgamation, both districts had clerical
areas which looked after the administration of personnel and pay
records and works and costing functions. Following the start of
the amalgamation process, the administration areas continued to
exist and function as separate areas. Despite being flagged as
areas needing rationalisation in the original agreement between
regional level management and the unions (struck during the first
half of 1989), as of May 1990, fifteen people were still located in
the Narrandera office administration area and seventeen in the

Wagga office

In addition, each section was still run by a Junior

management position below which were several supervisory
positions.

However, on his appointment the temporary district manager
decided to push for an amalgamation and rationalisation of the
two administration areas. Separate administration areas, it was
argued, could not be allowed to continue because they created
inefficiencies and potential discrepancies in the way employees
were remunerated and handled.

As one fimctional manager

argued:

We have in Narrandera and in Wagga personnel sections that look
after the welfare of the staff, whether it be leave or whatever. Now
aR of owr employees whether they work out of Narrandera or
Wagga their detaUs are on PERKINS the data base. There is no
reason,

therefore, why administration has

to be

done

at

Narrandera, because it can be done just as easily at Wagga They
could do the whole lot from one centre. Thus, you would have Just
one area controUing the clerical activities associated with the day
to day work of the field staff. Also with only one area there would
only be one interpretation of particular guidelines. We have had
trouble at Narrandera with administration people adhering to what
they beUeve to be the letter of the award; whereas the people in
Wagga interpreted it in a completely different way. So you had two
different interpretations within the one district.

^^ Administration functions for the Albury office had been handled by Wagga Wagga prior to the decision to
amalgamate districts.

In slightly more direct terms, the Commercial Manager argued:

The adwinistration group is a support group to management; most
of management is at Wagga and is going to remain that way,
therefore, the support group should be at Wagga and that is what
we should be working towards.

In line with the District Manager's decision, in May 1990 the
Commercial Manager devised a strategy aimed at the long term
transfer of all administrative fimctions from Narrandera to Wagga
Wagga. District management's ideal option would have been to
transfer all the functions over in one quick move; however, this
was not seen to be a realistic first step:

(We decided) that we would tolerate a certain amount ofoutposting
at Narrandera in order not to upset individuals too much there. We
obviously tried not to do it in one hit because that would create a
lot of turmoil for the people over there. So, those that are interested
and committed over there we

wUl probably give them the

opportunity to continue; with some disadvantage to us really
because option one would have been to shift the whole bloody
thing over here to Wagga and get the structure up and running
under one person and probably not have anything else.

In line with the original 1989 agreement between Regional
management and the unions on the amalgamation process, at the
end of May 1990 the District and Commercial manager
established a working party. The working party was to be

composed of employees drawn from tJie Narrandera and Wagga
Wagga offices. Its terms of reference were to come up with
recomimendations on how to most efficiently structure
administrative functions within the amalgamated district and to
investigate the potential for rationalisation of the customer
services area.
After several months of deliberation, the working party
recommended that staffing levels in the customer services area in
both the Wagga Wagga and Narrandera offices should remain as
they were. Further, they suggested that the structure of the areas
should be left to each office to review. They recommended that no
rationalisation of the administration functions should take place,
but it was suggested that administration duties could be shared
more equitably between the offices. This could be achieved, the
working party claimed, by transferring work to the Narrandera
office.
The working parties recommendations were clearly not in line
with those hoped for by the new District Manager, nor the
Commercial Manager. As a result, following receipt of the working
parties recommendations, the Commercial Manager developed his
own proposals for a re-structured administration area. His
proposals provided for a rationalisation of the administration
function.

In September 1990 this proposal was put to a new representative
group of staff from both the Narrandera and Wagga offices who
undertook to discuss the proposal with other employees back at
the workplace. The representatives returned with a range of
suggested modifications only a few of which district management
agreed to. As a result, it was decided that the proposal would be
put to a vote of employees via the state branch of the Public
Service Union.
At the beginning of November 1990 the Commercial Manager sent
a revised version of the proposed structure to the PSU
accompanied by a letter indicating that the proposal took into
account, as far as practicable, the concerns raised by staff. In the
letter the Commercial Manager also highlighted the importance of
having the new structure implemented as soon as possible.
The structure proposed by the Commercial Manager envisaged a
full integration of the administration function under the control of
one Junior management position (Administration Officer). The
Administration Officer was to be located in Wagga Wagga and
would be responsible to the Commercial Manager. Administration
functions would continue at Narrandera over the short term and
would be overseen by a supervisory position reporting to the
Administration Officer. The work of the Narrandera section, it was
proposed, would not be discrete but an integral part of the
administration workload for the whole district.

In the short term, the impact of the proposal on staffing levels for
the whole district was identified as a reduction by five positions,
all of which were located in the Narrandera office. In addition, it
was proposed that three other positions would be transferred to
Wagga Wagga. This would leave a total of seven administration
staff located at the Narrandera office.

Within the proposal it was clearly stated that over the long term
all administration fimctions at Narrandera were to be phased out:

It is part of the longer term strategy that all admin Junctions would
be performed by one group based in Wagga. Positions which
become vacant at Narrandera would, therefore, be transferred to
Wagga and physically filed at that centre provided that they
continue to be Justified based on workload, (Commercial Manager,
9/11/90)

On receiving the proposal, the state office of the PSU did not
organise a ballot but, instead, passed it on to the Wagga and
Narrandera staff seeking an expression of their concerns. The
concerns of both Narrandera and Wagga Wagga staff were
received by the imion at the beginning of December and
immediately passed back to Wagga Wagga management. The
concerns raised by Narrandera staff went, amongst other things,
to training and leave coverage issues, timing of the movement of
all administration functions to Wagga Wagga and a demand for
reinforcement of commitments by management to no forced
relocations or transfers. In addition, they said that:

(PSU) members wiR not consider accepting the proposal until
proper duty statements for aR positions and spare officers are
clearly defined in writing, (Narrandera employees, 7/12/90)
Wagga Wagga staff also indicated considerable dissatisfaction
with the proposal: mainly with regard to the Junior management
administration of&cer position. They argued that two Junior
management positions should be created, one responsible for
human resource management functions and the other for finance.
District management responded to the staff concerns in a letter to
the NSW Branch of the PSU half way through January 1991. In
the letter the Commercial Manager explained that only one Jimior
manager was required because of the long term strategy to
relocate all administration functions to Wagga, as weU as the
need to achieve improved coordination of administration
activities. The retention of several supervisory positions below the
administration officer position, it was claimed, would help even
out workloads. In the letter the Commercial Manager stated that:
No formal time span can be nominated during which outposting wUl
continue. This wiU depend on a rumiber of factors. In effect, all
Narrandera administration positions are being declared surplus,
though it is possible to continue the placement of a certain number
of administration staff at that centre in the shorter term. The right
is reserved if opportunities arise to transfer functions to Wagga and
reduce staff at Narrandera through voluntary redundancy
(15/1/91).

The

Commercial

Manager

reiterated

district

management's

commitment not to make any forced transfers or relocations. He
also indicated that in district management's view the staff
numbers proposed at each office were enough to allow for the
usual levels of short term leave. Finally, he attached duty
statements for all continuing positions. The Commercial Manager
signed off the letter by stating that district management intended
to implement the proposals with effect from 23 January 1991.

Following discussions between the Commercial Manager and
representatives from the NSW Branch of the PSU, the Commercial
Manager sent a slightly revised version of the same letter to the
Branch office of the imion in early February 1991. In the letter he
stated that:

it is in the interests of both management and staff that this
amalgamation proceeds quickly, advice by 13 February 1991, is
requested if you desire to discuss any issue Jiather (5/2/91).

However, this was not to be. The Commercial Manager's proposal
became caught up with a far broader set of issues. At the
beginning of February 1991 the District manager wrote to the
state office of the Public Service Union and the Australian Postal
and Telecommimications Union advising that in response to an
examination of all staffing requirements within the NSW South
and West Region some positions within the Riverina - Murray
district were to be cut. The staff cuts, he advised, were to be
primarily at the supervisor level. Six supervisory positions were to

be made redundant in the customer services areas: two positions
from the Wagga Wagga office, two from the Narrandera office and
two from the Albury office. Seven supervisory positions were also
to be cut out of the cable assigning and estimating section at
Narrandera. In addition, the District Manager advised that all
administration fimctions at Narrandera were to be centralised to
Wagga Wagga and this meant that initially five positions would be
surplus to requirements. As the following quote suggests, the
District Manager had decided to use the broader staff reductions
to hasten the rationalisation of the administration area:

The admin review, we put it in the current round of negotiations but
all we put in was what we negotiated with the association in the
first place (talked to the staff about in thefirstplace) which was to
amalgamate Wagga and Narrandera administration sections into
one. WeJust included those proposals in this round to speed it up a
bit because it is going very slowly.
After several months, negotiations at the regional level resulted in
an agreement in early May 1991 between the Public Service
Union, Telecom regional management and the District Manager. It
was decided that three clerical services positions would be cut:
two in Narrandera and one in Wagga. Four of the five remaining
Narrandera administration positions would also be made surplus
to requirements. The proposal to centralise the Narrandera
administration fimctions was also agreed along the Unes initially
proposed by the Wagga Wagga Commercial Manager: a complete
transfer over time but a commitment to no forced transfers or

relocations. Thus, in theory, another stage of the amalgamation
process had been achieved.

Despite this step, as of April 1991 the amalgamation process
became redundant. The District Manager's announcement in
February of regional staff cuts was actually part of a broader
rationalisation of staff numbers throughout the Country Division.
The

divisional

cuts were

being

driven by

corporate

level

management and were a response to the revenue shortfalls
experienced by Telecom as a result of the down turn in the
national economy. As one regional level manager put it:

Corporate dollars were required because of our revenue shortfall
people weren't making STD phone calls and all the rest of it and
our revenue shortfall was billions of dollars. We had to provide a
contribution towards that so it meant we had to cut expenses. One
of the mc^or expenses is labour.

In addition, the cuts were being driven by divisional management
as a further way of meeting the demands faced by deregulation.
In this context, senior management indicated an intention to
scrap the Country Division's district based structure. Quoting
from the Narrandera Argus:

A meeting between the PSU and Telecom's Executive General
Manager (Country Division), Mr Michael Makieve, last Thursday,
made it clear that Telecom plans to embark on a staff cutting
exercise that wUl seriously affect the working lives of every PSU

member in Country DivisiorL Mr Makieve made it clear that he
believed the current district structure in the division had no place in
the new deregulated environment and in particular he referred to
the districts on the east coast of Austrahcu A reduction in the
number of district offices and a staff reduction in the order of8000
Jobs over the next one to two years is envisaged, (Narrandera
Argus, February 19,1991)

In line with this, at the end of April 1991 a new divisional
structure was put in place which replaced the, incomplete,
amalgamated district structure with an "area management"
structure. Under the new structure the Riverina Murray district
was split in two with an Area Manager being placed at Albury and
one at Wagga: Narrandera missed out and was placed under the
control of Wagga Wagga. The Wagga Wagga district manager was
given the position of Area Manager, but all the remaining
functional management positions were declared redundant. That
is,

the Commercial

Manager

(Network)

Manager
positions

position,
and

the

the two

Operations

Operations

Manager

(Services) position were declared surplus to requirements. The
effect of the change was to remove a middle layer of management
from the structure of the Country Division. This, as the following
quote from a regional manager reveals, was in line with divisional
management's long term goals:

At present we have got a (regional) general manager, district
managers, and junctional managers. Now, the structure wUl go
general manager, area manager so it has taken one layer of

management out. So the aim is to reduce the layers of
management,,Jirea manager mokes sense, it is reducing the
number of layers of management between the MD down to the first
line supervisor. At present there is about eight levels - if the MD
wants to make a statement that he wants to be interpreted all the
way down the line and stiR make sense when it gets to the first
line supervisor - there is a lot in between them Area management
saves overhead and also flattens the comnvmication chain too.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONSEQUENCES

Prior to the amalgamation process industrial relations within the
Narrandera office could be characterised as generally consensual.
According

to

managers,

union

delegates

and

employees,

industrial disputation had been rare; a tight knit relationship
existed between management and employees; and employee
morale was high. It was claimed that before the amalgamation of
the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga districts, delegates in the
Narrandera office provided little more than an information service
to members. As one delegate put it:

There was not too much for me to do before. You know, the
delegates Job was felt to be a fairly easy one - sending out the
news that wouM come throughfrom branch office.

According to this delegate and others, the only industrial disputes
that occurred in the district were about national wage issues and

were at the behest of branch and national union offices. In other
words, Narrandera employees rarely instituted industrial action
themselves but simply followed national directives.
This passivity was evidently not confined to the Narrandera office
but was also a feature of many of the offices throughout the
district. One manager went further by claiming that many clerical
workers in the district were often reticent to follow national leads
and often decided not to go on strike. He had evidently come
across this attitude in a rather embarrassing way when he first
arrived at the Wagga Wagga office:
I was, I am still a union member but I was a fairly staunch union
member when I left WoUongong to go to Wagga to become a
manager, I forget what the industrial problem was but it was
decided natvonaRy that we would have a one day strike. So I
promptly went on strike. I went to work the next day and everyone
said: "where were you yesterday?' So I was the only one who had
a day off. The section that I managed had about 20 people in it but
I was the only one who had the day off.
In addition to low levels of industrial disputation, prior to the
amalgamation the relationship between management and
employees in the offices was also good. Delegates pointed out that
occasionally the odd manager or employee would create problems,
but in the main there was a high level of trust between the two
groups. In the Narrandera office this good rapport, it was argued,
was associated with a high level of morale and was based on the

good leadership skills of the old Narrandera management. A
supervisor in the Narrandera office summed up the relationship
in the following way:
Morale was good, but remember we are talking about the morale in
a place that was organised by people who were wiRing to take a
leadership role and make a decision. The old Narrandera
management team, they took a leadership role. Certainly there
were disagreements but we could all work them out. Occasionally
there would be a direction or something but that is Itfe,
The Operations Manager (Network) Narrandera concurred with
this view:
We as managers had a pretty good rapport with the people.
Because we lived pretty close to them, we weren't sort of separated
from them. We got on pretty well and there was really no real
hassles.
The amalgamation process changed all this. Interviews conducted
with managers and staff clearly revealed that the whole
amalgamation process created a considerable amount of fear
amongst Narrandera staff. In the past, they argued, Telecom Jobs
had been amongst the most secure in the town. Further, Telecom
offered a career structure: in Narrandera, clerical employees had
opportunities for promotion without having to leave the town or
the district. However, the amalgamation of the Wagga Wagga and
Narrandera districts was seen as a direct threat to their security

and opportunities.
In this regard, the clerical staff saw the amalgamation as having
three potential negative outcomes. First, the removal of local
Narrandera management was seen as a threat to opportimities for
advancement within the Narrandera office. As one manager put it:

When all the managers went from the area the feeling amongst the
clerical staff was: "Well here goes the career structure. I haven't got
a chance to stay in Narrandera and become the boss anymore.
Second, Narrandera staff firmly believed that in the short term
the amalgamation would lead to the Wagga Wagga office taking a
lot of the good work over; thus leaving them at a disadvantage.
The third, and most frequently predicted, negative outcome was
that the Narrandera ofi&ce would be eventually closed. Despite
continual assurances from Wagga Wagga management,
Narrandera staff strongly believed that the real rationale behind
the amalgamation was an attempt by Telecom management to
close the Narrandera office completely and trsinsfer all clerical
positions to Wagga Wagga. In fact, as the following quote reveals,
some of the staff at Narrandera believed that the amalgamation of
the district was Just the beginning of a long term centralisation of
clerical frinctions to metropolitan cities:

Well I would take ttfiirther than that and I can see quite logically
that they could do away with this office completely and Wagga
Wagga office completely. And they can have a set up in each town

where they have an administrative type person working in an
exchange or shop-front or somethingfr>rcustomer contact They can
move the electronic facilities we

have today and all the

administration and paperwork, or whatever you would like to call
tt, into a huge central office somewhere.

These beliefs and fears had a negative effect on Narrandera
employees attitudes to work as the following quote suggests:

I don't think there would be one person who feels as happy as they
were two years ago. It doesn't matter how many years you have
been in the place - twenty five or Just five, it is absolute apathy
towards the organisatiorL I don't know how to put it into words,
you are sort of living day by day. People have Just lost interest
Just the impact of workup in a situation where you feel you have
an axe hanging over your head and you feel tt could drop anytime.
The axe Just seems to hang there and hang there. And things Just
seem to drag on so it Just eats away at you day by day. They are
runnir^ the organisation down- the one thing you have been
working for all your life. What it does is everyone is so down that
little things become big things and spread further and further. It is
not a happy little work place.

The consequence of all this was a break down in the established
consensus. The amalgamation created a far more adversarial
industrial relations climate in the district. Industrial passivity,
high morale and trust were replaced by disputation, and a

growing level of distrust.

Where in the past clerical workers were occasional followers of
national calls for action, the amalgamation process resulted in
them becoming initiators of a number of disputes.

The first of these was in response to the non-renewal of the
employment contracts for the five temporary staff. As discussed
earlier, management's decision not to renew the contracts drew a
very hostile reaction from clerical staff in the Narrandera office.
The decision was seen by the Narrandera staff as a part of an
attempt by Wagga Wagga management to downgrade the role and
viability of the Narrandera office and they, therefore, saw it as a
threat to their jobs. This strong feeling is exemplified in a
statement by one Telecom employee to the Narrandera Argus:

Narrandera has already lost its Telecom general manager and I
feel these Job cuts are the second step in the downgrading of
clerical personnel at Narrandercu Ultimately this could result in the
loss ofTelecomJrom the town (19/7/91, p6).

In the initial stages of the dispute Wagga Wagga management,
represented by the newly appointed Human Resource Manager,
and Narrandera representatives of the Public Service Union tried
to negotiate a local solution. However, these talks quickly broke
down: the union representatives wanted a review of the whole
decision, but the Himian Resources Manager was tied to the
reduction in the five employees.

In response to this, the Narrandera employees commenced a two
day stoppage. This lifted the treatment of the dispute up to the
regional level where negotiations continued between regional
human resource managers and branch level union officials.
Discussions at this level evidently continued for a couple of weeks
without any compromise being reached. As a result, the staff at
Narrandera embarked on another two day stoppage and the
Public Service Union officials advised Telecom Managers that
unless progress was made they would take the issue to the
Industrial Conmiission.
Discussion then continued at the regional level and resulted in an
agreed solution between management and the union. But the
proposal was rejected by the Narrandera staff who insisted more
strongly that the whole issue be brought before the Industrial
Commission. Further negotiations continued and eventually
resulted in an agreement, described earlier, which was suitable to
a majority of the Narrandera staff. However, according to the
senior delegate at the Narrandera office, the Narrandera staff were
still not happy. Despite the advice of imion officials, many still
wanted the issue taken to the Industrial Relations Commission.
As one union delegate put it:

There was stiR a lot of people against it. They stiR wanted to go to
the CommissioTh A vote was taken and it was pretty close. There
wasn't a real lot in it.

The next industrial dispute took place in response to the District
Manager's announcement in early February 1991 to cut six
customer services staff, five administration staff and transfer the
administration function from Narrandera to Wagga Wagga. One
week after the announcement Narrandera clerical staff voted
imanimously to take industrial action. They decided to impose
revenue bans, which meant a significant slow down in the
processing of in-coming payments for Telecom services. In
addition, they decided not to answer phones anj^time before
9.30am and after 3.30pm and they imposed a ban on the
processing of service orders for work to be done within Telecom.
Finally, the Narrandera staff voted to halt the preparation of
information and statistics normally provided to management and
decided to discontinue any work that had previously been the
responsibility of positions left vacant.

The Narrandera office bans remained in place until early March
when state wide bans that had been imposed by the Public Sector
Union NSW branch were lifted in order to allow negotiations to
take place. The Narrandera staff held a ballot and voted in favour
of lifting their bans as well. They warned management that they
would be reimposed unless "meaningful negotiations with NSW
Country South and West management take place" (Narrandera
Argus, 5 March 1991 pi).

Following the lifting of the bans, negotiations did take place at the
regional offices between the imion delegates at Narrandera and
Wagga Wagga, the District Manager and regional level human

resources managers. The negotiations drew out over a one month
period with a major sticking point being the rationalisation and
transfer of administration functions to Wagga.
Regional and district management firmly wanted the
administration issue to be a part of any settlement. The
Narrandera and Wagga Wagga delegates, on the other hand,
insisted that the customer services rationalisations had to be
negotiated and settled upon first. According to the Wagga Wagga
delegate, this insistence was driven by a fear amongst clerical
staff of the long term impact of the amalgamation and transfer to
Wagga of administration fimctions. He argued that the
Narrandera staff were concerned about whether they would be
either forced to move to Wagga or forced to leave the company
and face imemployment. The Wagga staff he argued were also
concerned but their concerns were not so much about
employment security as they were about how the new
amalgamated structure would operate and what level of manager
would lead the function:

WelZ, the Wagga concern was more who was going to be the boss,
because they didn't have the worry of having to move family so
theirs was more a work oriented thing of who was going to run it,
their mcgor question was: can you run it with only one manager, do
you need two managers?

As stated earlier, the negotiations at the regional level eventually
ended in an agreement that saw a reduction in the number of
positions to be made redundant. Nevertheless, the staff at
Narrandera were left far from happy. The cuts had hit their office
harder than any other and as a consequence their fears about the
future of the Narrandera office continued to grow. As one delegate
from Narrandera put it:

Telecom has already ripped the heart out of its management
structure and has targeted supervisory positions this time. The
next round wiR be workers at the lower levels. (Narrandera Argus,
16/4/91, pi)

As is evident from the above discussion, staff at Narrandera
became more industrially sensitive.

And in this regard, they

began to criticise the PSU for being too slow and ineffectual:

A lot of people don't think the union is helping them either. Once
you used to be able to go to the union with a personal problem and
presto it would be fixed up. But tf it is a personal problem today,
you can be sure they wontfixit up. If it is something a little bigger,
maybe they wiU look at it. If it is a reaRy big problem they might
redly round but always too late.

Further, Narrandera staff developed a strong negative attitude
towards management. Regardless of whether the managers were
from Wagga Wagga or Narrandera, the staff felt that management
had either let them down or were intent on eliminating jobs in the

Narrandera office. As pointed out earlier, prior to amalgamation a
good relationship had existed between Narrandera management
and staff; however, the relationship soured in the early months of
the amalgamation. Narrandera management, it was argued, had
let the clerical staff down by not arguing strongly enough for the
Narrandera office. As the following two quotes reveal, staff in the
Narrandera office felt betrayed by their managers and were very
angry as a result:

Our commercial manager was the most ineffective man I've met in
any management group whatsoever. He seemed to have no
leadership, no goals, no aspiration, no nothing -except to achieve
and win for himself. And he didn't have the least bit of loyalty. He
was seen as their (Wagga Wagga management) lackey, I hate to
use that term, but he was seen as their man in Narrandera, He
really didn't stand up and represent us. He wasn't the type that
could have done that. He was a "yes" man.

and

The (old Narrandera)

district manager wasn't interested in

anything. He also lived at Wagga, I think his support was with
Wagga, right from the start. A couple of times he came out and said
he was on our side, but he didn't do anything. I think management
Just weren't prepared to accept their responsibilities.

While

the

management,

Narrandera
they

staff

strongly

felt betrayed

by

believed

Wagga

that

their

own

Wagga

management was intent on taking over Narrandera completely. As
one Wagga Wagga manager put it:

It was certainly seen as us and Narrandera, We were seen as the
takeover merchants, Dwing the war in Kuwait the Narrandera
people called the Wagga Wagga managernent the Iraqis.

In addition, the clerical staff at Narrandera came to strongly
distrust management's intentions. Regardless of the claims made
by managers, the Narrandera staff questioned its authenticity:

We have learnt a bitter lesson: we never believe what they are
teUtng us - you go in and pick the eyes out of it to find out what
makes their statement tick, and if it doesn't line up you Just say I
can't beUeve that.

Unfortunately for the Narrandera staff, their suspicions and
beliefs about the future appear to have been validly held; though
not because of the amalgamation strategy. Since the decision in
May 1991 to create a new area manager structure in the region,
the rationalisation process throughout Telecom has continued. At
the end of July 1991 it was announced that a number of offices
would be closed. In particular, it was annoimced that all
customer services areas within the South West Region were to be
investigated and a decision made as to which ones could be
effectively rationalised. In November 1991 they were advised that
the Narrandera customer services section was one of those to be

closed. This meant the loss of 19 Jobs (The Narrandera Argus,
25/7/91, 7/11/91).
As in the past, the Narrandera staff reacted by imposing bans.
Through this action they managed, in line with a national union
agreement, to gain a moratorium on retrenchments until the
beginning of 1993. However, Telecom management indicated that
the eventual closure of the customer services area was inevitable.
This was underscored in Jime 1992 with an announcement that
the stores area at Narrandera was to be closed. This, in addition
to the removal of administration functions, effectively meant that
as from January 1993 the presence of Telecom as a major
employer in Narrandera would cease (The Narrandera Argus,
2/4/92, 18/6/92).

CONCLUSION.

In the previous chapter it W2is concluded that industrial relations
in Telecom over the last eight years at both centralised and local
levels was, despite a significant amoimt of change, more
consensual than it had been in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It
appeared that the dominant reason for this was a more open and
communicative management style and a decentralisation of
decision making. It was also stated that the overall impression
held by managers, supervisors and unionists was that industrial
relations in rural communities is less problematic than it is in
urban communities.

It is in this context that the strategy to amalgamate the
Narrandera and Wagga districts took place. Given the general
level of consensus on industrial relations throughout Telecom and
since Narrandera is a small rural community it would not be
imreasonable

to

expect

that

the

implementation

of

the

amalgamation strategy would have been a smooth process. The
events described in this chapter do not fit this expectation.
Industrial relations at Narrandera have not been consensual and
it appears that management rather than creating a more
cooperative and consensual climate has helped to exacerbate
conflict. The events at Narrandera are obviously an exception to
the broader impression of consensual industrial relations that
emerged fi-om the interviews discussed in the last chapter.

In the next chapter the concept of 'managerial strategy' discussed
in Chapter 2 will be used to attempt to explain the events at
Narrandera. It was clearly the decision to amalgamate districts
that led to the problems at Narrandera; the concept of
'managerial strategy' as defined and discussed in Chapter 2 may
help to explain why this was the case. In this respect, the next
chapter provides an opportunity to Judge the usefulness of the
concept of 'managerial strategy' as a way of explaining industrial
relations activity. It will also provide an opportunity to access
some of the theoretical claims made by the writers reviewed in
Chapter2.

CHAPTER 6 - THE NARRANDERA EXPERIENCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF THE CONCEPT OF MANAGERIAL STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 the concept of 'managerial strategy' as defined and
treated in orthodox industrial relations and labour process
literature was discussed.
It was pointed out that the concept has been developed, amongst
other reasons, as an attempt to address inadequacies in
established theories. Specifically, it has been adopted by both
orthodox and labour process writers as a way of introducing a
dynamic element into the traditional models.
Orthodox and labour process theories have increasingly been
criticised for an inability to explain change and diversity in
industrial relations arrangements within modem capitalist
societies. Orthodox approaches concentrate on the institutions
rather than the actual dynamics of industrial relations activity.
This means they are ill-equipped to explain new developments in
industrial relations: for example, the increased proactivity of
management and a decline in the role of trade unions. The
classical labour process theory statements of Braverman (1974),
Edwards (1979) and Friedman (1977) are claimed to portray the
development of the capitalist labour process in too simplistic or
restrictive terms. More importantly, classical writers argue that in
capitalist economies the labour process would develop in certain

inevitable ways^^. The diverse and complex reality of capitalist
development is not in accord with this and the classic statements,
as a result, are seen as inadequate.

Strategies developed by managers, it is argued, can account for
diversity and 'managerial strategy', therefore, may help to
increase the explanatory power of traditional approaches. As
identified in Chapter 2, the reason the concept can account for
diversity is that it allows recognition of the ability all managers
have to make choices and that these choices influence activity.
Managers are not trapped within an environmentally determined
path. They can choose a course of action that means they become
more industrially proactive or they can choose to upgrade skills
associated with a particular type of production process. Thus, it
is the choices made by management which are being claimed as
the explanations for diversity and change in the labour process
and industrial relations.

In Chapter 2, 'Managerial strategy' was tentatively defined as a
term that referred to any intentional course of action
undertaken by any managerial group that is aimed at
achieving certain preconceived goal/s. This definition seeks to
reduce the ambiguities that have been associated with the
concept. It also seeks to incorporate 'intentionality', and 'a course
of action aimed at achieving a preconceived goal'

as defining

characteristics of 'managerial strategy'.
^^ As stated in Chapter 2, Bravennan argued that the trend was toward an increasing degradation of skilled woric
Edwards claimed that the capitalist labour process inevitably progressed through discrete stages. Freidman classified
labour process control strategies into just two types: Direct Control and Responsible Autonomy.
^^ Hiat is, a series of decisions or choices aimed at adiieving a certain preconceived goal. Managerial strategy is,
therefore, not meant to embrace one-off dav to day decisions but longer term courses of aaion.

In adopting this definition, a stance on several conceptual
debates was taken. The notion of intentionality was claimed to be
vital because without it the idea of 'choice' becomes irrelevant.
However, managerial strategies need not be planned in detail or
perfectly coherent. In addition, for a course of action to be
deemed a 'managerial strategy' it need not be fiilly implemented
or deliver results exactly as they were intended. Further, it was
claimed that management is not a homogeneous group.
Consequently, 'managerial strategy' may refer to a course of
action devised by one group of managers within an organisation
and may, as a result, conflict with the interests of other groups.
It was also claimed the adoption of 'managerial strategy' does not
imply a descent into extreme volimtarism. Managerial strategies
are constrained by a potentially large variety of external factors.
These constraints limit, but do not determine, the choices that
managers can make. Therefore strategies can create diversity but
only within certain boimds. With regard to public sector
organisations, the political context within which public sector
managers operate was identified as an important influence on the
character of their strategies. Overseas literature suggests that the
present orientation of this 'political contingency' is toward an
emphasis upon 'commercialism'. Commercialism, it is argued, is
often accompanied by a more aggressive, imcompromising
strategy toward industrial relations.
One other issue discussed in Chapter 2 was the relationship
between managerial strategies and industrial relations. Questions

were raised about the impact of managerial strategies upon
industrial relations and the extent to which strategy formulation
takes industrial relations issues into account. Writers appear to
argue that management strategies can influence industrial
relations. However, there is a considerable amount of debate over
the extent to which industrial relations issues are considered in
strategy formulation. The conclusion drawn was that the
relationship varies with the situation and is not open to
theoretical generalisations. The extent to which industrial
relations affects strategy formulation is, therefore, a matter for
empirical investigation.
In this chapter the events described in the last chapter will be
examined from the perspective offered by the concept of
'managerial strategy' as defined above. The discussion will serve
three purposes. First, it will provide an explanation of the
developments at Narrandera associated with the amalgamation
strategy. Second, it will enable further insights into the concept of
'managerial strategy' and, thus, address some of the debates
discussed in Chapter 2. Third, following on from one and two, it
will enable a judgement to be made in this chapter about the
power of the concept as a way of explaining industrial relations;
and a Judgement in the next chapter of its power to address the
inadequacies of orthodox industrial relations and classical labour
process theories.

PLANNING, INTENHONALITY AND CO-HERENCE

'Managerial strategy' as defined in this thesis clearly directs
attention to the actual strategy formulation process. This is the
stage at which management makes choices about what to do and
how to do it. It is, therefore, a potential source of explanations for
industrial relations activity that occurs as a result of the strategy.
In this section the strategy formulation process will be discussed;
the role of different management groups described; the influences
on the formulation process outlined; and the effect of the
formulation stage considered.

An investigation of the actual formulation of the amalgamation
strategy provides several significant insights. These insights help
to explain the events at Narrandera and the incomplete
implementation of the strategy. In addition, they also raise issues
that may have general applicability to a fuller understanding of
the 'managerial strategy' concept.

As is clear firom the description in the last chapter, the
amalgamation of the Wagga and Narrandera districts was part of
an intentional strategy on the part of regional management.
Amalgamation was not an ad-hoc decision or a direct result of
external factors. Rather, the strategy was worked out in some
detail by management before its implementation.

As is also clear firom the previous chapter, the formulation
process was spread across different levels of management. That

is, authorship of the strategy was not solely in the hands of
managers at Bnrwood. Managers at the district level were also
involved in the actual formulation of the course of action. This
distribution of authorship was intentional. Its rationale was
explained by regional management as related to a need to ensure
that district level management was made accoimtable and
responsible for the amalgamation processes. That is, it was seen
as important to ensure that the strategy was not imposed on
lower level managers. The amalgamation process, it was inferred,
would be far more likely to succeed if district level management
was involved in the development of the strategy. The approach
was also in accord with the overall trend to decentralise decision
making processes throughout the organisation.
Because of this policy, as stated in the last chapter, corporate
and divisional management did not play a part in the formulation
of the amalgamation strategy. They simply put pressure on
regional management to devise ways of streamlining fimctions
and activity. Regional management was given the discretion and
responsibility for formulating a strategy that would achieve this.
They chose amalgamation and followed corporate and divisional
management's lead by devolving to district management the
discretion and responsibility for formulating some parts of the
amalgamation strategy.
Looking at the roles of regional and district managers in more
detail, the explicitly stated role of Burwood management was

identified in interviews as the development of a broad strategy

framework. First, Burwood management decided that the goal of
increasing efficiency could best be achieved by a strategy that was
based on an amalgamation of districts. Second, they took primary
responsibility

for

deciding

which

districts

should

be

amalgamated. Third, they negotiated and attained an in-principle
agreement

from

the

imions

for

implementation

of

the

amalgamation strategy.

In interviews management at the regional level stated that the
finer detail of the amalgamation strategy was formally left to the
discretion of district level management. Thus, as was discussed in
the last chapter, the role of district level management in the
formulation of the strategy involved the detailed development of a
way to implement the strategy.

In this respect, in the Wagga Wagga-Narrandera amalgamation
the

role

of

the

district

manager

was

identified

as

the

determination of where the head offices of the new district would
be; what management positions were to be retained; and who was
to be

appointed

to these

positions.

In

addition,

district

management was responsible for formulating those aspects of the
strategy aimed at achieving a rationalisation of clerical staff. In
the case of the Wagga Wagga district this involved the transfer of
the administration section of the Narrandera office to Wagga.

The actual involvement of different management groups was not
as

clear cut as the above suggests. While regional level

management had primary responsibility to determine which

districts were to be amalgamated, they incorporated the district
level managers in the decision making process. District managers
became involved in this aspect of the process through their
membership of the teams set up at the regional board meetings.
The teams recommendations on district boundaries were used by
regional management to aid their considerations.
In addition, while district managers were formally responsible for
the detailed aspects of the strategy development, interviews
revealed that they were not given complete freedom. The decisions
they took were based on consultation with Burwood management.
This was particularly the case with the decisions about which
positions to retain. Interviews revealed that this was worked out
by the new district managers in consultation with Burwood
managers. District management was given final responsibility for
these decisions but was expected to discuss their decisions with
regional management.
It was also strongly suggested in several interviews that district
management's discretion was constrained by informal pressure
from Burwood managers who favoured certain results. For
example, one regional manager stated that the decision about the
location of the head office of the Riverina district was formally the
responsibility of whoever was the successful applicant for the
district manager Job. Narrandera, he argued, could, therefore,
have been the district head office if the new manager chose.
Quoting him:

We didn't say where the manager should be located. He could be
located at Narrandera, he could be located at Wagga Wagga or
even down in Albwy. Because what he was doing was controlling
a group of supervisors or managers within that geographic area. So
we deliberately didn't say where the managefs office was going to
be.
The final location, he argued, was dependent upon who filled the
district manager job and this position had been advertised
outside the organisation and throughout Telecom. It Just so
happened that the old Wagga Wagga district manager was
successful and he had chosen Wagga Wagga as the head-office.
However, interviews with the Wagga Wagga district manager
revealed, as stated in the last chapter, that he had been a very
reluctant applicant for the position. He had decided not to apply
but was put under considerable pressure from regional level
management to change his mind. This suggests that regional
managers had a strong, if indirect, role in establishing Wagga
Wagga as the head office. This conclusion is backed up by
regional management's explicitly stated preference for Wagga
Wagga as the most appropriate location. When asked what would
have happened if the new manager didn't have a preference the
same regional manager stated:
I think we would have gone through the recommendations of the
(working party) report and worked out where the staff expertise
was, the employment pool and the geographical location. What

people do they need to work with, and which people can they best
do with working remote. And if you assessed all that, you hod to
come up with thefact that Wagga was a logical hose because Hfs in
the middle of the area^also, probably, you had more senior people
with expertise located in that one area.
Overall therefore, the strategy formulation process was not vested
in Just one group of managers at a particular level within the
organisation. It spanned levels and groups: different managers
had different roles in the process and these were intertwined and
interconnected.
In formulating the strategy a range of considerations were taken
into account. As previously stated, the primary aim of the
strategy was to increase the efficiency of NSW Country South
West. As a result, the most important consideration was the
impact the strategy would have upon the efficiency of the Region.
To be a success the strategy had to reduce costs and increase
productivity.
Other issues were not totally disregarded. In this respect, the
impact the strategy would have upon the rural communities
concerned was not ignored. Regional management acknowledged
that this was an issue that they had to consider because of
previous commitments Telecom management had made to rural
councils such as the Narrandera Shire. The guarantee of
continuing community presence had evidently been a long
standing one throughout rural regions and was, therefore, a

difficult issue to address. As stated in the previous chapter, in
order to take community perspectives into account, local councils
were included in talks at the regional level and guarantees once
again given about 'a continuing presence'

Regional level management indicated that the effect the strategy
would have upon staff was also a very important consideration. It
was a factor that they had to weigh up in their deliberations
about whether to seek amalgamations. The strategy would involve
staff relocations and in some cases retrenchments, which they
had to incorporate into the decision making process.

In the final analysis, however, the efficiency considerations were
seen by regional and district management as the primaiy issue
and, therefore, had to over-ride concerns about the impact of
amalgamations on staff and communities. In this regard, the
following quote firom a regional level manager sums up well the
way in which the above considerations were taken into account:

„they've been concerned down in Narrandera that they would lose
their district status for a long, long time. We go back ten years. No
one would tackle it because of the community pressures. We had to
ask ourselves whether we could Just continue that operation,
whether we scale it down or whether we close it altogether. So I
suppose our aim was to minimise the amount of overhead
component and with that, aU the hidden positions that seem to float
around there when you have an administration. Of course, the

Though, as stated in the previous chapter, what constituted 'a continuing presence' was left un-defined.

negative side to that was ifs a town that is not growing and,
therefore, we would be a significant component of that. So there
would be an impact on the community. Where do the people go?
There is a staff impact as well as a community impact So aR those
you weigh up. But, at the end of the day you still have to move
ahead with your organisation.
Concerns about the impact of the strategy upon staff led to a
significant amount of consideration being given to industrial
relations during the strategy formulation stage. Interviews of
managers at regional and district levels revealed that an analysis
of the industrial relations implications of amalgamations was an
important aspect of the initial planning processes at both levels.
At the regional level strategy formulation incorporated industrial
relations issues in two ways. First, industrial relations
practitioners were closely involved in the formulation process and
they were involved in the actual development of tactics aimed at
facilitating the implementation of amalgamations. Thus, they
established the necessity for there to be consultation with the
unions
and negotiated the in-principle agreement which
district level management could follow.
Second, the in-principle agreement was an outcome of
negotiations between management and imions on the broad
details of the amalgamation strategy. Thus, to an extent, unions
were involved at the regional level in strategy formialation. Clearly,
19 In line with long standing agreements within Telecom.

the unions were not involved in the actual decision to
amalgamate districts. Nevertheless, they were involved in the
development of the Implementation aspects of the strategy
formulation as well formulation of those aspects of the strategy
concerned with the treatment of staff. In this respect, the regional
human resources manager stated that the negotiations covered:

the actual organisational charts and the organisational structures.
How it was going to be done on the technical side, how the
estimating and office junctions were going to be carried out and
how the lines of reporting for the staff were going to change. We
dealt with staff concems-indtuidual placement- what was going to
happen to those people who were going to be affected by this
change.
and

..we spent time talking to the associations informally, each of the
three unions. We sounded out their reactions before we wrote any
letters. There was a lot of meetings and a lot of work done behind
the scenes before we got the first paperwork done.
At the district level unions were not involved in the actual
formulation of strategies, but district management did develop
strategies that were aimed to address the likely industrial
relations Impact of the amalgamation. In the Wagga Wagga Narrandera amalgamation, district management formulated an
approach towards the rationalisation of administration staff that

addressed industrial relations issues by providing for working
parties and consultative arrangements. In addition, because of
the industrial relations ramifications, they decided not to
rationalise the administration function at Narrandera in one
quick move. Rather, they decided to:

..tolerate a certain amount of outposting at Narrandera in order not
to upset individuals too much there. We tried not to do it aU in one
hit where you would create a lot of turmoilfor the people over there.
(Administration Manager, Wagga Wagga)

Thus in simmiaiy, the dominant consideration in the strategy
formulation process was efficiency. This was above community
and employee concerns. However, managers at both the regional
and district level did consider and plan for the industrial relations
implications of the amalgamation strategy.
It can be argued that the strategy formulation stage of the Wagga
Wagga - Narrandera amalgamation had a detrimental effect upon
the outcomes of the strategy. The fact that the whole strategy was
not formulated by just one group of managers but divided
between two different groups at different levels can be seen as a
major factor in this regard. In addition, the primacy of efficiency
issues can also be seen as creating problems.
As indicated earlier, regional management devolved some of the
responsibility for formulation of the strategy because it was seen
as a way to facilitate the process. However, in the Narrandera -

Wagga Wagga amalgamation the involvement of the two levels
resulted in an inconsistency between the decisions and actions
imdertaken at the regional level and those at the district level.
The most important inconsistency in this regard related to the
timing of the amalgamation process.
As stated in the previous chapter, regional management handed
over the responsibility for the detailed aspects of the strategy to
district management on the basis that the total amalgamation
would be completed within three months. According to the
regional human resources manager, this was a realistic period
because all the hard work had been done at the regional level in
establishing the in-principle agreement. In other words, all the
districts had to do was develop the implementation strategy and
smooth over the wounds. Fast action by the district levels was,
from the regional perspective, vital in order to ensure the
agreement remained current and implementation, therefore,
achievable. According to the regional himian resources manager,
all staff throughout the region were informed of the agreement
and, thus, expected the process to progress quickly.
This was not the perspective adopted by district management. As
mentioned above, in order not to upset anyone, management at
the district level formulated an approach that was based on a
gradual implementation of the amalgamation process. Partly as a
result of this, the three month limit was passed and, in fact, even
after 12 months no real progress had been made.

According to the regional human resources manager, this delay
meant

that

the

in-principle

agreement

became

basically

irrelevant. The initiative that it had created was lost. Quoting
him:

CThe Riverina Murray district) had staff that were conscious of the
fact that decisions had been made and were, thus, in thatframeof
wind. We didn't capitalise on it. We let them slip back into that
mode of feeling like: "Oh well maybe nothing wiR change". And
then we hit them 15 months later and we ended up with the same
problem that we had when we first determined it. We had to go
through the process again. Them and us. So I think, by not moving,
I think it was poorly handled.

Further, according to the regional human resources manager, the
delays also created problems because:

Its a pairifid way to get the process done and doesn't do anyone
any good, particularly the staff. You're better off walking in, like
we've done this time with Area Manager, make a decision "bang":
Ilfs there. Do it. I have a feeling that it would have been far better
for the people because a lot of people lock themselves into
positions. Thinking that they would wiru Or that they'll give it their
best shot. And I think they lost focus on a lot of the work that we
needed to do for the business, to serve the customers.

Analysis of interviews of Narrandera staff reveals that the regional
human resources manager was correct in claiming that the delay

built into the strategy did cause an adverse reaction from the
staff. As pointed out in the last chapter the morale and attitude of
Narrandera office staff were undermined by the drawn out nature
of the process. The Narrandera people interviewed stated quite
firmly that they would have preferred a qxiick decision and fast
implementation. As one person put it:

If I was the management, I would've been more decisive than what
they have been. We have been living and working in a situation for
two years where we know this is going on and will happen. That to
me is ridiculous. Under the situation that we are working under,
you cant make plans for the future because you don't know when
you are going or if you are going: if you are married with a couple
of kids, trying to work out their future, where they are going to be
sent to school

Thus, it can be argued that the conflicts between the strategy
formulation stage at the regional level and that at the district level
was one of the causes of the industrial relations problems. Wagga
Wagga

management

may

have

thought

that

a

gradual

implementation would ease industrial relations problems but
their approach actually created problems.

The

dominance

of

efficiency as a consideration

in the

development of the strategy also created major problems for the
progress of the amalgamation strategy and was another cause of
industrial relations problems. Telecom management at all levels
perceived that to meet the challenges of deregulation they had to

make the organisation more efficient. In this respect, therefore,
the amalgamation strategy inevitably had to have efficiency as the
prime objective. However, this consideration was so overwhelming
that other issues were under-emphasised. The result was action
on the part of staff and the Narrandera commimity which
contributed to the failure of the amalgamation strategy.
The reaction of the staff and community had its greatest effect on
the implementation of the overall strategy and will, therefore, be
discussed in more detail in the next section. Nevertheless, it is
useful to mention at this stage that had management given as
much attention to staff and commimity considerations as they
did to efficiency they may have had more success in implementing
the changes. Regional level management did attempt to address
the community issues by holding discussions with coimcils.
However, while these discussions resulted in the "continuing
presence" commitment, regional management did not move away
from a line that stressed the primacy of efficiency. This hard line
could do nothing but create a negative reaction from country
communities and is summarised well by one regional manager as
follows:

Well our executive general manager put it on the line pretty clearly:
in reply to one commimtty's claim that "We need Telecom in this
town because we are a dying town and we need you to keep the
community going" he said "But that is why I am puRing out,
because you are a dying town If you want me to stay, then you
have to grow your town, because, otherwise, we don't have a

reason to be here. If the town grows, we would no doubt bring
more people back".
This argument clearly makes economic sense for Telecom as a
corporation but it places townships in a "Catch 22" situation that
they must react against. Ftom the perspective of townships the
employment generated by organisations such as Telecom keeps
them viable; without it growth becomes exceedingly difficult.
At Narrandera this problem was exacerbated by district
management's decision to shift all the Narrandera administration
functions to Wagga Wagga. They saw this as the most efficient
course of action and their decision was backed up by regional
level management^O. This approach was not necessarily followed
in some other regions within the Country Division. Management
in other regions also decided to amalgamate districts, but in some
of these districts, administration functions were evidently shared
between pre-existing district offices. However, Wagga Wagga
management rejected such an approach because they saw it as
less than ideal in efficiency terms. Considerations such as the
likely reaction of staff and the community were not seen as
important enough reasons to warrant a strategy that left some
administration functions in Narrandera. This was an unfortunate
decision. Most office staff at Narrandera recognised that
efficiencies were necessary but they strongly stated that they were
not convinced that all functions had to be transferred to Wagga
Wagga. As one person put it:
^ ^ fact, this appears to be an example of another area where regional management put pressure on district
management to take a particular approadi. Most of the districts within the South-West Region wait this way, but it was
never an explicit regional level policy.

I am not against them trying to rationalise, that is understandable
and you can accept that. But what they have done in other districts
in Victoria and up in North NSW, they have tackled the problem by
putting all Personnel in one office and aR Finance in another office.
So you have stiR got one Finance and one Personnel and you are
not running two of each in two separate offices. There is no reason
why they can't do that in the Riverina Murray, If they are genuine
about trying to keep this office open, it seems like an ideal
situation.

As

the

above

quote intimates,

the insistence

on

district

management's part to move the whole administration function to
Wagga Wagga was interpreted by staff, and the community, as
meaning that the whole Narrandera office would be closed. Given
senior management's guarantee of a "continuing presence" Wagga
management's

stance undermined

the trust staff and the

community had in Telecom management. This impeded the
progress of the strategy and exacerbated the industrial relations
problems.

The above describes the ways that a concentration on the
formulation of managerial strategy can shed light on events. It
also allows some insights to be made about the concept of
'managerial strategy' itself. The experience at Telecom clearly
supports the claim that strategies are intentional and developed
with some degree of coherence and rationality. However, it

indicates that a given managerial strategy should not be seen as
necessarily having its origins in the decisions of one group of
managers.

As argued in Chapter 2, management is not necessarily
homogeneous. It may be composed of different groups who may
develop different strategies. As a result, studies of managerial
strategies must allow for the fact that a strategy developed by one
group of managers may be affected by the activities of other
management groups. In addition, the experience at Telecom
reveals that different groups with different interests may be
involved in the formulation of a single strategy. As a result, it is
important to recognise that the coherence of a particular strategy
can be influenced by the interaction between different managerial
groups. One group's input into the formulation of a strategy may
have their intentions undermined by the input of other
managerial groups. As such, it is likely that strategy formulation
processes are highly political activities involving negotiations
between different and perhaps competing groups of managers.
The fact that regional management informally sought to apply
pressure on Wagga management on a number of issue exemplifies
this idea.

The political character of strategy formulation at Telecom was
also heightened by the involvement of trade unions in the actual
formulation of the strategy. This serves to highlight
importance of considering the role of parties other
management in the formulation of management

the
than

strategies.

Perhaps more importantly though, it backs up further the insight
that strategy formulation is not a simple process involving
managers as one group deciding what to do and how to do it.
Rather, it is a dynamic process that in itself can provide major
explanations

for

industrial

relations

and

other

activity.

Discussions of the concept of 'managerial strategy' need,
therefore, to highlight the formulation process and how it can be
a source of dynamism in industrial relations.

IMPLEMEOTATION

'Managerial strategy' as defined in this thesis also directs
attention to the implementation of strategies. As stated in
Chapter 2, a variety of factors can have an effect on whether a
strategy is implemented as planned. This section focuses
attention on the implementation of the amalgamation strategy
and in doing so provides an insight into several of the issues
mentioned in Chapter 2. As such, it sheds further light on the
concept of 'managerial strategy'. In addition, it helps to tease out
further explanations for the failure of the strategy as well as for
the industrial relations problems that were created.

As stated earlier, regional management devolved responsibility for
implementation

of

the

amalgamation

strategy

to

district

management. Interviews revealed that five factors had an impact
on district management's efforts to implement the strategy and
upon industrial relations activity associated with it: employee
reaction,

management

style,

community

reaction,

other

management strategies and activities; and broader industrial
relations developments.
The reaction of Narrandera staff was described in the last chapter
and has been discussed further in this chapter. Employees were
not supportive of the amalgamation moves and resisted them with
industrial action, bans and non-cooperation. In this regard, the
staff working party recommendations which suggested that no
rationalisation of administration functions take place is an
example of this resistance.
As discussed above, the resistance and industrial action of the
Narrandera staff were partiy due to the details of the strategy
itself. In addition, it can be argued that the situation was
exacerbated by the style adopted by Wagga Wagga management
when they were trying to implement the strategy.
In Chapter 4 it was argued that the management strategies
throughout Telecom had become more consensual and open.
Unionists and managers all argued that a far more consultative
approach had been adopted by management and this was having
a beneficial effect on industrial relations. It was also claimed by
Wagga Wagga management and Wagga Wagga based employees
and unionists that managers in the Wagga Wagga district had
adopted a far more consensual style. Industrial relations was
claimed to be improving as a result.

Despite this, it is apparent from interviews of managers and staff
that this consensual style was not adopted in relation to the
Narrandera - Wagga Wagga amalgamation. Wagga Wagga
management adopted a very aggressive and imcompromising
style that, because of the adverse elQfect it had on industrial
relations, made implementation of the strategy problematic.
According to one Narrandera manager, this aggression was
reflected in statements Wagga Wagga management made about
the future of the Narrandera office:

They were very outspoken in saying we are going to take you over
and you mob wUl Jose your Jobs. They came over very heavy. It
wasn't very diplomatic. I tend to think if it had been more
diplomathcaRy handled it wouM have been a different baR game.
For Narrandera staff the aggressive approach appears to have
been exemplified by the actions of management over the nonrenewal of the part-time employee's contracts. Evidently little
consultation took place over the decision. Instead, it was
presented as a foregone conclusion. As one staff member put it:

..we were asked for a series of statistics, which I don't think
Wagga really took into consideration, and then they Just lobbed in
one day; pulled everybody in, including the Jive people that were
going to be dismissed, and said that is it. So there was very little
consultation with us as to how and why Jive positions were going
to be lost

The regional human resources manager agreed with this
perception. The Wagga Wagga style, he said, was unhelpfully
aggressive. He argued that one of the main reasons industrial
problems emerged and the implementation delayed was that
district level management did not deal with the people very
sjmipathetically. The dominant reason for this, he claimed, was
that Wagga Wagga management saw the whole exercise as a
victory for their team over Narrandera management. He argued,
that while the district manager made conciliatory comments
aimed at drawing the district together into one team, his and his
management team's actions belied this. Rather than being
conciliatory, they were blatantly euphoric about their victory.
Even Wagga Wagga managers themselves indicated that they had
adopted an aggressive strategy and saw the amalgamation in
win/lose terms. According to one Wagga Wagga manager, this
attitude was a result of a lack of support from the regional office
on a range of issues^l and intransigence on the part of
Narrandera staff. He stated that he and other Wagga managers
were seen as being 'hot heads', arrogant and disaster merchants.
He admitted that they had, indeed, been very aggressive but:
We weren't getting support from the region, we were on our own.
We developed a mutual bond, bugger the region we wiR do it our
way. There was a lot of frxistrotion that nothing was getting done.
And that made you want to win, to prove something to yourself.
That seemed to affect our attitudes to industrial relations.
^^In particular, Wagga management thought that they had been abandoned by the regional office in a dispute over a
depot closure in Albury-Wodonga.

The reaction of the Narrandera community has already been
mentioned as an important factor in the formulation and progress
of the strategy. As was discussed in the previous chapter,
Narrandera is a declining town. Given this, the amalgamation
strategy was inevitably seen as a substantial threat to the
continuing viability of the community. The Narrandera Shire
Council, the local newspaper and many people from the town
became closely involved in the whole issue and took action which
helped to slow implementation down.

Narrandera council's major initiative took place in May 1987,
following rumours that Telecom was considering a relocation of
functions to Wagga Wagga. The Council in an attempt to ensure a
continuing presence offered to build a new set of offices for the
organisation valued at around 1.5 million dollars. In making the
offer the council stated that it was concerned that the poor office
accommodation occupied by the company may lead to a
relocation:

Loss of the Telecom office and its employees would be a big blow to
Narrandera and the cowicil was adamant that it would take every
possible

step

to

stop

this

occurring. (Narrandera

Argus,

12/5/87,pl)

In Jime 1987 Telecom advised the council that it would not
accept the offer because it was about to start a major
restructuring of the organisation as a result of the May 1987

economic statement.

In response to this, in July 1987 the council organised a meeting
with the managing director of Telecom to discuss the future of
Telecom's Narrandera operations. The council was advised that
though no assurances could be given over the long term, there
were no plans to restructure or downgrade the Narrandera office.
In fact, the managing director advised the council that the
company

would

be

boosting

the

quality

of

the

office

accommodation and introducing new technology. The managing
director stated that the company would continue to monitor
performance throughout its operations but:

In doing so, Telecom is cdways conscious of its duty and
responsibility to the community and customers it accrues and to its
staff, (M.Ward, Managing Director Telecom Australia, quoted in
The Narrandera Argus, July 30, 1987,pl)

Given this

assurance

the

announcement

in

1988 of the

amalgamation of districts and associated rumours that the
Narrandera office would be closed drew a strong response from
the Council. The Shire President claimed that the proposals
contradicted the managing director's assurances and stated that:

The council and community are outraged at yet another instance of
centralising administration at the cost of vrferior service to country
regions. It is another instance of the 'big is best mentality. The
council intends to pursue this matter to the highest levels of

Telecom and Government administration, (The Narrandera Argus,
8/11/88 pi)

The coxmcil's response involved a meeting at Narrandera with the
Regional General Manager of Telecom and a deputation to
Canberra to meet the Executive General Manager of the Coimtiy
Division.

The Regional General Manager evidently advised the

council that depending on the location of the new district head
office some transfers may occur, but Telecom would not close
down the Narrandera ofRce. At the meeting with the Executive
General Manager the council argued against the amalgamation
and was told that their argument would be given serious
consideration (The Narrandera Argus, 22/12/88).

Following the amalgamation decision and the appointment of the
district manager, the council kept up its pressure. Just prior to
the announcement that Wagga Wagga would be the district head
office, the council offered to provide the new district manager with
a house if he would locate the offices at Narrandera. After the
annoimcement, the council continued to seek meetings with the
successive district managers, each time seeking assurances that
the company would retain a presence in the town.

The council clearly became deeply embroiled in the whole
amalgamation process. However, perhaps the most consistently
vocal voice in the community was the editor of the local

newspaper. The Narrandera Argus. He took a very close interest
in developments at Telecom reporting anj^thing, including
rumours, about the company's future. In editorials a consistently
suspicious and hostile line toward Telecom management was
adopted. For example, on February 8, 1990 the editor argued
that:
Telecom should come clean about its intentions for its JUture
presence in Narrandera^
It seems to me that despite the public proclamations from
managerial levels that there is every intention of maintaining a
"substantial presence" in the town, actions so Jar, taken with a
minimum of exposure and, indeed, more than a degree of
smokescreening, suggest otherwise (The Narrandera Argus,
8/2/90,p2).
Six months later, following the non-renewal of the part time
contracts, the normally conservative editor became almost a
political radical when arguing that:
The human face of Telecom, as with so many government
organisations which are supposed to provide a public service, is
being sacrificed on the alter of cost-benefit analysis as a sop to the
deity of profitability.
No longer is any heed paid by organisational decision makers to
the social costs of their decisions. The fact that the lives of people

are dislocated..are of no consequence to managements whose only
goal is to show more and more profit year after year (The
Narrandera Argus, 6/8/90, p2).
Pressure from the council and the newspaper was supported by
community groups. One such group was the Concerned Citizens
of Narrandera Action Committee which was made up of
townspeople, representatives of senior citizen's groups and
employees of Telecom, the Department of Main Roads, the State
Rail Authority, teachers and hospital staff. The Action Committee
organised resistance to any proposal that threatened employment
in the town and in the case of Telecom organised a "mass protest
rally" when the Regional General Manager visited the township in
November 1988. At that rally the Regional General Manager
stated to the townspeople that Telecom would have a continuing
presence at Narrandera (The Narrandera Argus 8/11 /88).
Another group calling itself the Telecommunications Action Group
added support to the Action Committee's efforts by attempting to
keep the council and the local community informed about
developments in the telecommimications industry. For example,
when Senator E)vans released the May 88 statement on
telecommunications, the Group sought to impress on the
Narrandera community that the proposals outlined by the
statement would lead to a reduction in Jobs in the Narrandera
community and a reduction in the quality of service to rural
towns.

While the activities of the Shire Council, the editor of the Argus
and the community groups, did not achieve v^^hat was hoped for
them, according to regional and district management the groups
did have an affect on implementation of the amalgamation
strategy and upon industrial relations.
It was claimed that the community pressure had three effects.
First, the local council initiatives and deputations were argued by
local managers to have raised the political visibility of the
amalgamation; thus forcing the company to tread carefully so as
to avoid problems with state and federal politicians. Second,
according to one of the district managers, the attitudes and
support given by the community hardened the views of office staff
and, thus, worsened the industrial relations consequences. It was
argued that many staff had greater allegiance to the town than
they did to Telecom. In this respect, the district human resource
manager suggested that community pressure was used to ensure
that employees who may have been considering a move to Wagga
remained resistant:

A lot ofpeople out there are related, as a result peer pressure was
applied. You know: "I got you this Job, now what is Aunt Jessie
going to think7'
Third, according to the first district manager, it became difficult
to visit the town without having to spend a considerable amount
of time talking to the council and the Narrandera Argus. This, he
argued firustrated the whole process. Quoting him:

It drove me crazy, it got to the stage where I was depressed to go to
Narrandera. The moment I would walk into the (Narrandera) office
the telephone would ring and it would be the local newspaper or
the counciL You would make a tour of depots and you would have
a reporter following you askir^g "Are you out here to close it!'. Every
step was done in lights., and it made it hard, bloody hard. It
frustrated me, I Just couldn't handle it.

Another factor identified as affecting activity at Narrandera was
other managerial strategies and actions. It was frequently claimed
that the implementation of an amalgamated district was impeded
by other strategies and actions originating from higher levels of
the organisation. From the perspective of district management,
they were being hit by a continuous stream of strategies and
actions that, while consistently aimed at increasing efficiency, ran
over each other and, thus, stalled the whole process. As the
district human resources manager put it:

..while you have a strategy worked out, you believe it is a good
strategy, something may come in over the top which makes you
either have to change it or prevents you from doing the first step
until you have done the second step or something Uke that..I think
its a problem in that the organisation hasn't reaUy allowed time for
settlement of some of the current strategies and negotiations that
have already been commenced. They're continually adjusting the
level of the playing field, they're changing the rules.

District management also argued that the plethora of strategies
and changes adversely affected industrial relations. Because the
strategies were all primarily aimed at rationalising staff numbers,
they were not seen as discrete initiatives by Narrandera staff but
part of an overall attempt to close Narrandera down.
A union delegate interviewed took this issue further arguing that
the continual changes created by the strategies meant that
district managers were made out to be liars. He argued that
management at district and regional levels originally gave
guarantees about the Narrandera office not being closed or
redundancies occurring as a result of the amalgamation.
However, as discussed in the last chapter, other strategies
originating from higher management levels did result in
redundancies. These strategies, therefore, contradicted the
guarantees given by local management and the promises made by
senior management. Therefore they contributed to the lack of
trust employees had in management.
In this regard, the rationalisation of the clerical services areas
described in the last chapter is a clear example of how strategies
formulated at higher levels in the organisation affected the
amalgamation process. As discussed in Chapter 5, the district
manager attempted to use this new strategy as a way of speeding
up the rationalisation of the administration section at
Narraindera. Whether this was a wise move cam be debated.
According to the district himian resources manager, the union
and Narrandera delegates, while agreeing to discuss the

administration issue, refused to commence negotiations on the
issue until negotiations at the national level on clerical services
were resolved. Thus, a district initiative became tied up with
broader national strategies and was delayed as a result. As also
described in the last chapter, the whole amalgamation strategy
was finally overtaken or superseded in April 1991 by another
strategy: the divisional level area manager strategy.
One final factor that had an impact upon the amalgamation
strategy and consequent industrial relations activity at the
district level was the impact of industrial relations initiatives at
the national level. As discussed in Chapter 4, a significant
number of efficiency initiatives were introduced into Telecom
through the REP and award restructuring process. Many of these
had an effect upon industrial relations in the Riverina district and
upon the progress of the district amalgamation. According to the
regional human resources manager, Narrandera staff tended to be
very wary of such initiatives seeing them as real threats to the
ongoing future of their Jobs and the Narrandera office. The
regional human resources manager also argued that the
amalgamation strategy had an adverse effect on the success of
award restructuring initiatives. Every time management wanted
to bring something in, he argued, it became a battle: the
Narrandera staff always had the amalgamation in the back of
their minds. Quoting him:

The techniccd grades restructure, the lines restructure and clerical
integration were all outcomes of award restructuring principles.

They had nothing to do with the district ojrujdgojrmtion hut each
time you put in something that attacks or reduces the staff
component it is seen as aR tied in. They have a siege mentality and
I think the staff in Narrandera have difficulty in drawing a
differential between the actions.
The best example of this negative interaction between award
restructuring initiatives and the amalgamation strategy was the
interaction between amalgamation and the clerical integration
agreement. As described in Chapter 4, the clerical integration
agreement resulted in the restructuring of over fifty classifications
into one single structure containing six levels. It also involved
undertakings to redesign Jobs and work organisation.
The changes were to be worked out and implemented by Joint
working parties at the local branch or section levels. The process
involved groups of clerical employees working out the way the
new structure would be implemented and the ways in which Jobs
could be redesigned. The deliberations and decisions of the
employees were to be overseen by a management steering
committee who would discuss the proposals and endorse them
when they were satisfied appropriate efficiencies had been
achieved. From there the agreed proposals were to be sent to a
national level integration committee. This was made up of union
and management representatives who would endorse the
agreements or send them back down to the local level for further
discussions. Any disputes during the process were to be dealt

With through state integration dispute committees.
The Narrandera clerical integration exercise was drawn out and
unsuccessful. It was one of the last to take place in the country
and it compared very poorly with the Wagga Wagga exercise
which was one of the first successfully completed. The
Narrandera and Wagga Wagga integration exercises were started
at the same time but the Wagga Wagga agreement was completed
and set in place a full twelve months before Narrandera's. In this
regard, the Wagga Wagga integration agreement had a very
smooth path being quickly processed at the district level and
approved without controversy by the national integration
conmiittee. The Narrandera integration exercise, on the other
hand, while evidently processed quickly at the Narrandera district
level, was knocked back by the national corrmiittee. Drawn out
negotiations then took place between Wagga Wagga management
and clerical staff at the Narrandera office. These discussions did
not initially lead to an agreement and the issue was referred to
the state integration disputes committee. Negotiations at this level
led to a stalemate and it was handed back to district level where
an agreement was finally endorsed by the district manager (the
new permeant manager).
Interviews with managers and employees at Narrandera and
Wagga Wagga revealed that there were several reasons for the
drawn out exercise at Narrandera, all predominantly as a result of
the amalgamation. First, it was argued that the process was
hindered by management changes associated with the

amalgamation. That is, soon after the integration exercise began,
the rationalisation of management positions at Narrandera took
place. This meant that managers on the Narrandera steering
committee were replaced by Wagga Wagga management. This
slowed the whole process down as new priorities and
considerations were introduced by new committee members.
Further, the problems were exacerbated by the changes in the
District Manager position. The two replacement managers had to
familiarise themselves with the developments and each
introduced their ideas into the process.
Second, because the amalgamation issue had been around for a
considerable period of time, it had a negative effect on the
attitudes and conviction of Narrandera management to the
integration process. According to Wagga Wagga management and
clerical staff at Narrandera, Narrandera management did not
really help the process by critically examining the efficiencies
worked out by the staff: their attentions were focussed elsewhere.
This, it was implied, was a major reason why the initial
agreement was rejected by the national integration committee.
Third, according to the Narrandera clerical staff, the process was
slowed down by Wagga Wagga management who in their view
kept coming back with new changes. Quoting the union delegate
at Narrandera:
We got mucked around by Wagga Wagga so much. They would
come over and say "well if you reword this job and transfer some of

these duties over to this position then it will be alright'. We would
do as they say and then send it over there again and that was
alright but then they would want something else to be changed.
This sort of caper went on for over a year,
Wagga Wagga management argued, on the other hand, that they
had to keep requesting changes because the Narrandera staff
were not coming up with realistic options. According to the
managers, Narrandera staff were more concerned with
strengthening their position against the amalgamation than with
achieving efficiencies.
The amalgamation strategy clearly affected the integration
exercise. In addition, interviews revealed that the problems with
integration in turn had a negative affect on the amalgamation
strategy. Management at Wagga Wagga argued that the
integration process added a real complication to their attempts to
implement an amalgamated district structure. The district himian
resources manager argued, for example, that under the
integration package a certain nimiber of positions within the
Narrandera office were agreed to. However, the amalgamation of
districts called for a reduction in the number of positions. Wagga
Wagga management's attempts to achieve these reductions were
seen by the Narrandera staff as a breach of the integration
agreement and, thus, were resisted.
In addition, the drawn out nature of the integration process was
interpreted by the Narrandera staff as evidence that management

wanted to close the Narrandera office down and this hardened
their attitudes to amalgamation. On the other hand, when the
integration package was finally approved by the district manager,
Narrandera staff interpreted it as further evidence of
management's intention to close the Narrandera office:

One of the impressions that I had coming back from the state
committee was that there was a hidden agenda^ We heard
rumours. The only reason we got tt approved was because they
wanted to close the Narrandera Office, We got the impression that
it got to the stage where management was saying, "look it doesn't
matter what they present. Just pass it through because everything
is going to change anyway. It wont matter a damn".
As described earlier, the Narrandera staff came to distrust any
management action and, thus, treated any initiative suspiciously.
Industrial relations suffered as a consequence and any changes
proposed for the office were resisted.
Investigating the implementation of the amalgamation strategy, as
the above demonstrates, obviously helps to shed light on the
events at Narrandera. Implementation was impeded significantly
by a range of factors. In fact, to an extent, the whole strategy was
left incomplete because of the influence of such factors. Further,
it is clear that the strategy plus the other factors described above
helped to generate the industrial relations problems at the
Narrandera office.

In addition, the events help to shed further light on the concept of
'managerial strategy'.
In Chapter 2 it was stated that some treatments of managerial
strategy within the literature tend to collapse strategy intentions
and outcomes. That is, it is automatically assumed that a
strategy once formulated will be successful or, alternatively, that
all outcomes are intended and planned by management. It was
also pointed out in Chapter 2 that this assimiption has been
heavily criticised in more recent literature. The events at
Narrandera support firmly the argument that an improblematic
link between final implementation and management intentions
cannot be assimied. Regional management intended that the
amalgamation strategy be implemented quickly; yet this did not
occur. The strategy created real industrial relations problems and
the amalgamation was eventually superseded by events; these
outcomes were not planned for. Management strategies are not
somehow invincible or irrepressible forces. They are plans of
action that like so many human endeavours can become unstuck.
The Narrandera experience suggests that the implementation of
managerial strategies can be impeded by a potentially large
variety of factors. These factors may be derived firom influences
outside the organisation, such as local social and economic
conditions or, as with case of Narrandera, decisions of outside
bodies such as industrial relations tribunals. They may also be
generated firom within the organisation. The Narrandera
experience suggests that a given strategy may be adversely

affected by other strategies within an organisation, some of which
may have originated from the same management group or,
alternatively, from levels higher or lower in the organisation. In
this respect, it cannot be assumed that organisations are some
sort of consensual whole
There are clear fractures between
different groups of people within a given organisation. At Telecom
there were clearly differences between the goals and attitudes of
different levels of management and between management and
clerical employees. These differences, quite obviously, can impede
and perhaps halt the progress of a given managerial strategy. It
cannot be assumed that the strategies developed by one group of
managers will be automatically accepted by the people it affects.
Regardless of whether they are managers or award covered
employees, they may resist and this resistance may be very
effective.
It is also clear from the Narrandera experience that factors
influencing the implementation of a given strategy are not isolated
from each other. They interact and in doing so may compoimd
problems. Thus, in the Narrandera case the pressure exerted by
the local council had a direct influence on the implementation of
the strategy. In addition, the commimity response had an indirect
effect through the local pressure put upon Narrandera employees,
which increased their willingness to resist^S. Further, the various
influences on a given strategy are not unaffected by the strategy
itself. Clearly they are not exogenous determinants. The
^ The umtarist perspective of industrialrelationsis clearly not supported by the Narrandera experience. Poor
communications may have been a contributing factor but clearly there were fundamental conflicts of interest between
different levels of management and the Narrandera clerical employees.
It is likely that the employees reactions also had an affect on the community. If all the Narrandera employees
embraced the amalgamation the communitiesresponsewould have been different

amalgamation strategy was affected by award restructuring
initiatives but the strategy itself had real impacts on the success
of award restructuring as well.
Finally, it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that some writers portray
the problematic link between strategy intention and
implementation as cause to Jettison the concept of 'managerial
strategy*. However, while the Narrandera experience indicates
that the implementation process is exceedingly complex, it has
clearly shown that a strategy did exist and attempts were made to
implement it. As Batstone, et al. (1984) claim, the solution to the
difficulty of pinning a strategy down is not to reject the concept
but to engage in detailed empirical research.
POLITICAL CONTINGENCY

As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the concept of
'managerial strategy' also highlights the importance of broad
contextual factors that constrain the formulation and
implementation processes. These broad constraints it was argued
mean that managers don't have complete free choice when
deciding what sort of strategy to adopt.
In Chapter 2 it was argued that in private sector organisations
the major constraints are associated with the imperatives of
capitalism. For example, the necessity to compete and make an
adequate return on capital investment. In public sector

organisations it was argued the direction of strategy is
predominantly shaped by the policies and agenda of governments.
Batstone et al.(1984) argue that while the character of this
'political contingency' may vaiy, it is becoming increasingly
concerned with the pursuit of commercialism.
Investigating the character of the political contingency operating
at Telecom helps to explain further the Narrandera experience
and the Narrandera experience helps to shed light on the notion
of political contingency in considerations of managerial strategy.
As described in Chapter 3, the character of the political
contingency affecting Telecom is clearly concerned with
commercialism and the opening up of the telecommunications
market to competition. All the Labor Government's initiatives: the
GBE guidelines; the 1988 May Economic Statement; the
establishment of a private sector competitor; and the loss of the
first phone monopoly, have been concerned with putting Telecom
on a more commercial footing.
It is equally clear that the Government's drive for efficiency has
had a considerable effect on the broad strategic approach adopted
by Telecom management. As discussed in Chapter 4, the broad
character of industrial relations and the specifics of many
agreements were influenced by Telecom management's desire to
become more efficient. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 5 the
decision to divisionalise was driven by senior management's
desire to meet the challenges of deregulation by becoming more

efficient. In this respect, the importance of the Government's
imperative was summed up succinctly by one manager who said
in response to a question about the role of the Government:
It is huge, Wee Telecom would not go out and bring in a competitor.

In this light, it is obvious that the amalgamation strategy was
formulated by regional and district management as another
means of meeting the political contingency imposed by the Labor
Government. This was verified in interviews with all levels of
management. They all stated that in order to compete Telecom
had to become far more ef&cient in all aspects of its operations.
Because of this, the Country Division and all country branches
had to begin paying for themselves. The rationalisation of
management positions and overheads, it was consistently argued,
was fundamental to this goal.
As discussed in Chapter 2, much of the overseas literature
suggests that the drive for efficiency by governments has been
associated with an increase in industrial disputation and the
adoption of a far more aggressive approach to industrial relations
on the part of management. According to Batstone et al. (1984)
however, there is no necessary link between commercialism and
aggressive industrial relations strategies. Rather, the aggression
was another contingency imposed on public sector organisations
by governments. This argument is supported by the push for
commercialism at Telecom. As discussed in Chapter 4, the

management strategies adopted by Telecom in recent years have
been underpinned by a more conciliatory approach than
previously existed. Commercialism has not been aggressively
pursued rather a consensus based approach has generally been
adopted.
In this respect, as discussed in Chapter 3 the Labor
Government's consensual attitude towards the union movement
and industrial relations has undoubtedly been another important
contingency. This idea was verified in a number of interviews with
managers and union delegates who argued that the changes
occurring in Telecom were to an extent only possible because a
Labor Government was in power. Quoting one manager:

The Govemment has had a huge impact, because I can tell you that
industriaRy the Liberals would never have been able to do it. If the
Liberals had tried to do a quarter of the thirds that the Labor
Govemment has done, Telecom would have been on strike. There
would have been no way that a competitor would have got in. We
Just wouldn't have connected him, itJust wouldn't have happened.
However, the industrial relations consequences of the Narrandera
amalgamation strategy suggest that the consensus approach
adopted by the Labor Govemment was not a contingency that
eliminated totally other attitudes and styles. The Narrandera
experience was, despite broader trends, one of conflictual
industrial relations and an aggressive style on the part of Wagga
Wagga management.

In fact, it can be argued that at Naixandera the Government's
deregulation agenda was a major factor in the disputes. It clearly
meant that management was unable to consider seriously issues
other than efficiency, such as town viability or employee
hardship. Further, interviews of clerical staff suggest that at least
at Narrandera, while the general push for efficiency was seen as
Justified, people were openly hostile to deregulation. As one
Narrandera clerk put it:
With this deregulation anyway, who is the person up there saying
that the way that private companies are run is the best way. I
mean a Jot of private companies get in a mess and go broke. What
is to say that their way of doing it is better than Telecom when it
was semi-govemmsnt.
From the above it can be concluded that a given government's
policy stance and initiatives must be an important consideration
in any study of managerial strategy in the public sector. However,
it can also be concluded that it should not be assumed that
political contingencies are an irrepressible determinant upon the
character and dynamics of a given managerial strategy. They are
an important influence upon the formulation and implementation
of managerial strategies but they do not totally prescribe
managers decisions and actions.
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It is clear that an examination of the events at Narrandera
through the prism of 'managerial strategy' does allow the
development of useful explanations. Additionally, by using the
concept of 'managerial strategy' to explain the Narrandera
experience it has also been possible to develop insights into the
concept itself.
The theoretical and conceptual questions discussed in Chapter 2
raised a number of questions that can only be answered through
empirical research. Clearly a case study of one organisation
cannot be used to make massive generalisation about managerial
strategy and industrial relations. However, the Narrandera case
does provide insights into theory which can be tested for
applicability in other studies.
As stated earlier, the Narrandera experience suggests that the
concept of managerial strategies can imply intentionality,
coherence and rationality. The Narrandera experience has
highlighted the importance of the strategy formulation stage as a
vital source of explanations for industrial relations activity and for
the progress of a strategy itself. In addition, the events at
Narrandera provide evidence that, at least at the regional level,
industrial relations can be an important consideration in strategy
formulation. In this regard, the regional human resources
manager stated that the formulation of most managerial

strategies in Telecom involved a consideration of industrial
relations.

The Narrandera experience also backs up the claim that the
implementation of a given strategy is far from simple. Intention
does not equal outcome: a host of factors can and will interfere.
In this respect, it is also clear that managerial strategies and the
factors which influence them cannot be siommed up by a
simplistic input-output model.

The factors that act upon a

strategy are not exogenous variables: they affect the strategy and
are in turn affected themselves. The relationship between a given
managerial strategy and the factors that influence it are
interactive as is the relationship between the factors themselves.

The Narrandera experience strongly supports the contention that
management should not be treated as a homogeneous group.
Much emphasis in industrial relations literature and commentary
focuses on the schisms that may exist between workers along
union and trade lines. But it is equally important to focus on
divisions in management. Different managers and different
groups of managers may have conflicting attitudes, objectives and
ways of doing things. Organisations, therefore, are not pluralist
just because the goals of management and workers may conflict,
but also because they are made up of a variety of competing
groups. In this sense, it clear that organisations are political
arenas not unitarist teams.

The schisms which exist between different groups of managers
have an obvious effect on the concept of 'managerial strategy'.
Formulation processes may be complicated and undermined by
the involvement of different management groups whose
approaches and objectives differ. Implementation of a particular
strategy may be frustrated or stopped by the actions of a
particular group. Further, the strategy may be superseded or
adversely affected by other managerial strategies formulated by
other management groups within the organisation. Because of
this, it is likely the managerial strategies themselves may serve
the political purposes of one group of managers with relation to
the activities of other management groups. In industrial relations
terms managerial strategies cannot be seen as simply aimed at
influencing the activities of non-managerial employees or trade
unions. Studies of managerial strategy must be careful to tease
out the managerial allegiances that exist and which group's
interests a particular managerial strategy serves and which
managers does it adversely affect.
Finally, all the complications revealed by the Narrandera
amalgamation do not mean that 'managerial strategy' is a concept
that cannot be operationalised or studied. Case study research
allows the complications to be investigated and the progress of a
strategy to be followed. Strategies may be adjusted impeded or
made redundant in the course of being implemented, but this
does not mean they do not exist.

The efficacy of any particular theoretical approach must to a large
extent be judged in terms of how well it enables activity to
explained. In this respect, the analysis in this chapter has shown
that the concept does allow events to be explained.
From the perspective of a 'managerial strategy' approach it is
clear that no single cause led to the industrial relation problems
and the delays and ultimate failure of the amalgamation strategy.
Rather, a combination of factors at the strategy formulation and
implementation stages impeded progress. In this respect,
however, it would appear that the dominant reasons were related
to the decisions and actions of Telecom management and the
reactions of Narrandera staff.
One of the fundamental purposes of the 'managerial strategy'
concept was to provide for the notion of choice in labour process
and orthodox industrial relations theories. That is, allowing
managers to make choices it was argued may help to explain
diversity in industrial relations. Using the concept of 'managerial
strategy' to explain events at Narrandera did highlight this aspect.
It is clear that regional management within Telecom chose
amalgamation as one way of meeting the pressure for increased
efficiency. Amalgamation was not forced upon them by some sort
of external determinant. Corporate and divisional level pressure
and a political contingency did exist which constrained them to
formulate strategies aimed at increasing efficiency and
productivity. Obviously, it would have been very difficult for them

to develop strategies aimed at equity or employment generation
rather than cost cutting. Nevertheless, it was regional
management's choice to pursue change through amalgamation
and to devolve responsibility for some details of formulation and
implementation to Wagga Wagga management. It is obvious that
this choice had profound effects on industrial relations and the
success of amalgamation itself. Further, it was Wagga Wagga
management who chose, when implementing the strategy, to
adopt an aggressive style that was clearly not aimed at healing
the wounds; they, in fact, exacerbated the problems. Their Job
was obviously hampered by decisions and strategies developed by
management at other levels in the organisation. In particular,
their promises to staff were continually undermined by new
initiatives and agendas developed at higher levels in the
organisation. But it does appear that they felt they had won a big
victory in securing the district head of&ce at Wagga Wagga and
were a little less than humble. In addition, Wagga Wagga
management chose to introduce the amalgamation slowly. Their
reason for doing this was related to a belief that such an
approach would facilitate implementation. This choice clearly
back j&red because it conflicted with decisions and choices made
at the regional level. Regional level management chose an
amalgamation strategy on the assumption that it would be
implemented quickly; district management imdermined this by
formulating a different time scale.
If regional and district management had formulated a different
approach, different outcomes might have resulted. A strategy

could have been chosen that did not Involve amalgamation or that
did not lead to the rationalisation of all Narrandera management
positions and the transfer of administration functions. In other
words, if management had chosen not to wind down the
Narrandera office, events would have developed in a very different
way.
Thus, it is clear that management strategy does allow for choice
and that the notion of choice does allow dynamic explanations of
activity. Attempts at explaining the events at Narrandera which
do not allow a conscious role for management would be
inadequate. They would miss the fact that it was the decisions
and choices of individual managers, not the influence of
irresistible forces, which explains the failure of the amalgamation
strategy and the industrial relations activity.
It is also clear, however, from the events described in this and
earlier chapters that the actions of Narrandera staff provide
another very important explanation of events.
The Narrandera clerical staff saw all aspects of the amalgamation,
from the rationalisation of management positions to the transfer
of administration functions, as part of an overall threat to their
Jobs and to their lifestyle in Narrandera. As a result, they were
unwilling to accept it and strongly resisted as a result.
Many other factors had their dominant effect upon the
amalgamation strategy through the reactions of the Narrandera

Staff. Thus, the strategy of delay chosen by Wagga Wagga
management was agonising for the staff in Narrandera, leaving
them uncertain and fmstrated. The perceived arrogance of Wagga
Wagga management angered them and made them feel bitter.
Other managerial strategies led them to distrust local
management and reinforced their belief that Telecom
management was intent on closing the Narrandera office down.
And all these feelings were reinforced by a community that could
not afford to lose any more Jobs.
The Narrandera staff reacted with industrial disputation and
hostility, which clearly had a negative impact on the
amalgamation process. Therefore it can be argued that to a large
extent the amalgamation strategy founded because of the impact
it had upon industrial relations in the Narrandera office. As
stated earlier, industrial relations in Telecom generally had been
far more consensual in the last ten years. In addition, in rural
areas such as Narrandera, staff had traditionally been
industrially conservative and non-militant. The way the
Narrandera staff reacted to the amalgamation strategy created an
exception to this general development.
Given the above it is clear that an explanation of events from a
'managerial strategy' perspective allows an imderstanding to be
developed which includes the ways a variety of groups may
influence a given strategy's progression. However, the role that
other groups play raises an important weakness of a purely
'managerial strategy' approach to explaining events. A

concentration solely on managerial strategy inevitably underplays
the strategies that other groups may have formulated and acted
upon. For example, in many respects staff at Narrandera have
been portrayed as simply reacting in a spontaneous way to
management's actions rather than as proactively developing a
strategic response. An examination of activities from the
perspective of strategies developed by employees may have
provided further insights into the choices and decisions they
made.
Further, the strategic decisions and choices of the Public Service
Union, which the Narrandera employees belong to, are not
specifically the subject of a 'managerial strategy' perspective.
Union officials restricted their role to discussions at the regional
level. Perhaps as a consequence, the employees at Narrandera felt
let down by their union who they saw as siding with
management. An investigation of events at Narrandera from a
union strategy perspective may have revealed why the union did
not become involved at the local level (as may a more in depth
study of the Narrandera employee's strategies).
In this regard, the union's non-involvement may have been
related to higher level union strategies. As suggested by AIRC
decisions, the PSU's policy was to accept the inevitability of
deregulation and the push for commercialisation. Further, while
accepting the inevitability of staff rationalisations, the PSU did
develop strategies to ameliorate as far as possible the detrimental
effect of the deregulation process (for example securing agreement

from management for the establishment of working parties and
voluntary rather than compulsory redundancies ). In developing
these

strategies,

however, perhaps

the union

decided

to

concentrate all its resources on the establishment of in-principle
agreements with management at the regional, divisional and
corporate levels rather than dealing with specific developments in
particular offices such as Narrandera.

In addition to imderplaying staff and union strategies, a focus on
managerial strategies can also be argued to have meant that the
strategies of the Narrandera community were underplayed. As
with the employees, the community was portrayed

as being

simply reactive. This may not have been the case, other
perspectives on the events may have emerged if the actions of
these groups were investigated from something other than a
purely 'managerial strategy' perspective.

Clearly an examination of events from these other perspectives is
beyond the objectives of this thesis. But the above serves to
highlight that, while the concept of 'managerial strategy' does
allow the formulation of dynamic explanations of activity, it is not
a total answer.

A concentration on management strategy does give management
groups an active role role. As such, it highlights the fact that the
character and nature of industrial relations activity is not solely
determined by factors outside the control of managers; that
managers

actually play an important part in influencing

industrial relations activity. The approach also avoids extreme
voluntarism by portraying manager's choices and strategies as
constrained by contextual factors. However, in highlighting the
role of management, the approach plays down the fact that the
strategies of other groups may also shape activity. In this respect,
a 'managerial strategy' perspective tends to portray the actions of
groups other than management as simply reactive and, therefore,
dependent on management's choices and decisions.
This is an unappealing assumption. It is at least intuitively
obvious that management does not have a monopoly on decision
making and strategy formation. If it is excessively determinist to
assume that management do not influence activity and are slaves
to external forces, then an assumption that other groups of
people cannot make strategic choices is also excessively
determinist. In other words, the introduction of the notion of
choice into industrial relations explanations should not be
confined to one group. The concept of 'managerial strategy' helps
to redress the problems of labour process and orthodox theory,
but so would the concept of strategy applied to other groups as
well.
In this respect, perhaps an ideal, if exhaustive, approach to
explaining activity is to investigate and describe the strategic
choices made by all groups involved in a given set of events. Such
an approach would establish the extent to which different groups
were able to influence activity through their strategic decisions. It
would also allow the identification of constraints that act upon

the choices of one or more of the groups. As a result, the
approach may reveal that certain groups at particular periods of
time have a greater or lesser ability to influence events depending
on their power and situation. It may also reveal that certain
groups have a long term advantage based on their location in the
production process or their control over the means of production.
Further, other groups may be shown to have little or no ability to
influence events through strategic choices because of their
location or lack of control. Overall, therefore, the approach would
allow an extremely comprehensive picture to be built up that
would be even more effective as an explanation of industrial
relations diversity than a concentration on managerial strategyalone.

CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The main concern in this thesis has been with the concept of
'managerial strategy' and its usefulness as an explanation of
industrial relations activity in the Riverina Region of Telecom
Australia. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the concept can
be successfully used to shed light on industrial relations. It allows
explanations to be developed that draw on the choices and
actions of managers and managerial groups. As a result, it
introduces a dynamic element into explanations of industrial
relations activity.
Based on the experience at Narrandera, it can be argued that the
concept of 'managerial strategy' provides a corrective to the static
orientation of orthodox industrial relations theory and the one
directional nature of some labour process approaches.
With regard to the orthodox approaches, 'managerial strategy'
focuses attention on the actions and decisions of managers, not
Just the institutions of industrial relations. The managers at
Telecom were constrained by the institutions that they had to
work with and within as well as by external forces such as the
Australian and world economy. However, their actions were not
completely determined: they made choices that had a profound
impact on events. The adoption of a purely orthodox approach
concentrating on the relationships between institutions and the

environmental factors would have overlooked the role played by
managerial action. It is imlikely that a concentration

on

institutions would have adequately addressed the role played by
individual Telecom managers at Wagga Wagga. An investigation of
events using an orthodox approach would have obscured the
impact that competition between different managerial groups
played in the failure of the amalgamation strategy. That is, the
competing goals and conflicting actions and decisions of regional
and district management groups.

It was the strategies of managers in Telecom that to a significant
extent explains the developments,

changes and

industrial

relations activity which took place in Narrandera. Therefore any
approach that enables a focus on these strategies to be
incorporated in orthodox explanations is an improvement. The
concept of 'managerial strategy' clearly results in a very strong
concentration upon management activity and choice. Its adoption
or integration into orthodox explanations, therefore, has the
capacity to supply a needed dynamism to the overly static
institutional focus.

This thesis has not been specifically concerned with the structure
or dynamics of the labour process at Telecom Narrandera.
Nevertheless, it shows that activity does not take place rigidly in
accordance with a set of immutable laws. Managerial strategies
and the character of industrial relations activity cannot be simply
assimied to fit some kind of inevitable pattern. Telecom
managment were and are severely constrained by the capitalist

context within which they operate. The deregulation of the
telecommunications industry and the opening up of Telecom to
competition meant that management had to seek ways of
rationalising operations in order to survive. In labour process
terms, they had to devise means of creating surplus value in an
increasingly difficult context. Yet they obviously had a significant
amount of freedom when it came to devising and implementing
strategies to meet this challenge. They did not follow a clear and
predictable path that was somehow determined by the logic of the
economic system. As stated before, Telecom regional management
chose to pursue a broad amalgamation strategy and Wagga
Wagga district management chose to operationalise the strategy
in a particular way. They could have chosen to cut costs or
rationalise operations in other ways. An amalgamation strategy
was not an inevitable development dictated by immutable
economic forces: Narrandera office's decline was not an automatic
result of impersonal forces.
Approaches such as Braverman's version of labour process theory
do not adequately allow for this unpredictability in the strategies
and actions of management. It is, therefore, not surprising that
they have faüed to predict or adequately explain the diversity that
has developed in the organisation of work in modem capitalist
societies. It is even less surprising when it is realised that
management is not homogeneous but a collection of groups who,
while perhaps forming a loose alliance, may, nevertheless, hold
conflicting goals and engage in contradictory activities.

This does not mean that labour process approaches are
irreversibly flawed. As with the orthodox approach, the inclusion
of the concept of 'managerial strategy' into labour process theory
can be used to account for a large amount of diversity. An
investigation of managerial strategy focuses attention on the
action and choices made by managers and highlights instances
where different managerial groups may engage in conflictual
behaviour. These choices, actions and conflicts can be used to
provide an important explanation of how different labour
processes may develop in modem economies. Management as a
whole may face very strong pressures to continually devise new
ways of creating surplus value, but different management groups
may choose and seek to implement very different strategies in an
attempt to meet this pressure. These different strategies are likely
to have different results; they may conflict with each other and
they may or may not be successfully implemented as intended.
The consequence of this is that the structure and character of the
capitalist labour process in different organisations must vary. It
must, as a result, be somewhat unpredictable. But despite this, it
can be understood and an examination of managerial strategies
can help in this respect.
The usefulness of the orthodox and labour process approaches is
improved substantially by the inclusion of the concept of
'managerial strategy' because, as stated before, the concept
provides for choice. The theories become less determinist and,
therefore, more powerful. Further, because 'managerial strategy',
as defined in this thesis, is not portrayed as totally unrestrained.

the theories do not become excessively voluntarist. Manager's
choices are constrained by a variety of social, economic and
political factors; they cannot simply choose to do whatever they
like. Nevertheless, it should be clear that both approaches could
be improved further by, in addition to investigating the strategies
of managers, concentrating on the choices and strategies of other
groups in industrial relations. Thus, the strategies and choices of
employees, their unions and even local community groups, could
be incorporated in orthodox theory as another source of change
and in labour process approaches as another explanation of
diversity. The inclusion of strategies developed by other groups
would highlight further the important role played by 'choice' in
structuring industrial relations activity. Management may have
more economic power in many circumstances and, thus, may be
more able to implement its choices and strategies but other
groups are not powerless. As demonstrated in this thesis, they
can influence activity by their actions. A consideration of their
strategies must be incorporated into the orthodox and labour
process approaches if the intention is to increase the explanatory
power of these perspectives.
While an examination of the usefulness of the concept of
'managerial strategy' has been the main concern of this thesis,
the events at Telecom Narrandera have raised a number of other
issues that could be constructively investigated further.

It was argued in chapters 3 and 4 that the character of the
industrial relations climate within Telecom was far more
consensual in the mid 1980s than it had been in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. This argimient was based on an examination of
decisions brought down by the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission and an analysis of interviews of managers, workers
and union delegates in Burwood, Wollongong and Wagga Wagga.
The Commission decisions revealed that senior management and
the major unions had successfully negotiated a significant
nimiber of changes that would contribute positively to the
organisation's efficiency and the working life of employees. The
great majority of people interviewed argued that industrial
relations within the organisation had improved considerably. It
was claimed by nearly all interviewees that the reason for this
improvement was related in large measure to a change in the
strategy of management toward industrial relations. In the late
1970s and early 1980s management had developed strategies
underpinned by centralised decision making and an autocratic
management style. In the mid 1980s management strategies
changed. In accord with the Labor Government's industrial
relations orientation and in line with emerging participative
management approaches, such as Total Quality Management,
strategies based on a decentralisation of decision making power
and a willingness to consult with employees and unions emerged.
In this context, the experience at Narrandera is an exception:
industrial relations were not becoming more consensual, rather
the relationship between managers and employers was

deteriorating.
As described earlier, regional management decided to pass on the
responsibility for detailed formulation and implementation of the
amalgamation strategy to Wagga Wagga management. Wagga
Wagga management was given the discretion to determine what
implications the amalgamation would have upon staf&ng and how
best to put the strategy into place. Regional management's
decision to devolve responsibility was in accord with the
organisation wide emphasis upon decentralising decision making,
but rather than increase managerial effectiveness it, clearly,
created major industrial relations problems. The Narrandera
experience, therefore, raises questions about the efficacy of
decentralised decision making. Theory may suggest that
decentralisation means more effective decision making but clearly
this cannot be assumed.
Further, unlike the national trend, Wagga Wagga management's
strategies were not consultative. They adopted an aggressive
approach which was a major cause of disputation. In this respect,
it can be claimed that the events at Narrandera help to verify a
link between more consultative management strategies and
improved industrial relations. Management throughout the
organisation adopted more open strategies and industrial
relations within the organisation improved. But with the
Narrandera amalgamation, Wagga Wagga management chose to
become aggressive and industrial relations worsened.

If Wagga Wagga management had adopted a less aggressive
stance, then the Narrandera staff may not have reacted so
strongly. However, other factors played an important role.
Amongst these factors was the fact that the Narrandera staff saw
the amalgamation as a threat to their jobs and the local
community saw it as a threat to their town. It is questionable
whether, given this circumstance, a more consultative approach
on the part of Wagga Wagga management would have completely
averted industrial action.
This raises questions about the ability of consultative
management strategies in general to substantially improve
industrial relations and aid the implementation of change in
organisations when Jobs are at risk.
The Labor Government's approach to micro-economic reform is
underpinned by the belief that the changes required in the
Australian economy can be best introduced via consultation
between management, unions and employees (Willis 1988). This
belief also underpins new managerial approaches such as Total
Quality Management. In this respect, it does appear that Telecom
management in consultation with unions were able to introduce
significant changes via the REP and SEP processes without
widespread industrial conflict.
However, the strong reaction by Narrandera staff to what they
saw as a threat to their Jobs raises questions about how far
consultation can really go. Where managerial strategies threaten

worker's employment, perhaps no amount of consultation can
avoid some degree of industrial disputation.
This assertion is backed up by developments in Telecom since
those described in this thesis. In the last year it appears that
industrial relations in the organisation has worsened. Several
major disputes have occurred that stem from staff cut
announcements and disputes over the nimiber of employees to be
retrenched and the redundancy packages ofiFered. For example, in
March 1992 Telecom announced plans to close all but nine
customer services offices throughout Australia. This immediately
led to strike action and eventually an agreement by management
to reduce the number of ofi&ces to be closed. Despite this
agreement, in June 1992, Telecom re-announced its intention to
close the original nimiber of offices and indicated that
approximately 4000 Jobs would be shed. This led to the
imposition of nation-wide bans and eventually an order from the
Industrial Relations Commission which required Telecom to
comply with the March 1992 agreement (The Narrandera Argus,
2/4/92, 10/6/92 & 12/6/92).
The implication that may be drawn from this is that consultation
may not be the universal panacea which some of its more zealous
advocates seem to believe. This issue needs further examination,
but it does appear that if managers and governments, equate
increases in efficiency with reductions in employment then they
should not be surprised that consultation will fail to deliver
change without conffict.

The disputation at Narrandera also throws into question the
impression that many people have about industrial relations in
rural communities. In Chapter 4 it was revealed that there was a
strong perception amongst Telecom employees that industrial
relations in rural communities was more consensual than in
urban areas. The events at Narrandera clearly indicate that this is
not necessarily the case. As described in Chapter 5 and 6,
Narrandera employees were veiy outspoken and hostile. They
continually criticised their own imion for not being militant
enough and often gave the impression that imion leaders were on
the side of the bosses.
Nevertheless, the Narrandera experience does not necessarily
prove the claim wrong. Perhaps in less extreme times industrial
relations in Narrandera is less problematic than in places such as
WoUongong. In addition, perhaps industrial relations in rural
areas generally is more consensual than that which exits in
industrialised and urban centres. This is an issue that requires
far more empirical research.
The reasons put forward for the difference between rural and
urban industrial relations included the claim that people in rural
commimities tend to be trapped in a fairly weak labour market;
that the quality of life in rural commimities is far better than that
which exists in the city; and that rural commimities are smaller
and far more close knit than urban communities. These
arguments may be correct; once again further research needs to
be undertaken. But to an extent it can be argued that, given what

happened in Narrandera, they are factors that may actually lead
to an Increase in the potential for disputation.
The employees at Narrandera are trapped in a veiy weak labour
market. Their prospects for employment within the town are
extremely limited and may never improve. As stated in Chapter
5, Narrandera is in decline: its largest remaining employers are
government organisations and these are progressively pulling out.
If people lose their Jobs in Narrandera, most are forced to seek
employment in a larger centres such as Wagga Wagga.
This bleak situation did not lead to industrial passivity on the
part of the people at Telecom Narrandera. On the contrary, it
clearly spurred them to action. They did not go to groimd in the
hope that compliant behaviour would save their Jobs. Rather, the
threat they perceived to their livelihood and to their quality of life
appeared to make them more aggressive. Their hope seemed to be
that through industrial action and other means they would
somehow gain a stay of execution if not a complete reversal of
management's strategy.
In addition, it was apparent that the size of Narrandera rather
than leading to employees avoiding disputation because of a fear
of social rebuke also contributed to their militancy. In large
commimities the threat to the relatively small nimiber of jobs
involved would probably cause only a minor reaction from local
community groups but in a place the size of Narrandera any loss
of Jobs is a major blow. As described, the local Narrandera

community got behind the employees. The local council and the
editor of the Narrandera Argus were particularly vocal because of
the threat they saw to the viability of the Narrandera township. As
a result, rather than being made passive by social pressure, the
militancy of Telecom's Narrandera employees was supported by
the town. Indeed, to an extent it appears that some employees
were put under social pressure to react rather than accept the
changes.
The insight that may be gained from this is that as with the
efficacy of consultative approaches the industrial passivity of
people working in rural commimities does not apply to situations
where employment is threatened. On the contrary, reductions in
employment opportunities reveal to rural communities that
compliance and conservative attitudes are not necessarily
rewarded.
The fact that the threat to employment brought a strong reaction
from both staff and the community, focuses attention on a far
broader issue; that of what can be called the 'industrial relations
of redundancy'. In this respect, the Narrandera dispute clearly
indicates that the industrial relations of redundancy is far more
difficult for management to deal with than what are, arguably,
more common industrial relations problems, such as disputes
over pay and allowances. That is, disputes over job losses are of
a different order to disputes that relate to remimeration: they
cannot be easily resolved amicably after an appropriate period of
negotiation.

Retrenchments have negative effects on the local economy of any
community. As a result, it is perhaps inevitable that disputes over
redimdancies are more likely to draw the attention of community
groups. As described earlier, this is particularly the case in rural
communities where the loss of even Just a few Jobs is next to
impossible to absorb. Management will, therefore, not only have
to deal with employees, imions and tribunals, but they are also
likely to have to deal with groups such as local councils and
commimily action committees.

Further, when the issue is mass Job losses, management is likely
to face a very resolute workforce that will be far less willing to
accept deals struck around the bargaining table. In addition, as
Just pointed out, while managerial approaches that stress
employee consultation and involvement may work weU with
changes that do not mean Job losses, when people's employment
is threatened consultation and involvement may be of little use.
In other words, the threat of retrenchment, particularly in times
of economic recession, will probably always draw a negative
response from people who are effected by it.

The reasons for this are relatively obvious. When discussing
retrenchment, unions and management are not Just discussing
shares of a pie, they are discussing whether or not some people
will miss out all together. Further, involving employees in
decisions about the way work is done or how employees are paid
is clearly very different to involving them in a decision to
eliminate their own Jobs. Unemployment is a very dire situation to

find oneself in, especially in small rural communities where other
employment opportunities are shrinking and where the costs of
selling up and moving can be prohibitive^^. Most people facing
this situation can be expected to fight, regardless of their
propensity to take action in the past.

In this respect, it could be argued that the whole issue of
retrenchment is a problematic one for advocates of management
approaches, such as TQM, that appear to be premised on the
notion that employers and employees have common goals. That if
they Just work together both groups will be better off in the long
run^S.

Management's continual reliance on retrenchment,

particularly at present, must be seen as a question mark over
these unitarist assumptions. The interests of management and
employees

may be

similar

in

some

circumstances.

But

retrenchments are a situation where there is little question that
real differences exist between the interests of employers and
employees.

The threat to Narrandera created by management's amalgamation
strategy raises one more issue that is worthy of further
investigation.

As discussed in Chapter 3, all the changes affecting Telecom at
Narrandera are a part of the Labor Government's broader public
sector reform process. Public sector reform is in turn a part of the
Hiese costs are exaceibated in communities like Narrandera where decline can have an effect upon land and housing
values, therefore, making it difficult for retrenched woricers to sell their homes and forcing them to accept sale prices that
make it difficult for them to buy into urban housing markets.
^ The growing importance of this assumption is evident in many of the new agreements strack under the enterprise
bargaining principle.

Government's

overall

micro-economic

reform

agenda.

The

fundamental objective of micro-economic reform is to improve the
international

competitiveness

of

Australian

industry

and

presumably, therefore, to help protect living standards. However,
the Narrandera experience suggests that the process may be
having consequences which have not been explicitly considered
by policy makers.

Rural communities throughout Australia are in decline. This
decline is portrayed as being the result of a continuing rural
crises and changes in farm ownership structures and technology.
It is resulting in high levels of imemployment in country towns
and, as a result, a considerable amoimt of rural poverty
(Lawrence, 1987). Yet despite this:

..state and federal governments appear to be reluctant or unable to
alter the forces

destroying famdy-farrn

agriculture and

the

economies of smaR inland towns. Facing their own fiscal problems
in times of economic recession they appear incapable of redirecting
economic activity from the large cities. In a period when city
unemployment and the closure of factories in the traditional
manufacturing areas have become political embarrassments for
governments,

regional decentralisation

initiatives have

been

afforded a low priority. (Lawrence, 1987, p35)

In fact, if developments at Narrandera are typical of developments
in other rural conmiunities, then it may be the case that the
micro-economic reform policies of the Labor Government are

actually contributing to the decline in rural communities. As
argued in the Narrandera Argus:

The decision to centralise operations is an economic one made to
improve the efficiency of the operations of enterprises such as
Telecom However, it is based on the assumption that what is good
for the company is necessarily good for the society as a whole.

Who is to bear the social disruption that happens in both the larger
urban areas and the rural towns? The people transferred are
forced into much more expensive housing markets. Further
pressure is added to the already overstretched facilities of the
capital cities and larger urban areas. On the other hand,
Narrandera and towns Uke it continue to lose services as the
population base declines.

The costs associated with this are not taken into consideration by
the firms involved and are transferred to the community as a
whole. It is not the Telecoms who pick up the costs. It is borne by
the individuals and families forced to uproot their lives and move
on. It is borne by the townsfolk of Narrandera who lose services.
(The Narrandera Argus, 7/11/91, pi).

Perhaps the Australian economy's competitive position is not only
dependent upon a restructuring of industry, but also upon a
restructuring of communities. Further, perhaps the population of
Australia needs to become even more concentrated, than it
already is, in urban areas in order to meet the needs of the urban

majority. If this is the case, then the impact of the changes upon
people either forced to move or left isolated in country towns
needs to be considered. The Government's reform processes may
be increasing efficiency but if it results in high levels of rural
unemployment and poverty then it is clearly efficiency at the cost
of equity.
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